Geopolitical calculation prevails over rhetoric

Ilham Aliyev's decision not to come to Ankara has become the most striking indicator of the tension that has been simmering between Turkey and Azerbaijan for some time, and even a 'golden goal' that has changed the course of the crisis. 

The picture expected in Ankara was actually quite different. 

Tayyip Erdoğan was going to appear before the cameras with Aliyev to send messages of friendship and brotherhood to friends and foes alike, thereby neatly covering up what has been happening in recent days. 

However, that diplomatic ground prepared to soften the sharpness of the crisis completely collapsed when the expected family photo could not be taken. 

Tayyip Erdoğan, without naming names, made a statement saying, "There is no room for separation and discord in the family photo of the Turkic world," but the political distance between the leaders had reached a point that could no longer be hidden.

So, was the reason for all this really the restriction placed on headscarves in schools in Azerbaijan? 

This debate is only the storefront of the crisis, that is, its visible face. 

Behind the curtain, there is a much more comprehensive, much more deep-rooted geopolitical reckoning. 

Let us recall; Baku's move to restrict headscarves in public schools created a serious reaction in Ankara, especially in government circles, and Tayyip Erdoğan's targeting of headscarf bans at the UN General Assembly was the declaration of this discomfort. 

However, Baku's response did not get stuck in a line of ordinary diplomatic objection; to show that it would not accept interference in its domestic law and sovereign territory, it declared 31 Turkish citizens "persona non grata" all at once due to social media posts. 

The fact that Tayyip Erdoğan sacrificed Oktay Saral, who had made a statement saying, "Preventing the right to education of students wearing headscarves in Azerbaijan is unacceptable! To what conscience, to what justice does it conform to leave a student who covers her head due to her faith at the school gate? The headscarf is not an obstacle, it is a requirement of faith! The right to education cannot be sacrificed to any ideological imposition!" was not enough to save the situation either. 

Of course, Aliyev knew very well that Oktay Saral could not shake his finger at Azerbaijan without instructions from Beştepe.

The emphasis on "two states" in the "one nation, two states" slogan, which has been relied upon for years, has come to the fore more than ever before.

Aliyev is clearly standing against a hierarchical big brother-little brother relationship; he wanted to establish a partnership between equals and limit Ankara's political weight over Baku.

Moreover...

He had raised an eyebrow at Feridun Sinirlioğlu, whom Turkey nominated for the United Nations Secretary-General position.

There is also the economic front of the crisis, which pushes the boundaries of diplomatic courtesy. 

Ankara saw Baku as a gushing spring that carries water without return in the financial bottleneck it has fallen into, a lifebuoy whose door would be knocked on whenever it was in a tight spot.

However, Baku absolutely refused to play this role of being treated as a "backyard" and a "reserve fund" source to cover Ankara's budget deficits. 

A publication close to the government in Azerbaijan wrote openly, "The Azerbaijani budget is not a reserve fund for Turkish officials"! 

This harsh outburst was a clear ultimatum given to Ankara's economic expectations. 

Let us underline this with a red pen. 

As it will be remembered, in the 1 billion euro swap debate in the 2021-2022 period, Baku had defined this money not as financial aid, but directly as an "investment." Azerbaijan's main objection here is not to investing in Turkey, but to these investments being turned into an expectation of political tribute by Ankara. 

Baku is strongly emphasizing its economic sovereignty by saying, "We are brothers, but we are not Turkey's financier." Now, the rational ground between the two capitals seems to have cracked seriously due to this imposition of a wallet partnership.

When the factors of Israel and Armenia enter the mix, the political, strategic, and psychological gap in the relations between the two countries widens even further. 

While Turkey was building the -ostensibly- toughest political barrier against Israel due to the Gaza war, Azerbaijan continued its strategic partnership with Israel in defense, intelligence, and energy pipelines without interruption; it even cemented this closeness by hosting Israeli President Herzog in Baku. As for the Armenian front, we know that Turkey is seeking to open border gates and normalize relations.

Baku, on the other hand, insists that its own security conditions be strictly observed. Anyone who has read a little bit about international relations knows very well that it is not rhetoric but naked interest calculations that determine relations between states. 

Aliyev's avoidance of giving that artificial friendship photo side-by-side with Erdoğan by not coming to Ankara is the announcement to the world of this new, pragmatic foreign policy understanding that has changed after Baku's Karabakh victory.

We must emphasize that the real breaking point of this crisis, which is not dwelt upon enough, is ideological. 

This situation is literally a collision of two different worldviews, two separate sociopolitical genetics. 

In Tayyip Erdoğan's foreign policy vision, it is not enough for Turkey to be just a regional power; he wants to make Turkey an ideological, Sunni-conservative center in the Islamic world through the Maarif Foundation and the dissemination of conservative values in the international arena. 

This is already known to everyone who knows him even remotely. 

Tayyip Erdoğan intends to code Azerbaijan, which has a population with a Ja'fari/Shiite majority, as part of this Sunni-conservative vision in some way; Aliyev's world stands on a completely different coordinate. 

The Baku administration had made its secular, national, and secular state identity its red line after the collapse of the Soviet Union; it sees the growth of the religious sphere outside of state control as a direct national security threat. 

Baku is now raising a similar secular barricade against Ankara's soft power instruments and structures like the Maarif Foundation, just as it did against the religious influence waves of its neighbor, Iran. 

Therefore, the issue is not just about wearing a headscarf in a school, but a struggle over which values the Azerbaijani social structure will be shaped upon.

In short; while Tayyip Erdoğan adds the goal of leadership of the Islamic world to his claim of leadership in the Turkic world, he may want to include Azerbaijan in this political projection. 

Aliyev's objection is knotted exactly at this point. 

Baku accepts being Ankara's brother, but it stands against being its ideological extension, satellite, or "backyard" in no uncertain terms. 

The relationship between the two countries has ceased to be a romantic "unity of hearts" and has settled into a cold and rational balance of interests. For Ankara, Azerbaijan will always remain a "brother country"; but the message Aliyev clearly gave by not coming to Ankara stands in the middle as the clearest answer to the question, "While Baku wants to remain a brother, does it have to accept Ankara's ideological world?" let us put a period to our article by saying this.