From the Yalu to Saigon; the honor of resistance from Ho Chi Minh to Hormuz

The Anglo-Saxon powers that won the First World War, the Second World War, and subsequently the Cold War—specifically the US and the UK—have spent the last century attempting to suppress every geopolitical challenge that emerged outside their own will. From communism to nationalist independence movements, and from Korea to China and Iran, different actors have faced this pressure. Korea, Vietnam, and today Iran have stood out as examples that have shown the will to resist this hegemonic order, which appears far more powerful than they are. The common point of these countries is that they view war not merely as a struggle of military power, but as a struggle of time, geography, social resilience, and cost generation. The resistance Iran is displaying today is, in many respects, a continuation of the long-term anti-hegemonic struggles waged in Korea and Vietnam.

Although their duration, losses, and outcomes are not exactly similar, the honor of resistance—and therefore the culture of it—in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the 107-day Iran-US-Israel war share similarities. The culture and strategy of resistance that Iran displays today, when read alongside the Korean and Vietnam wars, reveals the same historical truth. The hegemonic power views war within the framework of financial strength, technology, firepower—especially smart munitions—air superiority, economic pressure, and logistical capabilities. The resisting side, however, approaches war within the framework of time, space, society, ideology, belief, will, and generating costs for the opposing side. Throughout military history, great powers have often surrounded and controlled the battlefield, possessing air superiority, more ships, aircraft, and money. However, what determines the outcome of wars is often not the quantity of weapons possessed, but whether they can break the opposing side's will to resist.

Henry Kissinger’s famous observation in his article titled “The Vietnam Negotiations,” published in Foreign Affairs in January 1969, summarizes this reality: “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” In his work On War, Clausewitz emphasizes that the purpose of war is not to destroy the enemy army, but to break the enemy's will to resist. Therefore, it does not matter how many tanks, aircraft, or ships are destroyed. What truly matters is which side can maintain the determination to continue the war for longer. Clausewitz’s approach, which can be summarized as “war is a clash of wills,” forms the theoretical foundation of the culture of resistance extending from Saigon to Hormuz.

For this reason, the examples of Korea and Vietnam, and today Iran, can be seen as links in the same historical chain that have emerged in different periods. In both, one of the parties facing off is the greatest military and economic power of the era. The other is the side that is militarily weaker and economically more fragile, but possesses a higher political will.

THE FIRST EXAMPLE OF RESISTANCE: KOREA

The People's Republic of China, founded in 1949, was an extremely poor state that had emerged from wars and was technologically backward. In contrast, the US was the undisputed victor of the Second World War, a superpower possessing nuclear weapons and holding the world's largest industrial capacity. The US could not remain indifferent to the communist North Korea's attack on the south on June 25, 1950. Because the declaration of China as a communist People's Republic under Mao's leadership in 1949 was a major loss for the US. The US had been unable to prevent one of the greatest basins of civilization in human history from rising again outside its own sphere of influence. That day, China, poor and emerging from civil wars, would one day become the world's production center, the largest industrial power, and the primary strategic rival on the Pacific coast challenging American hegemony. George Kennan, the architect of the containment of the USSR, and the American strategists of the time understood the long-term meaning of this better than anyone. Therefore, the establishment of the People's Republic of China was not just a regime change for Washington, but a historic geopolitical rupture that altered global power balances. Indeed, this event, known throughout the Cold War as the “Loss of China,” was etched into memory as one of the greatest strategic shocks American geopolitics had faced since Pearl Harbor. Therefore, North Korea's advance to the south and the meeting of communism with the Pacific Ocean in another country after China was unacceptable.

When American forces occupied Pyongyang on October 16, 1950, China crossed the Yalu River on the same day and launched a counter-attack. Because the Beijing administration had decided that this was not just a security issue regarding Korea, but one regarding the future of China. The Chinese leadership aimed not to win the war, but to stop the American advance. In the end, China could not defeat the US, but when the armistice was signed in July 1953, the US also did not achieve what it wanted. Communist North Korea could not be eliminated. The American army could not settle on the Chinese border, and the war ended where it began. Thus, although the US has made large deployments and established bases in South Korea, which was placed under American protection, over the last 70 years, it could not prevent South Korea from remaining in a position akin to an island state. North Korea maintains its situation of completely cutting off South Korea's land connection to Asia to this day. Let us note that there is no peace treaty between US forces and North Korea, and just as in the TRNC, an armistice is still in effect. The most critical decision in this 3-year war for China was undoubtedly the moment it saw the US's will to advance to its border and decided to attack. China made the decision to enter the war that day despite the overwhelming superiority of the US. The risk it took that day paved the way for its subsequent 73-year rise. The fundamental lesson Korea gives to Iran today is that preventing a great power from reaching its strategic goals is sufficient, rather than defeating it.

