Local Elections and Turkish Foreign Policy

The process leading up to the local elections appeared to be in the shadow of last year's general elections and lacked excitement. The expectation for change, which was attempted to be captured in the lead-up to May 2023 with opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's “I promise you, spring will come again!” slogan, had already suffered its first disappointment in the first round, even though the presidential election went to a second round, and this disappointment only deepened after the second round. At the CHP convention following the elections, Özgür Özel, who ran against Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, became the new chairman of the CHP with the support of the CHP mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Ekrem İmamoğlu, who had been voicing calls for “change” immediately after the elections, which seemed to raise expectations once again. However, it was still not possible to completely lift and cast off the shadow of May 2023.

Setting aside the “tradition of factionalism” that has long been claimed to exist within the CHP, even the experience of the Table of Six during this process had instilled a fear that multi-headed leadership would eventually lead to failure. Despite the fact that the two most important metropolitan municipalities, Istanbul and Ankara, had passed to the CHP in 2019, the opposition group's failure to secure a majority in these metropolitan municipal councils led President Erdoğan to characterize these mayoralties as led to it being labeled a "lame duck." On the other hand, there were concerns that new tensions might emerge between the new CHP chairman, Özgür Özel, and Ekrem İmamoğlu, who has felt little need to hide his presidential ambitions. Furthermore, the two main pillars of support that existed in 2019—the explicit alliance with the IYI Party and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), as well as the indirect support from the Kurdish political movement, which was organized under the HDP name at the time and did not field candidates—were absent this time. While this situation did not affect Mansur Yavaş as much in Ankara, where the Kurdish political line is less decisive, it represented a very serious challenge for İmamoğlu in Istanbul, where that line is assumed to hold a much more decisive share of the vote. Despite these disadvantages, the CHP mayors in both Istanbul and Ankara hoped to reap the rewards of having demonstrated a municipal practice that was accepted by the public. İmamoğlu hoped that even without an alliance at the party level, a grassroots "Istanbul Alliance" could function, and Özgür Özel was hopeful that this could turn into a "Turkey Alliance." The picture that emerged on Sunday night shows that this hope was not in vain.

İmamoğlu's "Bring it on, all of you!" During the campaign process that led to this, it was observed that the ruling AKP party focused heavily on Istanbul in particular. There is no need to debate the importance of Istanbul as a city with the largest population in Turkey and Europe, and the economic resources that correspond to it. It was revealed that the resources of the metropolitan municipality were used to allocate official vehicles to former AKP deputies, that large scholarships were provided to prominent AKP figures to study abroad, and furthermore, that municipal properties and facilities were made available to many religious sects and community foundations, or that they were allowed to construct illegal buildings. Since 2017, when complaints about the economy began to rise, the ruling party has been deprived of the economic resources of these cities, which were lost in 2019. The other places it still holds are areas where the conservative base is broader, but where the use of Islamism as a network is limited, which by its nature has begun to cause dissatisfaction by including some and excluding others. Today, in these latter types of places, there is a [rising] sentiment among those excluded from the use of these economic resources. We are also facing the reality of the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi). In order to overcome this impasse, the ruling party has been attempting to implement austerity policies in the economy through Minister Mehmet Şimşek since last year, while in foreign policy, it has been striving to re-engage with the West through Hakan Fidan and İbrahim Kalın.

In the period after 2017, when inflation began to rise again, a segment of the public tried to secure their position against inflation by borrowing in Turkish Lira to acquire assets, at least in the form of housing or vehicles, through low interest rates and borrowing opportunities, while poorer segments were able to sustain their livelihoods by continuing to carry debt as long as the money supply lasted. Despite the printing of more money, the closing of credit and overdraft taps, along with the termination of credit card installment options for many products, has led to a situation where the poorer segments of the public are unable to make any move.

