The fragility of civil society in Turkey through the lens of the ‘AHBAP Association’

“The concept of civil society is like a black box. Everyone can see what they want to see inside it.” 

F.İbrahim

On July 15, during the commemoration days of the FETÖ coup attempt, the debates reflected in the media (social and internet media) surrounding the “Ahbap Association” and Haluk Levent brought the question of who determines the boundaries of a legitimate civil society independent of the state back to the agenda. The discussion, which began over a specific person and association, eventually transcended the political tension between pro-government and opposition circles, shifting toward an axis of total reckoning with anti-government and secular segments.

The mutual labeling and marginalizing accusations carried out between secular and conservative segments, especially in the public eye and the media, have over time transformed into a broader struggle for identity and representation. This division, which is constantly reproduced in the field of civil society, has a historical and sociological background.

Historical Background of Civil Society

In general, in Middle Eastern Arab-Muslim societies, and specifically in countries like Turkey, which are both secular and Muslim, civil society has been shaped on a different social and political ground than in Western societies due to the historical tensions between a strong state tradition, religion, and democracy. The center-periphery cleavage inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the top-down modernization process have divided society into two main blocs: secular and traditional-conservative. This fault line, which evolved into a structural identity politics over time, turned the field of civil society into an arena of ideological/cultural conflict between the parties rather than a channel for independent democratic participation. Both secularists and Islamists have used civil society as a tool for their political projects for years. Consequently, this conflict has hindered democratization in state-society-individual relations and weakened civil society.

However, in the West, civil society is a tool for analyzing the relationships between the state, society, and the individual. The concept points to the existence of ‘civic manners’ or a set of ‘urban values.’ The root “civil” in civil society encompasses the rights and obligations brought about by urban life. Civil society, which corresponds to an important stage in the history of Western society, implicitly refers to ‘citizenship’ and ‘human rights.’

The interaction of both ‘religious structures’ and ‘secular-modern organizations’ with the state (representing it) and with each other is of critical importance. The interaction of civil actors, as in our country, both with the political power and among themselves, has directly determined the quality and development of democracy.

Center-Periphery Tension and Civil Society

The founding cadre of the Republic aimed to build a modern and secular society through reforms; during the single-party period, they considered religion an element that should be kept outside the public sphere. This approach was shaped by the goal of creating a contemporary society by utilizing the universal and scientific accumulation of the West. In Habermas’s approach, secularization is also treated as one of the fundamental conditions of democratization.

Turkish political scientist Şerif Mardin’s “center-periphery” theory provides an important framework for explaining the historical and social ruptures that passed from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. While the political structure in Turkey was shaped by the tension between the ‘secular-bureaucratic center’ and the ‘religious-traditional periphery,’ the legitimacy boundaries of the ‘center’ made the civil sphere open to the influence of the “secular-religious” opposition. As sociologist Nilüfer Göle also emphasizes, the central authoritarian state structure and deep socio-cultural fault lines have made these identity-based divisions permanent, carrying political polarization into the social sphere; thus, civil society has turned into a fragile ground where political and cultural tensions are reproduced rather than an area of consensus and commonality.

Politicization of Religious Communities

With the transition to multi-party life after 1950, the public sphere became relatively autonomous, political pluralism strengthened, and the modernization process gained a new direction. While religion regained visibility in the public and political sphere during the Democrat Party and Justice Party periods, religious groups also became increasingly politicized in election processes. In the 1960s, the ideological competition between left and right politics deepened; while the left defended social justice and freedoms through unions and professional organizations, right-wing politics organized around the axis of anti-communism and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. During this period, uncontrolled migration from rural to urban areas and distorted urbanization deepened political polarization in the social sphere as well; for segments struggling to adapt to the city, hometown associations and religious communities turned into important areas of solidarity, belonging, and refuge. As Yerasimos puts it, segments that concentrated on the outskirts of cities due to rural migration and struggled to integrate with the urban economy created an alternative area of economic and cultural belonging through ‘religious communities,’ and religion turned from being merely a worldview into a behavioral code providing social status and ‘identity.’

In Turkey, while traditional communities were decisive in the historical architecture of right-wing politics, the Gülen structure differed within these communities with its state-focused structure. This movement, which sprouted with the goal of fighting communism in the Cold War environment, developed an independent leadership, parallel bureaucratic staffing, and a global network. The most radical breaking point of the structure, which instrumentalized the civil appearance it gained with the discourse of ‘Service’ and ‘interfaith dialogue’ in line with the goal of seizing the state mechanism, was the July 15, 2016 coup attempt; after this bloody uprising, it was defined as the ‘Fethullahist Terrorist Organization’ (FETÖ) on an official and legal level. The FETÖ structure is a striking and extraordinary example showing that the organization of a religious community in areas such as education, health, and social aid can lead to gaining power within bureaucratic structures and infiltrating state institutions over time. For this reason, the political condition for the transition from community to free individual is democratization. Secularism is the guarantee and assurance of this.

Legitimacy of NGOs: Transparency and Accountability

The political condition for the transition from community to free individual is democratization; the economic and social condition is the strengthening of social justice in society, such as balanced income distribution, reduction of urban poverty, and ensuring equal opportunity in education and social services.

For both religious communities, sects, and foundations on the traditional-conservative line and civil formations positioned on the secular-modern side, the establishment of internal democracy, transparency, accountability, and effective audit mechanisms is a necessity. The democratic legitimacy and functionality of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be measured not only by the discourses they present to the public sphere but also by the auditability and autonomy of their internal power relations, financial processes, and implicit/hidden agendas within the framework of the rule of law.

It is meaningful to look at the current debates surrounding the Ahbap Association and Haluk Levent from this political and sociological lens. Civil society is undoubtedly not an area independent of oversight. On the contrary, transparency, legality, and accountability are the fundamental principles of the democratic legitimacy of civil society. The social impact and contribution of civil society are also strengthened on the basis of these principles.

Democratic Role of NGOs

In Western societies, an organized and dynamic civil society is one of the fundamental pillars of democratic regimes. While the culture of pluralism, dialogue, negotiation, and consensus develops largely in the field of civil society, non-governmental organizations contribute to the strengthening of accountability by auditing political power. For this reason, what Turkey needs is not less, but a stronger and more organized civil society. However, the issue is not just to increase the number of associations and foundations; it is the existence of a civil society that is democratic, transparent, and accountable, independent of the state, political parties, and capital, and capable of establishing dialogue and negotiation with different segments of society.

What is expected from civil society is not to have hidden agendas, to turn into the backyard of political and ideological structures, to focus on fund-seeking, or to pursue narrow interests. Civil society can gain legitimacy by producing independent, principled, and effective solutions to social problems in an environment where economic crisis, poverty, corruption, and the hopelessness of young people about the future are deepening. When NGOs overcome the obsolete polarizations and unproductive conflicts of the past and become carriers of the ideal of a democratic, secular, pluralistic, and stable Turkey rather than marginalization, they can transform into a true democratic subject.