VIETNAM: A WAR WON NOT ON THE FRONT, BUT IN WASHINGTON

On the other hand, the struggle Iran is facing today resembles Vietnam, which continued between 1962 and 1973, much more than Korea. In the Vietnam War, the goal of the Hanoi administration was not to destroy the American army. It did not have such an opportunity anyway. North Vietnam was not in a position to be compared with the US in economic, technological, military, or political terms. However, the Hanoi administration had grasped very well that the true center of gravity of the war was not on the front, but in Washington DC. Therefore, the goal of the war was not to destroy American soldiers, but to erode American political will. That is why Vietnam's true victory was won not in Saigon, but in the capital.

The most striking example of this reality is the Tet Offensive in 1968. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces launched simultaneous attacks on many cities and military facilities in South Vietnam during the Vietnamese New Year holiday. At the end of the clashes, the forces that carried out the attack suffered very heavy losses. Viewed purely by military criteria, the Tet Offensive could be considered not a success, but even a failure at the tactical level. The true effect of the Tet Offensive changed the perspective of American society and political decision-makers. Because the American public had been convinced for years by the White House and the Pentagon that the war was about to be won. Yet, the Tet Offensive showed that the resistance against the world's most powerful army was still standing and that the end of the war was not in sight. Images of the war were reaching millions of homes on American televisions every day, and the anti-war movement was growing in public opinion. In the end, although the Viet Cong was the side that lost in the military field, the side that gained superiority in the political and psychological field was North Vietnam. After Tet, President Lyndon Johnson decided not to run for re-election. The Washington administration increasingly moved away from the goal of winning the war and began looking for an exit strategy. During the Nixon era, the “Vietnamization” policy was put into effect, and American soldiers were gradually withdrawn. Ultimately, the US left the battlefield, and Saigon fell in 1975. Thus, the outcome of the war was determined not by tactical battles on the front, but by the exhaustion of political will.

For this reason, Vietnam's greatest success was not defeating the American army on the battlefield, but breaking the American state's and society's determination and will to continue the war. The element of political will, which Clausewitz placed at the center of war, played a much more decisive role in Vietnam than tanks, planes, and bombs.

On the other hand, the most important factor to keep in mind is that the US during the 1968 Tet Offensive was not very different from today. In those years, the US was a superpower that produced approximately half of the world's manufacturing industry (today 16%), controlled more than a quarter of the world economy, held the undisputed dominance of the dollar, and had a debt burden at 1/120th of today's level ($350 billion). Vietnam's historical success is even more remarkable for this reason. The Hanoi administration succeeded in eroding and eventually breaking the will of the most powerful state of that period of history to continue the war.

THE HANOI OF HORMUZ: IRAN'S STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The strategic approach Iran is applying today is, in essence, no different from the model applied by Vietnam. Iran is not trying to defeat the US Navy in a decisive battle on the high seas or in the air. It also does not aim to militarily eliminate Israel. Instead, it is moving the war to the Strait of Hormuz, American bases in the Gulf, military targets in Israel, energy terminals, tanker insurance, oil prices, air defense stocks, global supply chains, and finally, the comfort zone and patience limits of the American public.

Because in modern wars, what is decisive is not always the number of platforms destroyed. Gasoline that was $2.95 a gallon on February 28 rising to $4.95 100 days later can create much greater political consequences for the American public than a downed fighter jet. Iran's goal is not to sink the US Navy, but to make the Gulf no longer a safe American lake. Indeed, most GCC member countries pay the price for every attack on Iran by having their own energy infrastructure, economic facilities, and American bases located on their soil come under the threat of missiles and UAVs. This situation not only erodes confidence in US security guarantees but also increases the reaction in the world and American public opinion against the American administration, which is thought to act under the influence of Israel.

Besides this, the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is effectively within Iran's control zone gives Iran an extremely important strategic trump card. Even if it does not completely close the strait, Iran can use the threat of opening and closing it as a deterrent tool, almost like a nuclear weapon. Because the Strait can only be permanently brought under control if Iran is occupied through a large-scale land operation. The political, military, and economic cost of such an operation is extremely high. The effects of the closing of the strait would not be limited to the region; it would directly affect the 8 billion world population through energy prices. Therefore, the resulting global pressure is not a burden that Washington can carry for a long time.

Just as Vietnam tried to exhaust American will through the draft, especially after heavy American losses, rather than by destroying the American army, Iran is also trying to erode American strategic will today through economic losses. For this reason, the model Iran is applying is not a war strategy seeking a classic military victory. The main goal is to break the will to continue the war by constantly increasing the political, economic, and socio-psychological costs of the opposing side. History is full of examples of hegemonic powers having to retreat not on the battlefield, but because of political will worn down by rising costs.