Today, second-hand sales websites are overflowing with listings for every item imaginable, especially personal computers, which people have decided to sell—not because they would consider selling them under normal circumstances, but because they believe they will fetch some money. Cash has, for some time now, turned into a pursuit that is needed more than ever before. Under these conditions, the ruling party's expenditures on the defense industry, the sending of a Turk into space at a certain cost, or projects like Kanal İstanbul—which ultimately create new rent-seeking areas that add to the wealth of others rather than the impoverished public—seem to have created as much antipathy as sympathy among the people. City Restaurants (Kent Lokantaları) providing dining services at more affordable prices for middle and lower-income groups, and the CHP-led metropolitan municipalities, which have focused on social municipalism through dormitories built for higher education students and increased social aid, have helped the impoverished public, who have become financially paralyzed, to breathe by easing their burdens to some extent. This has enabled the CHP to strengthen its position, especially in metropolitan areas, by incorporating district municipalities it had not previously won in the local elections. It is understood that, the CHP has now reached a level of power where, in the two largest metropolitan cities, if İmamoğlu or Yavaş were to resign from their posts for a potential presidential candidacy, they could hand over their positions to another CHP member.

As for efforts to move closer to the West in foreign policy, they continue at a level characterized by developing less assertive rhetoric toward the Middle East for some time now and, in particular, maintaining commercial relations with Israel without issue. This has led to a significant emergence of the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi) created another fertile area of attack for. This rise of the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi) also shows that one should not fall into the trap of assuming that the rise and power adventure of political Islam in Turkey is limited to the lifespan of Erdoğan's political career. Despite everything, in addition to winning many new districts in Istanbul and Ankara, many new provinces such as Bursa, Balıkesir, Afyon, Kütahya, Uşak, and Denizli, as well as central districts like Şehitkâmil and Ortahisar in provinces such as Gaziantep and Trabzon, passing to CHP administration is a major success for the CHP. Just as in the case of Yenimahalle, one of the central districts of Ankara that was won in 2009 and has not been lost since, it would not be surprising for the CHP to become established and permanent in Şehitkâmil and Ortahisar.

Implemented since 2014, the "metropolitan municipality" regulation was expected to weaken the dynamics of secular change in city centers by incorporating the wider peripheries of cities and villages—which were converted into urban neighborhoods—into the jurisdiction of metropolitan municipalities. As seen in examples like a university in every province, dual carriageways everywhere, and an airport in every city, the "metropolitan municipality" (bütünşehir) implementation has actually only provided short-term gains for the AKP. In the long run, however, it appears that the secular change dynamics of urban centers have extended into areas they previously could not reach. Despite the top-down Islamization process that has intensified since the 1980 coup and especially since the 2010s, and the hundreds of thousands of Syrians who have been granted citizenship and turned into voters, it seems quite difficult to stop this dynamic of change.

Returning to Turkish foreign policy, it would be appropriate to start with the assessment that the current ruling party has taken a blow even heavier than the one it received in 2019, taking on the appearance of a "lame duck." The ruling party, whose most important metropolitan municipalities are now limited to provinces such as Konya, Gaziantep, Kayseri, Samsun, and Trabzon, finds that the local economic opportunities that previously accelerated its rise to power have narrowed significantly. This situation places even more weight on the economic factor, which is the most fundamental driver behind the pivot toward the West that has been ongoing since last year. This orientation, which the Erdoğan administration has been pursuing through Hakan Fidan and İbrahim Kalın, will continue to intensify until May 9, when Erdoğan has been invited to the White House after a long hiatus. With the Erdoğan administration's hand further weakened against the West following the picture that emerged after the local elections, the possibility of it becoming dependent on an IMF package or feeling compelled to participate in risky foreign policy decisions, such as the West's moves to contain Russia, stands before us as a possibility that must be taken into account. The limits of the West's leverage over Turkey are, of course, uncertain and variable. Conjecturally, the West's influence on Turkey's domestic politics can increase or decrease. Without forgetting that there may be problems in developing an analysis by creating a monolithic category called 'the West,' in such a period when the West faces serious hegemonic challenges at the international level, the West may also prefer the continuation of a weakened Erdoğan administration and may even ensure this to a certain extent through specific instruments. Of course, foreign policy will not be the area that the opposition, which has had its sails filled with the self-confidence of the local election results, will prioritize. Nevertheless, the opposition must not neglect this minefield at all.