Israel’s new front: The sea

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statements on October 4, 2026, regarding the development of naval power, signal a new orientation in Israel’s security and defense strategy. Having built its military power primarily on air superiority, ground operations, intelligence, and technological dominance since its founding, Israel is beginning to view the sea not merely as a geography that needs to be protected along its coasts, but as one of the fundamental elements of its national security, economic continuity, and regional power projection. While Israel possesses significant military capacity in terms of air and ground power in its immediate vicinity, it is not a state capable of generating power on the same scale at sea, especially in long-range and long-term operations. It is this strategic imbalance that makes Netanyahu’s statements significant.

During his visit to the Ashdod Naval Base with Defense Minister Katz, Netanyahu cited developments in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb as examples, stating that the seas have turned into one of the major arenas of international conflict. Emphasizing that Israel’s maritime areas in the Mediterranean, its ports, and its maritime traffic are under threat, he mentioned the sixth submarine, INS Drakon, built in Germany, and announced that the navy needs more submarines, surface warships, and other naval warfare assets. The most striking part of his speech was the goal of making Israel one of the world’s leading countries in surface and subsurface warfare.

It would be incomplete to evaluate these statements solely as a defense program aimed at procuring new warships and submarines. The growing discussions on naval power within Israeli security circles, strategic research organizations, and among military commentators also point to a search for expanding the traditional air and ground-centered security understanding into the maritime dimension. However, a fundamental distinction must be made here. Possessing a strong navy, that is, military naval power, is not the same as possessing comprehensive maritime power.

Israel has limited capacity in terms of maintaining a continuous presence at sea, especially in regions far from its own coasts, protecting maritime transport lines, and projecting power from the sea. Conversely, it is a country that conducts approximately 99 percent of its foreign trade by volume via sea, has an increasing dependence on offshore resources in the Eastern Mediterranean for energy security, and has extremely limited strategic depth. Therefore, there is a significant and very serious mismatch between Israel’s economic and strategic dependence on the sea and the naval power that could secure this dependence.

The attacks by the Yemeni Ansar Allah on Israeli maritime transport in the Red Sea, the pressure created by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, and the changing military balances in the Eastern Mediterranean have made this mismatch more visible. Israel’s Eilat Port, which opens to the Red Sea, has become effectively inoperable in recent years due to the loss of maritime traffic caused by Houthi attacks. On the other hand, Israel has used its naval firepower intensively on the Palestinian and Lebanese fronts, carrying out naval blockades, coastal bombardments, and special forces operations from the sea. In particular, the disproportionate and uncontrolled use of force by the Israeli navy against unarmed civilian maritime targets, most notably the 2010 Mavi Marmara raid, and its ability to remain free from the resulting responsibility and criminal sanctions, has been one of the most prominent examples of international law debates. However, the use of military superiority in near-coastal areas and the creation of a naval power that can continuously protect national interests in distant seas require different capabilities.

The real problem facing Israel emerges here. Developing naval power is not possible solely by increasing the number of warships, submarines, and missile systems. Maritime power is a holistic capacity formed by geography, ports, the merchant fleet, shipyards, the shipbuilding industry, maritime technologies, marine sciences, maritime law, maritime education, maritime economy, and maritime culture. A state’s becoming a maritime power depends not only on the government’s military preferences but also on society’s adoption of the sea as an economic, scientific, cultural, and strategic living space. The extent to which Israel’s existing maritime infrastructure and social maritime accumulation can support this transformation is a subject that needs to be examined separately.

The fundamental question is whether Israel has the potential to go beyond having a strong coastal navy and transform into a maritime state that has developed all elements of maritime power. The answer to this question is important not only for understanding Israel’s future military capacity but also for understanding the new power balances that may emerge in the Eastern Mediterranean and the seas surrounding Turkey.

