Energy war after the 'Ankara Summit'

While leaders in Ankara were discussing security, the energy map in the Middle East was being redrawn. Although Turkey is at the very center of this new equation, it faces the risk of being left out of the game for the first time. The fact that NATO's 36th Leaders' Summit was held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, coincided with a critical period not only in terms of diplomacy but also global energy security. During the same days, the reignited war between Iran and the US and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz shook energy markets and reopened the debate on Turkey's geopolitical position.

Today, approximately one-fifth of global oil trade and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz. For this reason, the ongoing crisis has become a problem not only for the Middle East but for the global economy as well. One of the most important topics of the NATO summit was energy security, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the resilience of supply chains. The new security approach defined in recent years as "NATO 3.0" views energy pipelines, maritime trade routes, and strategic infrastructure as an inseparable part of security, beyond classical military deterrence. Precisely for this reason, the energy developments occurring in the shadow of the Ankara Summit have the potential to create far more economic impact than the summit's final declaration.

Hormuz Crisis

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted approximately one-fifth of the oil supply. Iraq was one of the countries most affected by this situation. While approximately 95 percent of Iraq's oil exports took place via Hormuz before the war, the country's oil exports by sea have declined significantly with the closure of the strait. Considering that approximately 90 percent of Iraq's state revenues depend on oil revenues, the disruption in energy exports is a development that could have not only economic but also political consequences.

It is precisely at this point, simultaneously with the Ankara Summit, that a critical development directly concerning Turkey occurred: Iraq and Syria took action to reactivate the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline, which was built in 1952 and has been idle for many years. In energy circles, this initiative is evaluated not only as a new export route but also as a strategic move that could reduce Turkey's weight in the energy corridor.

A New Route Bypassing Turkey

Reports regarding the project mention a consortium that includes US-based energy companies, international investment funds, and regional capital groups. It is stated that the process is accompanied by diplomatic contacts coordinated by the US Ambassador to Ankara, who is also the Special Envoy for Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack.

The remarkable point here is not just a new pipeline. The interest shown in the project by global energy players like Chevron shows that Washington's energy security strategy is now shaped not only by military but also by commercial and infrastructural tools. In other words, energy pipelines no longer just carry oil; they also carry geopolitical influence.

With the reactivation of the approximately 800-kilometer-long line, the goal is to transport Kirkuk oil directly to Syria's Baniyas Port on the Mediterranean coast. Although the existing infrastructure has a daily capacity of approximately 300 thousand barrels, a comprehensive renovation process is needed to reach full capacity. For this reason, Turkey's Ceyhan terminal will continue to maintain its importance in the short and medium term. However, even the formation of an alternative export corridor in the long term could affect Turkey's bargaining power.

Old Agreement Ending

The picture also has a legal and diplomatic dimension. The Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement signed between Turkey and Iraq in 1973 expires as of July 27, 2026. Behind Ankara's desire to create a different and more comprehensive legal framework in the new period lies the multi-billion dollar compensation dispute experienced in the international arbitration process in 2023.

The transition memorandum announced by Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar is important for this reason. Thanks to the temporary commercial arrangement the parties are working on, it is planned that BOTAŞ will continue to transport Iraqi oil for a certain period. Thus, it is aimed that the current energy flow will not be interrupted while the new comprehensive agreement is being prepared.

Energy Hub?

The real question is what will happen next.

Over the last twenty years, Turkey has acted with the goal of becoming not just a transit country, but a regional energy hub. TANAP, TurkStream, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, the Ceyhan terminal, and recently Black Sea natural gas have formed the fundamental building blocks of this strategy.

However, if the Kirkuk-Baniyas line is reactivated, an alternative Mediterranean outlet outside of Turkey could strengthen for the first time. This does not only mean a decrease in transit revenues; it could also lead to a recalculation of Turkey's strategic weight in energy diplomacy.

In energy geopolitics, pipelines are not just engineering projects. They are also strategic tools that determine countries' foreign policy capacity, diplomatic influence, and economic bargaining power.

What Do Markets Expect?

Turkey is a country that imports most of its energy. Therefore, any permanent rise in oil prices will create direct pressure on inflation, the current account deficit, and foreign exchange markets. While every additional price increase in Brent crude oil increases the energy import bill, it can create a new pass-through to prices via production costs.

On the other hand, NATO's beginning to see energy security as one of the fundamental elements of its new security architecture could also create new opportunities for Turkish companies operating in the fields of defense industry, energy storage, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure technologies, and energy logistics. Therefore, in the coming period, the winners will not only be those who produce energy, but also the companies that safely transport, store, and manage energy.

Conclusion

The picture that emerged after the Ankara Summit may be a harbinger of not only a new war but also a new energy order. When the Hormuz Crisis, the Kirkuk-Baniyas line, and NATO's new approach focusing on energy security are read together, the truth is this: In the coming period, countries that control energy corridors will not only earn transit revenues; they will also be the owners of regional political influence.

Today, Turkey is trying to protect not only its oil pipelines but also its geopolitical weight. The most important advantages it holds are still the strong infrastructure of Ceyhan, Black Sea gas, the advanced energy transmission network, and the unique geographical position it possesses between Europe and Asia. The real issue is how it will use these advantages within the new geopolitical equation. Because as the energy map is being redrawn, the most critical question before Turkey is now this: Will it be just a spectator of the new order, or one of the actors shaping it?