FROM TUNNELS TO GRANITE MISSILE CITIES

Whatever tunnels, forests, public support, propaganda, and patience were in Vietnam, for Iran, they are underground missile cities, command centers inside granite mountains, swarms of UAVs, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, proxy power networks, and the geography of Hormuz, but most importantly, the support of its people for the state despite decades of sanctions and blockades. One of the symbols of the Vietnam War was the Cu Chi tunnels. The Americans dominated the sky, but an invisible war was being waged under the ground. The Cu Chi Tunnels were one of the most striking examples of the asymmetric war developed by the weaker side against the stronger side. This underground network, which reached 250 kilometers around Saigon, was like a city built underground with command centers, ammunition depots, hospitals, and living areas. Despite the US's overwhelming air and fire superiority, the Viet Cong survived, maneuvered, and maintained its fighting capability thanks to these tunnels. A similar situation was seen in the tunnel networks built by Hamas in Gaza today. Despite Israel's absolute air superiority, precision-guided munitions, and advanced intelligence systems, the underground tunnels were able to keep the organization's command-control, logistics, and fighting capacity alive for a long time. Both examples reveal an important truth of modern war: Technological superiority is not always enough to eliminate the enemy's will and resistance capacity. Sometimes the fate of the war is determined not by the planes in the sky, but by the tunnels under the ground. Today, Iran has similarly established a second battlefield underground. Missile production facilities, depots, command centers, and logistics networks have largely been moved underground. For this reason, the “underground warfare” concept developed by Iran is extremely important for the wars of the future.

THE LIMITS OF BOMBARDMENT

In the 107-day war against Iran, the US and Israel hit 13,000 targets with warplanes and missiles. Iran's air and naval forces were destroyed. However, Iran did not surrender. Aerial bombardment can burn cities, collapse infrastructure, intimidate civilians, and create massive destruction. However, it is often not enough on its own to force political will to surrender. In the Second World War, Goering’s London Blitz could not break British will. Moreover, 12 tons of bombs had been dropped per square kilometer. At the end of the war, as if to take revenge for the Blitz, the British completely destroyed Dresden by dropping 600 tons of bombs per square kilometer. Even this bombardment did not bring surrender on its own. In the summer of 1945, Tokyo was burned by American bombers, and 41 tons of American bombs were dropped per square kilometer, but Japan's surrender only occurred in the environment of strategic shock that came with the Soviet entry into the war and the atomic bombs. The 78-day illegal NATO bombardment in Kosovo and Belgrade in 1998 only yielded results with the threat of a land operation, diplomatic pressure, and Russia's stance. Serbia surrendered. That is, the number and tonnage of bombs do not determine the result. Winning the war is possible thanks to the combination of bombardment with political goals, the pressure of occupation, diplomacy, and a general strategy that will break the opposing side's will. Otherwise, tons of bombs only produce ruined cities and unbroken wills.

The US dropped more bombs on Vietnam than it dropped on Germany in the Second World War. Between 1962 and 1973, American warplanes dropped approximately 7.6 million tons of munitions on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This figure is more than three times the American bomb tonnage of approximately 2.15 million tons used on all fronts of WWII. Despite this, Hanoi did not surrender. Today, the air superiority, satellite systems, precision-guided munitions, and AI-supported targeting networks possessed by Israel and the US may not produce political results on their own. As seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Yemen, technology is often not enough to eliminate the culture of resistance.

SPREADING THE WAR, INCREASING THE COST RATHER THAN THE FRONT

There are also striking similarities between Vietnam and Iran in terms of the spread of the war. The Vietnam War spread to Laos and Cambodia. One of the most important elements behind Vietnam's success was the massive logistics network that connected North Vietnam to the Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam, which went down in history as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This trail, which extended through Laos and Cambodia, was not just a road, but consisted of thousands of kilometers of paths, supply centers, depots, fuel pipelines, and hidden transportation networks. The US dropped millions of tons of bombs throughout the war to cut this trail, but never achieved permanent results. In the end, the Ho Chi Minh Trail became a symbol of North Vietnam's will to continue the war and its logistical resilience. The main reason for the spread of the Vietnam War to Laos and Cambodia was the need to protect and operate this trail. Thus, the war turned into a struggle of cost and attrition that spread not only to Vietnamese territory but to the entire region.

The broad sphere of influence that Iran is trying to establish today through the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen is also based on the same logic to a certain extent, aiming to create a multi-layered strategic depth that takes the war off the front and increases the opponent's costs. The maritime transport routes Iran has established with Russia in the Caspian Sea should also be considered within this scope.