CONSTRAINTS OF GEOGRAPHY

Israel has a total coastline of 204 kilometers, with approximately 190 kilometers on the Mediterranean and 14 kilometers on the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea. Despite the limited length of its coasts, the most important feature of its maritime geography is that it opens to two different strategic sea basins. It has access to Europe and the Atlantic via the Mediterranean in the west, and to Asia via the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb, and the Indian Ocean through the Port of Eilat in the south. However, there is no direct coastal connection between these two maritime fronts. Maritime transport between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea is dependent on the Suez Canal; access to the Indian Ocean from the south is dependent on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait under the control of Yemen and Djibouti/Somalia; and access to the Atlantic Ocean is dependent on the Strait of Gibraltar under the control of Morocco and Spain/UK. Furthermore, although Israel’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean provides proximity to the northern approach of the Suez Canal, it does not provide the opportunity for direct geographical control over the sea passages around Cyprus, Rhodes, and Crete.

For this reason, for Israel, the Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea, Suez, Gibraltar, and the Eastern Mediterranean are not independent maritime areas, but parts of a strategic maritime transport system that affects each other in terms of energy security, foreign trade, and military operations.

It is significant that Prime Minister Netanyahu mentioned Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb together while stating in his October 4 speech that the seas have turned into an international battlefield. It shows that Israel no longer sees maritime security as limited only to coastal defense, but also considers the protection of transport lines in distant seas as a matter of national security. The main constraint on this orientation is Israel’s short coastline, two separated geopolitical maritime areas, and limited control over strategic straits. It is possible to see Israel’s search for overcoming the strategic constraints arising from its geography in its strengthening of its military, economic, and financial presence on the island of Cyprus, the strategic cooperation it has developed with Greece, and its diplomatic move toward recognizing Somaliland.

TRANSITION FROM COASTAL DEFENSE TO STRATEGIC NAVAL POWER

Since its establishment, the Israeli Navy has focused primarily on coastal defense, port security, naval blockade, and operational tasks in near-sea areas, but in recent years it has expanded its area of responsibility with tasks such as submarine operations, protection of offshore energy facilities, security of maritime transport lines, missile defense, and power projection in distant seas. According to open sources, as of 2026, it appears to have a force structure consisting of 6 submarines, 7 corvettes, 28 patrol boats, and various auxiliary elements. The main base of the navy is Haifa, while Ashdod is the operational base in the southern part of the Mediterranean, and Eilat is the operational base in the Red Sea.

While the backbone of the submarine force is formed by Dolphin-class submarines built in Germany, the number of submarines reached six with the INS Drakon, an AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion) submarine delivered in September 2026. With a displacement of approximately 2,600 tons, the Drakon is Israel’s largest submarine. Three new Dakar-class submarines, the production of which has begun in Germany, are expected to replace the aging first-generation Dolphin class in the 2030s. Strategic assessments that Israeli submarines possess a nuclear second-strike capability have now turned from perception to fact.

The modern core of the Israeli Navy’s surface force consists of four Sa’ar 6 corvettes built in Germany. These ships, with a displacement of approximately 2,000 tons, are equipped with advanced Israeli-made radars, Gabriel 5 anti-ship missiles, and modern air defense systems. Sa’ar 6-class corvettes are considered one of the most heavily armed surface warships in the world in terms of the density of weapon systems carried per ton. Israel has adopted a design approach that provides high firepower, advanced electronic systems, and multi-layered air defense on relatively small ships instead of large-tonnage platforms. However, high technological equipment does not guarantee the absolute safety of Israeli warships against asymmetric threats. Indeed, on July 14, 2006, during the Lebanon War, the Israeli Navy’s Sa’ar 5-class corvette INS Hanit was hit off the coast of Beirut by an anti-ship missile assessed to be from the Chinese-designed C-802 family fired by Hezbollah, resulting in the deaths of four sailors and causing serious damage to the ship.

On the other hand, it aims to increase domestic platform production with five Reshef-class warships, the construction of which has begun at the Israel Shipyards in Haifa. The commissioning of the INS Nahshon and INS Komemiyut landing ships, built in the USA, shows that Israel is investing in amphibious operations and maritime logistics support capacity again after about thirty years.

In conclusion, although Israel possesses a navy capable of providing high firepower and technological superiority in near-sea areas and supporting its strategic deterrence with its submarines, it has not yet reached an integrated naval power capable of continuously protecting maritime transport lines extending from Gibraltar to the Bab el-Mandeb, conducting long-term operations in distant seas, and rapidly compensating for its losses with its own industrial infrastructure when necessary. The fundamental reason behind Netanyahu’s new search for naval power is the elimination of this capacity gap.

