Considering the internal CHP crisis within the government's political design

The crisis within the CHP has transcended the boundaries of political and institutional debate, evolving into a harsh conflict environment where the parties target each other with severe accusations. From a sociological perspective, the crisis has created significant disappointment and distrust among the party base and ordinary citizens. Speculations circulating on social media, troll activities, and misinformation are further deepening the existing tension.

Yet, the deliberative and inclusive style of politics, the foundations of which were laid during the Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu era, combined with the sincere "Turkey Alliance" discourse established by Özgür Özel on the campaign trail—which centers on Atatürk and Republican values—has spearheaded a very important sociological transformation. This broad-based sociological structure, which brings together voter groups with different political sensitivities in a common future, has created a wave of social hope for the country's democratic and economic future.

At this point, it is essential for the main opposition party to overcome its internal administrative disputes as soon as possible. Because sacrificing this social credit and democratic alliance potential, which has been painstakingly woven with great effort, to internal strife will not only damage the party's institutional future; it will also cause a difficult-to-repair fracture in the democratic faith of millions of citizens who expect change.

THE GOVERNMENT'S 2028 STRATEGY

Following the 2024 local elections, the political government has been putting two main strategies into action. The first was the "Terror-Free Turkey" process initiated at the call of Devlet Bahçeli. With this initiative, it is aimed to redirect a portion of the Kurdish voters who did not provide support in the local elections back to the ruling bloc.

The second strategy is designed to reduce the political influence of the CHP, which emerged stronger from the local elections. In this context, the aim is to highlight the party's internal problems and direct its energy toward internal debates. It is evident that the developments in the subsequent process have strengthened the claims and discussions in this direction.

With this strategy, the political government aims to limit the political effects of the social discontent and anger caused by the deepening economic crisis. In this period when the cost of living is rising, low-income segments are becoming impoverished, and young people are turning to seeking their future abroad; it has been assumed that the anxiety about the future and the feeling of hopelessness spreading in society can be managed politically.

The 2024 local elections were an important turning point where changing social trends in Turkey were reflected in the political sphere. The election results showed that there is a strong demand for change in society; this demand emerged as significant social support and trust, particularly toward the CHP.

The successes the party achieved in new cities and towns expanded its voter base and weakened the perception that it was limited only to certain regions. Thus, the CHP has become a political actor that finds resonance in different parts of Anatolia; this social expansion has significantly strengthened the party's potential to be an alternative to the government.

CHP MUST MATURE THE SOLUTION, NOT THE PROBLEM

The current crisis of the CHP, beyond being a simple management problem, is a historical test of its capacity to meet social expectations for change. While a deep economic and social depression is being experienced, the main opposition party being buried in internal strife carries the risk of breaking the link between the demands of the masses and the mechanisms of political representation; therefore, it is inevitable that the current tension be overcome through democratic negotiation, guided by reason and science.

The historical accumulation and institutional memory possessed by this deep-rooted mass party, which has undertaken Turkey's modernization process from the founding of the Republic to the development of the secular state, is the strongest key to emerging from the crisis. Therefore, this process is not merely an institutional bottleneck that must be overcome; it is also a critical threshold that will determine whether the CHP can reproduce its own historical mission under today's conditions. It should not be ignored that all responsible actors have very important duties during this challenging period.

CHP CANNOT MISS THE CHANGE

Throughout its 100-year history, the CHP has constantly renewed its programs and principles according to the changing conditions of the era. In these transformation processes, social dynamics and global and local political developments have always been determining factors. Naturally, the political and social ground belonging to the nation-state building process of the 1920s and 30s is not the same as today's "conjuncture" in the second century of the Republic. Due to the differentiation of periodic needs, both the social base that the CHP addresses and relies upon, and the country's political system, have undergone a radical change. This situation has made it mandatory for the party to reproduce itself within historical continuity and update its programs according to social demands.

In Turkey, the most concrete breaking point of change in the political regime occurred in 2017. The 150-year tradition of the parliamentary system was abandoned, and the Presidential Government System was adopted. This constitutional transformation mentioned not only changed the state architecture but also radically transformed the party system, alliance mechanisms, and all the codes and rules of the game of politics in general.

The introduction of the "50+1 percent" requirement in presidential elections has forced parties to form broad social and political alliances. However, in this new era, intense debates have emerged in areas such as the fairness of elections, the use of state resources, media access, election security, and the impartiality of the judiciary. The strengthening of the perception that political competition is not conducted under equal conditions has weakened trust in the democratic process and the political system, especially among opposition voters.

This picture has led parties not only to electoral alliances but also to establish new relationships with different social segments. It should not be forgotten that voter behavior in Turkey was shaped for a long time through strong cultural divisions between right and left blocs. For this reason, it has not been easy for the CHP to overcome social prejudices and build trust between different segments. The "dialogue," "negotiation," and "reconciliation" politics initiated by Kılıçdaroğlu in 2018 is an important turning point in this respect. The contacts established with segments that kept their distance from the CHP and the "meeting of conscience brotherhood" formed around "parliamentary democracy" contributed to the opposition developing a broader cooperation. This deliberative and pluralistic approach has reflected in election results over time. Indeed, the winning of Istanbul and Ankara in 2019, and metropolitan cities such as Bursa, Denizli, Manisa, and Balıkesir in 2024, has significantly strengthened the opposition's social support and the belief in its capacity to govern.

TIME FOR DIALOGUE AND COMMON SENSE

In summary, after the 2024 local elections, a strong conviction has formed among broad segments of society that the CHP is a political alternative capable of understanding and producing solutions to Turkey's fundamental problems. The voter has extended significant social credit to the party and expressed the expectation for change through the CHP.

For this reason, it is of critical importance that the political struggle line, which began to take shape during the Kılıçdaroğlu era and continues under the leadership of Özgür Özel, be maintained without being weakened by internal tensions. The real issue is to be able to transform the demand for social change into a strong political program by overcoming personal and organizational rivalries.

The CHP can only emerge from the crisis it has fallen into through calmness, solidarity, and integration. This process necessitates the establishment of communication based on dialogue and negotiation, not conflict, between the party's two important actors, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and Özgür Özel. Managing intra-party tensions and restoring institutional integrity is only possible by operating a culture of dialogue and consensus within the party.

At this point, it is of great importance that both sides move away from definitive judgments and confrontational rhetoric; and manage the process within the framework of common sense, dialogue, and a rational approach. Demonstrating a common will for a solution with a sense of historical responsibility appears necessary not only to protect the party's institutional integrity but also to strengthen the opposition's social trust and capacity for influence. Will the CHP be a hopeless, losing party in the second century of the Republic that is drowned in internal conflicts and questions its own claim and existence? Or will it be the key party of economic and social restoration inspired by its founding and establishment mission?

The future of the CHP is hidden in its choices between transforming into a status-quo structure that exhausts its strength with internal strife and becoming a pioneer of social change by combining its deep-rooted past with today's economic and social needs.