The 'absolute nullity' ruling is a political intervention by the judiciary

The "absolute nullity" ruling issued regarding the Republican People's Party's (CHP) 38th Ordinary Convention cannot be evaluated merely as the result of an intra-party dispute. The issue at stake here is not limited to the formal validity of a congress. What is being debated is the extent to which political will formed through elections can be made subject to judicial intervention.

In a state governed by the rule of law, courts certainly exercise oversight. However, this oversight also has constitutional limits. When court rulings begin to replace the political sphere, legal certainty is harmed. Especially when political parties are involved, much more caution must be exercised. Because political parties are not ordinary private legal entities. They are essential elements of democratic life, protected by the Constitution.

Precisely for this reason, a separate legal regime has been established regarding the congresses of political parties. The Law on Political Parties clearly regulates which authorities shall examine disputes regarding convention and congress elections. Elections held at congresses are conducted under the supervision of election boards and the electoral judiciary. Therefore, the address for resolving objections regarding the election process is not general civil courts, but the mechanism of election law itself.

This is one of the most fundamental problems emerging today. If congress results that have been finalized after passing through the oversight of election boards can be rendered void by other courts years later, it can no longer be said that any election result is under legal protection.

Moreover, the criminal investigations cited as one of the grounds for the ruling are also legally controversial. The existence of individuals under investigation does not automatically result in the entire convention being disregarded. The presumption of innocence, the most fundamental principle of criminal law, prevents this. Without a finalized conviction, accepting allegations as true in advance and deeming the entire political process flawed is incompatible with constitutional guarantees.

Furthermore, a significant portion of the allegations reflected in the public domain does not directly overlap with the scope of the crime of "tampering with voting" in a technical sense. Even if the allegations that pressure was placed on delegates, promises were made, or political influence was exerted are accepted as true, it is separately debatable whether these constitute direct interference with the ballot counting or vote tabulation. For this reason, deeming the entire convention void based on ongoing criminal processes is an interpretation with a highly controversial legal basis.

Moreover, the outcome of criminal proceedings and the institutional existence of a political party are not the same thing. If a finalized conviction emerges in the future and creates a legal obstacle for some individuals to serve in party organs, the result of this could create a new political process. However, even this possibility does not justify disregarding all past congresses and all decisions taken.

One of the most striking aspects of the ruling is that it seeks to render ineffective not only the 38th Ordinary Convention but also the extraordinary conventions held subsequently and the decisions taken during this process. Yet, in the intervening time, new delegation structures have been formed, new political wills have emerged, and different organ elections have been held. Declaring all subsequent political processes invalid based on a debate regarding a previous congress results in completely breaking the chain of democratic representation.

More importantly, the attempt to return the former administration to duty through an injunction carries serious problems in terms of legal technique. The duty of courts is not to form a political party administration. A judicial body effectively re-determining a party administration based on a dispute that has not yet been finalized creates the appearance of an intervention that goes beyond judicial oversight.

The fundamental principle that must not be forgotten at this point is this: The authority to determine administrators in political parties belongs essentially to the delegates and the party's will. Courts do not hold elections; they resolve legal disputes. An opposing approach places the judiciary at the center of political competition.

The atmosphere that formed at the CHP Headquarters following the ruling has also revealed how a significant segment of society views the issue. The fact that people flocked to the headquarters in anger, anxiety, and uncertainty shows that the debate has not remained solely on a legal ground. Because people are no longer debating just a party congress, but the future of democratic representation.

What Turkey needs is not the reshaping of politics by the judiciary, but the ability of the law to maintain its impartial position over the political sphere. When the law becomes a tool of political struggles, not only parties but democracy itself is directly harmed.

For this reason, the ruling issued today is seen by many not just as an incorrect legal interpretation, but as a political intervention carried out by the judiciary. And for this very reason, the debate has moved far beyond a party issue.

Atty. Dr. Mehmet Ruşen Gültekin - Atty. Deniz Ali İlkem Demir