SHIPBUILDING AND BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR CAPACITY OF ISRAELI SHIPYARDS

The fundamental structural weakness of the Israeli naval defense industry is the imbalance between its ability to develop advanced technology-based weapon and electronic systems and its capacity for the construction, docking, and heavy damage repair of large warships. Possessing significant technological competence in radar, missiles, electronic warfare, command and control, and unmanned systems, Israel continues its dependence on foreign shipyards for the construction of large surface warships and submarines. The fact that the Sa’ar 6 corvettes and Dolphin-class submarines were built in Germany, and the new landing ships in the USA, are concrete indicators of this dependence.

One of the areas where Israel’s technological competence stands out is unmanned maritime systems. The Seagull unmanned surface vehicle developed by Elbit and the BlueWhale autonomous underwater vehicle developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) are important examples for anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence missions. These systems reflect Israel’s approach of balancing its limited personnel and platform capacity with technology-intensive solutions. However, these high-tech capabilities do not replace the heavy industrial infrastructure needed for the construction and repair of large platforms.

Israel has serious weaknesses in docking ships. For example, in the event that a 30,000-ton tanker receives heavy underwater damage, it is not possible for them to dock this ship. Israel Shipyards in Haifa has a significant infrastructure for the construction, maintenance, and repair of platforms at the scale of fast attack craft, patrol boats, and corvettes, with a ship-lift system with a lifting capacity of approximately 3,000 tons, maintenance workshops, and production facilities. However, this capacity is limited in terms of docking large-tonnage merchant ships or the simultaneous repair of multiple military platforms that have received heavy battle damage. The fact that manufacturer support may be needed for advanced hull and system repairs of US and German-made corvettes and German-made submarines also creates a significant dependency in terms of wartime repair times. The concentration of Israel’s important maritime industry and naval facilities around Haifa creates additional risks in terms of the continuity of production, maintenance, and repair activities in a high-intensity war.

In conclusion, Israel is a naval power that can equip its warships with advanced weapon and electronic systems, but continues its foreign dependence in the construction of large platforms and faces significant limitations in terms of heavy damage repair capacity. In a long-term and high-intensity naval war, what is decisive is not only the combat capabilities of existing ships. The time it takes for damaged ships to return to operations, the ability of shipyards to continue their activities under wartime conditions, and the speed at which lost platforms can be replaced are also fundamental elements that determine the sustainability of naval power. In this respect, the technological advancement of Israel’s naval defense industry does not completely eliminate its structural limitations in shipbuilding and repair infrastructure.

COAST GUARD MODEL?

There is no independent, large-scale, and nationwide authorized Coast Guard Command in Israel in the sense that exists in Turkey. Tasks related to maritime security, maritime safety, search and rescue, port inspection, and protection of the marine environment are shared between the navy, maritime police, port authorities, and the Administration of Shipping and Ports under the Ministry of Transport. This administration is responsible for ship and seafarer registries, seaworthiness, port state control, licensing of small boats, maritime traffic, and the implementation of international maritime legislation.

The Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Center in Haifa operates on a 24-hour basis, coordinating responses to maritime accidents and distress calls. Therefore, although there are civil maritime administration and maritime safety institutions in Israel, a significant portion of law enforcement and security duties at sea are carried out directly within the military structure.

This model is different from the coast guard understanding adopted by many maritime states, including Turkey. In tasks such as ensuring safety of life and property at sea, maintaining public order, combating smuggling, protecting the marine environment, and conducting search and rescue activities, the essential approach is not military operations, but law enforcement, maritime safety, proportionality, and, when necessary, graduated use of force.

In Israel, the fact that maritime security is carried out largely by the navy increases the impact of military threat assessment on civil maritime activities. The direct involvement of the navy in practices such as the naval blockade off the coast of Gaza, interventions against Palestinian fishermen, and the stopping of foreign civilian ships are examples of this. This leads to some activities that could normally be carried out by coast guard or maritime law enforcement units being performed by military forces. Thus, the weakening of the distinction between security and safety at sea brings the use of military force to the forefront in relations with civilian mariners.

