Operations against religious communities: Who is being touched, and who is not?

As the second round of the 2023 presidential elections approached, the Semerkand Foundation, affiliated with the Menzil community, declared its support for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stating, "Turkey needs stability to achieve its goals." This statement was merely the latest in a series of similar endorsements from various sects and religious communities during election periods. The political preferences of different religious structures, particularly the İsmailağa community and various Risale-i Nur circles, demonstrated that the relationship between religious communities and the government in Turkey is not merely a temporary alliance formed from one election to the next.

Reducing the issue to the simple sentence "religious communities support the AKP" is insufficient. There is a more comprehensive political relationship at play. While religious structures benefit from the legitimacy, room for maneuver, and political opportunities provided by the government, the government in turn feeds on the social base, organizational power, and political support of these structures. Consequently, a mutual interdependence is formed. One side reinforces the power of the other, and the other side opens up political space in return. Therefore, the relationship between the AKP and certain sects and religious communities should be evaluated not as a simple support relationship, but as a political partnership shaped by mutual interests.

Moreover, these structures can no longer be defined solely through religious affiliation. Over time, they have accumulated significant power through foundations, associations, companies, real estate, media outlets, and various economic resources. Thus, the internal politics of these communities have also changed. The control of property, wealth, companies, and economic resources has become as important as who holds religious authority.

Menzil is one of the most striking examples of this transformation.

In recent times, the divisions within the community have been reflected to the public not so much as a theological divergence, but rather through management, property, companies, and economic assets. The rift has occasionally intensified. Incidents such as the fight in Istanbul's Sancaktepe, where four people were shot, have come to the fore. In addition, various allegations regarding the community's assets, companies, and economic relations have been debated in the public sphere. Many topics, from legal processes in the UK to foundation-company-money relationships, have been brought to the agenda.

It is, of course, necessary to distinguish between allegations and proven facts here. However, the discussions themselves point to a significant transformation: the struggle within the community is no longer just a matter of who holds religious authority. It is also a matter of who controls a vast economic power.

This is precisely where the state's stance becomes important.

As the Minister of Justice emphasized in his statement regarding the Furkan Foundation investigation, the target of the investigation is not religious identity or belief; it is concrete criminal acts, victim and witness statements, allegations of organizational pressure, and financial evidence. This approach is understandable in principle. But then the following question must be asked: Is the same criterion applied equally to all religious structures?

Because the issue is not whether the state investigates religious communities or not, but rather which community becomes the subject of an investigation, under what conditions, and when.

This question also leads us to the debates between the İsmailağa community and the Süleymancılar. Cübbeli Ahmet, who left the İsmailağa community to form his own structure, heavily accused the group led by Alihan Kuriş following the operation against the Süleymancılar; he directed various accusations ranging from corporatization to money laundering allegations, and from FETÖ connections to organizational structuring. Furthermore, he stated that a similar fate could befall the İsmailağa community as well.

The contradiction here is remarkable: an actor who was part of the same structure yesterday can today portray that structure as a threat requiring state intervention. Competition between religious communities thus goes beyond differences in religious interpretation; it turns into a struggle for economic resources, organizational power, and political influence. In other words, the religious communities are at war.

A similar picture emerged in the divisions within the İsmailağa circle. In the debates between the Fatih Medreseleri group and the circle around Cübbeli Ahmet, accusations regarding property, management, wealth, and economic resources played a significant role. Thus, the distance between the religious life of the base of these communities and the power struggle conducted at the top has become more visible.

We can reach an important conclusion from this.

As religious communities grow, not only does the number of their followers increase; their economic and political power also grows. The claim of religious service becomes intertwined over time with the management of companies, foundations, real estate, and financial resources. At such a point, it becomes necessary to ask where the rhetoric of "service to Islam" and economic and political interests diverge.

More importantly, this transformation is not only a transformation of the religious communities. The government is also transforming within this relationship.

In Turkey's recent political history, it can be argued through numerous examples that religious structures that do not conflict with the government have a wide range of movement, whereas structures that come into sharp confrontation with the political power have to struggle with various tools of the state.

However, the general pattern tells us something more important: the relationship that religious communities establish with the government affects not only the political preference of the communities but also the state's view of these structures.

As long as the relationship continues on the basis of mutual interest, economic growth, organizational power, and wealth often become secondary issues. When a conflict of interest begins, however, activities that were not considered a problem yesterday can become the subject of an investigation today.

Therefore, the real question is not, "Which community supports the government?" The real question is when religious structures cease to be social actors supporting the government and turn into a part of the government's political order.

Because there is no one-sided support relationship. On one side, there are religious communities growing with the political space, legitimacy, and power provided by the government; on the other side, there is a government that feeds on the social base, organizational power, and political support of these communities.

The name of this relationship is not just support, but mutual interdependence. Let us be clearer: it is a partnership of destiny.

However, when this partnership is broken, not only does the political direction of the communities change; the government's view of them also changes. Structures that were granted legitimacy and whose growth was overlooked yesterday can turn into power centers that need to be investigated in the eyes of the same government today.

Therefore, it is not only the religious communities that are changing. The transformation that these communities undergo is also not independent of the government. On the contrary, the ways in which these structures gain political and economic power are directly affected by the nature of the relationship they establish with the government. The government also transforms within this relationship; the relationship it establishes with religious communities becomes a part of its own political order and power boundaries.