Just as decades ago in distant Asia, the front was not just Vietnam, the war had spread to the entire region. Iran similarly does not see the conflict as limited only to its own territory. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, the Strait of Hormuz, the 5 states that are members of the (GCC) Gulf Cooperation Council, and the American bases in these states, energy terminals, maritime trade routes, and even the Greek Cypriot Administration, which has become part of the energy equation in the Eastern Mediterranean, are among the indirect extensions of the war. In reality, this is not expanding the front in the classic sense. This is touching the nerve endings of the hegemon, that is, the US and Israel. Vietnam was waging a psychological war extending from rice paddies to Washington. Iran, on the other hand, is trying to create an economic and geopolitical pressure mechanism extending from Hormuz to the Eastern Mediterranean, from the energy exports of the Gulf monarchies to global maritime trade, and from energy markets to Wall Street. The goal is not to open new fronts, but to constantly increase the cost of the war for the US, Israel, the Gulf countries, and their economic partners.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RESISTANCE

In the analysis of Vietnam and Iran, the similarity in the socio-cultural dimension is also striking. In Vietnam, rather than communist ideology, the resilience of the peasant society, anti-imperialist nationalism, the culture of sacrifice, and the ideal of national independence were the cornerstones of the war. In Iran, the Shiite memory of resistance, the prestige that martyrdom brings to the individual and their family in Shiite sociology, the “sacred defense” culture left by the Iran-Iraq War, the experience of living under embargo/sanctions, and the developed national honor reflex against foreign intervention serve the same function. At this point, the most important issue is that the regime and the state are not always the same thing. In Vietnam, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong risked death and fought to avoid surrender. What kept them standing was not so much their romantic attachment to communism as the culture of resistance they had developed against centuries of foreign domination and humiliation (Chinese, Japanese, French, and American occupations). For this reason, the Hanoi administration was able to present the war as a national liberation and independence war rather than an ideological struggle. In the end, American bombardments hit cities, destroyed bridges, and rained millions of tons of bombs; however, they could not break the Vietnamese society's will to live independently. In Iran, too, while a significant segment of society continues its criticisms of the administration, it has been able to show a common reflex against foreign intervention. The Iranian people had seen that all the Muslim countries the US attacked after 1990 were torn apart and fell into the status of pariahs as failed states due to civil war. The reflex of “standing against the humiliation of the homeland,” which emerges independently of the regime in resisting societies, often turns into a more important strategic capital than technology and firepower.

CONCLUSION

In the end, Korea, Vietnam, and Iran are three links in the same historical chain. Korea drew the first strategic line against American hegemony, which won the Second World War and relied on a nuclear monopoly. Behind it was Chinese logistical support and blood. Vietnam showed that the political will of the world's most powerful military machine could be broken. Behind it was both USSR and Chinese logistical support. Iran challenged the unipolar world order that emerged after the Cold War.

Like Vietnam, Iran has eroded the opposing side's will to continue the war. It has not only increased the cost of the war for the US and Israel. It has distributed the cost to the whole world. It has caused heavy damage to US allies. It has stood out as the state that defends the Palestinians and Lebanese massacred in the Israeli genocide and pays the price for this with its nation, and in this way, it has won the sympathy of the world. Most importantly, it has become the only country in the Shiite or Sunni Muslim world that can challenge Israel not in words, but in essence.

The Korean War and the Vietnam Wars showed that a militarily very weak state could achieve strategic success by depriving a superior power of absolute victory. Similarly, Iran, instead of taking a step back against the US and Israel, succeeded in bringing the US to the negotiating table at the end of 107 days by using the power of its geography together with asymmetric armament and an effect-oriented strategy. If Iran can show long-term resistance from now on; if it can maintain its position of being able to harm Israel under any circumstances, it can guarantee its status for the coming decades. North Korea did the same, and by constantly arming and even establishing its nuclear deterrence, it reached the position of a country that no one would dare to attack after 1953. For Iran, the goal should be to adopt an active deterrence model after a permanent peace agreement at the end of 60 days. Israel can only be deterred in this way.

On the other hand, the Iranian example showed that what is essential is not military victory, but strategic patience. The goal is not to destroy the enemy, but to prevent it from winning. Hegemony may have won two world wars. It may have declared that the end of history had arrived at the end of the Cold War. However, it was stopped in Korea, and its political will was broken in Vietnam. Today, Iran is continuing the same challenge on a new battlefield shaped by seas, straits, energy lines, UAVs, ballistic missiles, underground cities, and the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine. Despite changing technology, the unchanging truth is the magnitude of the endurance of nations.