One of the most striking examples of this approach is the Mavi Marmara raid that took place in international waters on May 31, 2010. As a result of the intervention of Israeli naval commandos with helicopters and speedboats against the civilian ship carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza, ten people lost their lives. The incident brought the legal limits of using military force against civilian maritime vessels and the proportionality of the intervention to the center of international debates. The intervention, which Israel defended on security grounds, was found to be unlawful by the investigation panel within the UN Human Rights Council, and the Palmer Panel established by the UN Secretary-General evaluated the force used in the intervention as excessive and unreasonable.

The issue that needs to be emphasized here is not just institutional organization. In modern maritime states, the coast guard forms an important legal and institutional interface between the military force and the civil maritime society. It is as much a representative of maritime professional culture, international cooperation, proportionality, and, when necessary, diplomatic tact as it is of the exercise of authority at sea. The power of a maritime state should be measured not only by its ability to use weapons at sea, but also by its capacity to maintain order without using weapons, protect the rights of civilian mariners, and establish trust-based relationships with the international maritime community.

MARITIME LAW AND ISRAEL

Israel is not a party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, it applies the provisions of the convention within the scope of customary law. It utilizes this legal framework in its practices regarding maritime jurisdiction areas. Concrete examples of this are the EEZ delimitation agreement it signed with the Greek Cypriot Administration on December 17, 2010, and the maritime delimitation it carried out with Lebanon under US mediation on October 27, 2022. While the median line approach was taken as the basis in the first agreement, the second arrangement provided an economic and political compromise for the development of the Karish and Qana natural gas fields between two states that do not have diplomatic relations. Thus, Israel has placed its maritime jurisdiction areas and energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean into a legal framework by utilizing the principles of UNCLOS, which has gained the status of customary law, even though it is not a party to it.

However, it would be incomplete to evaluate Israel’s approach to maritime law only through these agreements. In particular, the Gaza blockade and interventions against civilian ships in international waters are concrete evidence that Israel does not recognize the law in its practices regarding the use of force at sea and freedom of navigation.

In this respect, Israel’s approach to maritime law shows a completely interest-oriented character. While it utilizes international customary law in the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, the operation of natural gas resources, and the securing of economic rights, it does not recognize the law in matters of military force use at sea and interference with civilian maritime transport.

MERCHANT FLEET AND PORTS: DEPENDENCE ON THE SEA AND STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY

As of 2025, the Israeli-owned merchant fleet, which consists of approximately 60 ships and has a carrying capacity of 2.56 million DWT according to 2024 data, is quite limited when compared to the country’s high dependence on the sea for its foreign trade. Foreign-flagged and chartered ships play an important role in Israel-linked maritime transport. Israel is a country that conducts approximately 99 percent of its foreign trade by tonnage via sea, but does not have a national merchant fleet of a size to meet this dependence. The main centers of maritime trade are the ports of Haifa and Ashdod on the Mediterranean coast. Modern container terminals that have entered service in these two ports since 2021 have significantly increased Israel’s maritime trade capacity. The Bayport terminal in Haifa is operated by the Chinese Shanghai International Group. Approximately 3.45 million TEU containers were handled in Israeli ports in 2025.

The most important company in Israel’s maritime trade is ZIM, which engages in global container shipping. However, the ships operated by ZIM, which was founded in 1945, and Israel’s national merchant fleet should not be confused. While the company operated 128 ships at the end of 2025, it owned only 16 of them; the remaining 112 ships were chartered. Although ZIM, which has a carrying capacity of approximately 708 thousand TEU, has a strong international logistics network, it provides the majority of its ship capacity from foreign shipowners. This situation increases Israel’s dependence on foreign shipowners, insurance companies, and the international charter market during periods of war and crisis.

