We paid 304 billion dollars, our debt rose from 144 billion to 565 billion dollars

Whatever the cost. Attracting large amounts of foreign currency to Turkey constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of the AKP government's economic policy.

Borrow from abroad at a high cost, offer high Turkish Lira interest rates to foreign investors, and let foreign currency flow into the country... Do not let the value of the dollar rise as much as inflation. Let the Turkish Lira be artificially overvalued. Naturally, the price of this has been heavy. Turkey has both lost its competitive power in the economy and transferred massive wealth from within the country to abroad. 

I examined the balance of payments data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The picture that emerges is truly remarkable…

From 2004 to the end of 2025, we made payments of 304 billion dollars to the outside world. Of this amount, 232 billion dollars went to interest and portfolio income payments, and 72 billion dollars went to direct foreign capital profit transfers. I estimate that within the 232 billion dollars of interest and portfolio payments, the interest amount was 200 billion dollars and the dividend payment amount was 32 billion dollars. We paid this much money, but our debt to the outside world did not decrease; on the contrary, we increased our external debt from 144 billion dollars at the end of 2003 to 565 billion dollars at the end of 2025. 

High-interest external debt and an artificially overvalued Turkish Lira cause significant structural distortions in the economy on one hand. On the other hand, they condemn the country to an external debt spiral and to paying more interest.  

A country will both run a current account deficit and have its currency appreciate... A development contrary to the natural flow of the economy and life. How can the Turkish Lira appreciate while we have such a large foreign trade deficit and our external debt grows every year?

Of course, by offering high interest rates on the loans and hot money you find from abroad...

The AKP government tried this method during the Ali Babacan era as well, and it broke the competitive power of industry, agriculture, and the Turkish economy in general. The difference between that period and today was that the dream of full EU membership was also being marketed, and direct foreign capital was coming to Turkey in addition to loans. But due to the Turkish Lira, which was overvalued by high interest rates, the direct foreign capital investments that came were not directed toward exports and industry, but toward companies, banks, and construction aimed at the domestic market. 

Foreign currency became abundant and cheap. But this abundance did not stem from Turkey's exports or tourism revenues. High interest payments for debts had not yet begun either. A period of fake prosperity was experienced in the economy. We strongly objected to these policies at that time, but our objections were not accepted due to the fake paradise being experienced. But the results are being felt very heavily today.  

The industrialist gave up on intermediate goods production. The industry's capacity to create value-added fell, and it turned into an assembly industry dependent on intermediate inputs. Because foreign currency was cheaper than it should have been, agricultural products started to seem expensive. Agricultural production was restricted. Turkey, which was one of the 7 self-sufficient countries in the world, became dependent on the outside for agriculture. 

External borrowing with high interest, which was frequently applied during the AKP era, has gained intensity again in the last three years of Mehmet Şimşek. The main instrument of the disinflation program is, “finding foreign currency, whatever the cost…” As a result of the foreign currency found with high interest, the Turkish Lira remains more valuable than it should be. While prices increase with the Turkish Lira, the purchasing power of not only the Turkish Lira but also the dollar falls. Products in Turkey become more expensive even in dollars. As a result, the farmer, the exporter, and the tourism professional lose their competitive power. 

During the Mehmet Şimşek era, just like in the Ali Babacan era, the game of finding foreign currency with high interest was put on stage, but this time the conditions are different... 

There are no full membership negotiations with the EU. On the contrary, Turkey has been excluded from Europe and is being treated like a Middle Eastern country. Direct foreign capital is not coming. On the contrary, factories here are going abroad. 

And more importantly, the debts taken in the past are now thoroughly inflated with their interest. Every year, we have to transfer more resources abroad from both the budget and the private sector.

RESOURCES TRANSFERRED ABROAD

The compilation I made from the Central Bank's balance of payments accounts shows that interest and portfolio income payments made to the outside world are becoming increasingly heavy.

In the 2005–2009 period, which was marked by the IMF program, global liquidity abundance, and close relations with the European Union, the annual average payment was 9.4 billion dollars.

In the 2010–2017 period, when the FED went for monetary expansion and global interest rates remained low, this amount was an annual average of 8.2 billion dollars.

In the 2018–2022 period, when currency crises, the pandemic, heterodox policies, and foreign capital outflows were experienced, the annual average payment rose to 11.1 billion dollars.

In the 2023–2025 period, when Mehmet Şimşek returned to office, the annual average interest and portfolio income payment jumped to 19.8 billion dollars.

During the Mehmet Şimşek era, gross interest payments made abroad showed significant increases every year. 

It was 14.5 billion dollars in 2023,

20.3 billion dollars in 2024,

24.7 billion dollars in 2025.

External debt interest and dividend payments approaching 25 billion dollars per year. Approximately 85 percent of the 25 billion dollars is interest... As a state, as banks, as companies, we paid 21 billion dollars in interest to the outside world in 2025. This money corresponds to 7–8 projects on the scale of the 1915 Çanakkale Bridge and connecting roads, about 100 full-fledged hospitals with 500 beds, or four large nuclear reactor investments.

The 72 billion dollars of direct investment profits within the 304 billion dollars of external payments need to be evaluated separately. A foreign investor who sets up a factory in Turkey, produces, provides employment, and takes risks will of course make a profit. A financial institution that lends money will also receive the interest on the resource it provides. The issue we are objecting to here is not the existence of interest and profit... It is borrowing with high interest whatever the cost and the question that follows immediately after: 

“Why have we been condemned to an economic model that constantly pays interest and profit to foreign capital but at the same time continues to run a current account deficit and sinks deeper into the external debt quagmire every passing day?”

We have been making these assessments for about 20 years. The same policy is being put on stage again under different names and different programs: Find external resources with high interest, artificially overvalue the Turkish Lira, create a temporary relief; then leave the growing external debt and interest burden to future years.

We thought we would remind you once again. The way out is clear... An economic model that targets a balanced budget, collects fair taxes, directs country resources to economic development without selling them off, does not borrow for current expenditures, and prioritizes planned, public-oriented development based on own resources and fair distribution...