The most concrete example of this vulnerability was experienced in Eilat, Israel’s only port opening to the Red Sea. As a result of the attacks by Ansar Allah on maritime transport in the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea after 2023, the number of ships calling at Eilat fell from approximately 134 in 2023 to 16 in 2024, the port’s automobile imports stopped completely, and its revenues decreased by approximately 80 percent. Moreover, it was not necessary for the port to be directly occupied or physically destroyed for this to happen. The withdrawal of shipowners and insurers from the region due to increasing security risks has largely rendered the port economically inoperable. On the other hand, according to the Bank of Israel, the use of the Cape of Good Hope route in maritime transport from China to Israel increases the distance by approximately 114 percent. The Eilat example shows that it is not necessarily required to seize sea control for maritime transport to be interrupted, and that creating a sufficient level of threat and insurance risk can also have strategic consequences.

Israel is integrated into the international reinsurance and P&I system in the field of maritime insurance. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have also revealed the importance of war risk insurance for Israeli maritime trade.

Ultimately, although Israel has advanced port infrastructure and an important company in global container shipping, it is far from the capacity to secure its maritime transport with its own national fleet. Israel’s dependence on maritime trade is high, while its capacity to maintain and protect this trade with its own means is limited. One of the main economic and strategic reasons behind Netanyahu’s goal of expanding naval power is this structural imbalance.

OFFSHORE ENERGY: THE INCREASING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SEAS

One of the important reasons for the transformation in Israel’s maritime strategy is the natural gas resources discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean. In Israel, which has approximately 850 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, Tamar started production in 2013, Leviathan in 2020, and Karish in 2022. Israel consumes a significant portion of the approximately 27 billion cubic meters of gas it produced in 2024 in the domestic market. Natural gas meets more than 70 percent of the country’s electricity production. The remaining gas is mainly exported to Egypt and Jordan. In this context, Israel’s gas exports to Egypt are an important development in Eastern Mediterranean energy geopolitics. In August 2025, a $35 billion agreement was announced covering the sale of an additional approximately 130 billion cubic meters of gas from the Leviathan field to Egypt. Israeli gas is consumed in Egypt or can be delivered to international markets from the Idku and Damietta LNG facilities. Thus, Egypt is becoming an important hub for Israeli gas’s access to Europe. A similar energy corridor is developing between the GCA and Egypt. While it is planned that Italian ENI and French Total will export the gas from the GCA’s Kronos field via Egypt, the American ExxonMobil company is also working on transporting the gas to be extracted from the GCA’s Glavkos and Pegasus fields to Egypt. Thus, a new regional energy network is taking shape between Israel, the GCA, and Egypt with the participation of American and European companies. This situation generally affects Mediterranean geopolitics. One of the reasons why Egypt is in the anti-Turkey bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean with the GCA, Greece, and Israel is its dependence on Israel for energy.

All these developments have increased Israel’s economic and strategic dependence on the seas. The protection of the Tamar, Leviathan, and Karish fields, submarine pipelines, and coastal facilities has entered among the priority tasks of the navy. The equipping of the Sa’ar 6 corvettes built in Germany with advanced air defense and surveillance systems is also a result of this need.

ISRAEL’S MARITIME EDUCATION, SCIENCE, AND CULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Israel has been an IMO member since 1952 and, although it is not a party to UNCLOS, it is largely integrated into international maritime regulations. The Acre Maritime College, founded in 1938, stands out in maritime education, while the University of Haifa, Technion, and the Israel Oceanographic and Limnological Research Institute stand out in scientific research. These institutions create a significant academic and technological infrastructure in the fields of maritime technologies, oceanography, marine engineering, underwater systems, and maritime strategy. In particular, the relationship between marine sciences and the defense industry is one of Israel’s strengths. On the other hand, the fishing fleet of approximately 350 boats in the Mediterranean is quite limited. Despite high seafood consumption, there is an import dependence in production. Although the marina and yachting infrastructure is small-scale compared to Turkey, international successes have been achieved in sailing and windsurfing. Maritime museums in Haifa create a national maritime memory by associating maritime history with Jewish immigration, the establishment of the state, and the development of the navy. Maritime publishing is mainly based on digital and academic sources.

CONCLUSION: CAN ISRAEL BE A MARITIME STATE?

When all the elements that make up Israel’s maritime power are evaluated together, the fundamental conclusion that emerges is that it is a state that has not been able to develop its maritime power to the same extent despite its high degree of dependence on the sea. Israel has gained significant capabilities in advanced defense technologies, missile systems, electronic warfare, marine sciences, and offshore energy infrastructure. However, these technological successes do not replace the economic, industrial, social, and cultural infrastructure necessary for a country to be a maritime state.

The first limitation facing Israel is geography. It has a coastline of approximately 190 kilometers in the Eastern Mediterranean, a narrow outlet in the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea, and limited port options. The fact that maritime trade is largely conducted via Haifa and Ashdod, the serious loss of function of the Eilat Port due to Houthi attacks, and the openness of maritime transport to external threats reveal this geographical vulnerability. Israel’s dependence on the seas is high, but its capacity to secure maritime transport with its own national means is limited.

The second limitation is economic and industrial. Although Israel is advanced in high technology and defense electronics, it is dependent on the outside for the construction of large warships and submarines. The national merchant fleet, shipbuilding industry, shipyard, and battle damage repair infrastructure have not reached a size proportional to the country’s dependence on maritime trade. The technology, finance, and services-weighted structure of the Israeli economy also limits the creation of a large-scale maritime industry. What is decisive for the sustainability of naval power is not only having modern warships, but also being able to build these ships, repair them, compensate for their losses, and maintain maritime trade uninterruptedly.

The third and deeper limitation is in the historical and sociocultural structure. Unlike historical maritime states, Israel’s state-building process has been shaped essentially around land-centered security, settlement, and border issues. In its social memory and security culture, land forces, air power, and intelligence are in a decisive position. Despite developments in maritime education, marine sciences, and water sports, maritime has not yet turned into a deep-rooted cultural structure that spreads to broad segments of society and integrates economic production and national strategy. What is in question here is not immutable biological characteristics, but social and strategic behavioral patterns formed in the historical process.

Netanyahu’s statements on October 4, 2026, which highlight naval superiority, show that the importance given to the maritime dimension in Israel’s security understanding has increased. However, strengthening the navy and a state’s truly becoming a maritime power are not the same thing. Being a maritime state requires creating a sustainable power that feeds each other in all areas, from the merchant fleet to shipyards, from fishing to marine sciences, from ports to maritime culture.

In conclusion, considering its existing geographical limitations, historical and sociocultural structure, economic priorities, and foreign dependencies in the maritime industry, Israel does not have the conditions to transform into a comprehensive and independent maritime power in the classical sense in the foreseeable future. However, it is possible for it to develop an advanced-technology, limited but effective regional navy. This situation also creates Israel’s fundamental contradiction at sea. Israel’s economic and strategic dependence on the seas is increasing, but its holistic national maritime capacity to meet this dependence is not developing at the same speed. Israel can increase its naval power, but it does not seem possible for it to close the structural gap between naval power and national maritime power in a short time.

Israel is aware of these structural weaknesses in its maritime power. For this reason, it is not trying to ensure maritime security only with its own navy, but aims to expand its sphere of influence through administrations and partnerships close to it along strategic maritime transport routes. The North African coasts extending from Morocco to Libya in the west, and Somaliland, Bab el-Mandeb, Socotra, and the Red Sea surroundings in the east are important in this respect.

The close relations Israel has developed with Greece and the GCA should also be evaluated within the same strategic framework. For Israel, Greece is an important partner in maritime transport and energy connections extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Aegean and Europe; the GCA is in a position that can provide strategic depth with its geographical proximity, ports, airports, and energy infrastructure. Trilateral defense cooperation, joint exercises, maritime security arrangements, and projects such as the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) are concrete elements of these relations. Furthermore, Turkey’s policies regarding its naval power and maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean are an important factor in the evaluation of the strategic relations Israel has developed with these two countries. It has now turned into open policy that this cooperation carries an anti-Turkey balancing dimension. Ultimately, Israel is trying to complete the strategic depth that its own geography and maritime capacity cannot provide with political, military, energy, and intelligence partnerships extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea. However, this approach based on external partnerships does not replace an independent and sustainable national maritime power.