From Preveza to Blue Homeland: The Turk's reunion with the sea after 488 years

The future of the Turks lies not only in Anatolia, but in the seas surrounding Anatolia. The goal is not just to go out to sea, but to never return from it.

488 years ago, on September 27, 1538, the Turkish Navy, formed by the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary States, defeated the Crusader Coalition Navy—composed of ships from the Papacy, Venice, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, and Genoa—in the Battle of Preveza in the Adriatic Sea. This victory initiated a period of peace that would last for 33 years, until the defeat at Lepanto in 1571. On the other hand, the era of competition and war with Spain and the Knights of Malta continued. It is necessary to read the success of Preveza well and draw lessons for today.

WHY DID THIS BATTLE TAKE PLACE?

The Naval Victory of Preveza occurred as a result of the Ottoman Empire transitioning beyond being a land power to becoming a major naval power in the Mediterranean in the first half of the 16th century. With Suleiman the Magnificent appointing Barbaros (Hayreddin) Pasha as Kapudan Pasha (Grand Admiral) in 1534, the Navy of the Barbary States in North Africa became integrated with Ottoman state strategy. The Ottoman advance toward the Aegean islands and the Central Mediterranean began to threaten, in particular, Venice's maritime trade and island dominance, as well as the Habsburg order of Charles V.

The breaking point of the tension was the Corfu Campaign in 1537 and the subsequent operations by Barbaros against islands under Venetian rule. A large Holy League navy was formed at the initiative of Pope Paul III, who wanted to stop the Ottoman advance. Command was given to Andrea Doria of Genoa, one of the most famous European sailors of the time. Thus, Preveza was, in reality, less of a personal struggle between Barbaros and Doria, and more of a naval showdown in the Ottoman-Habsburg/Venetian power struggle that would determine who would hold strategic influence in the Mediterranean in the future.

WHAT HAPPENED IN THE BATTLE?

On September 27, 1538, the two navies faced each other around the Gulf of Preveza and Arta. Although the number of ships in the sources varies, there is a general consensus that the Holy League fleet was significantly larger than the Ottoman navy. In contrast, Barbaros's forces had a more balanced command structure. The fact that Ottoman galleys could move with oar power provided a significant advantage in maneuverability and freedom of movement in light wind conditions. Hayreddin also made good use of the coastal, shallow, and wind conditions around Preveza, while the fact that the Venetian, Papal, Spanish, and Genoese elements under Doria's command had different interests and priorities was one of the alliance's major weaknesses.

On September 27, 1538, instead of remaining trapped in the Gulf of Preveza, Barbaros took the initiative by bringing his fleet out into the open sea. In the battle, which lasted about five hours, the Ottoman fleet's agile galleys were effective against the large Christian ships that were more dependent on the wind. When Barbaros's maneuvers threatened the order of Doria's forces, Andrea Doria chose to withdraw his fleet toward Corfu rather than continue a general pitched battle. For this reason, Preveza is not a battle like the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar, where the enemy fleet was completely destroyed. It was a strategic victory in which Hayreddin Pasha thwarted the attempt of a coalition fleet much larger than his own to destroy the Ottoman navy and forced it to withdraw from the battlefield.

Thus, the great coalition formed by Europe could not push back Ottoman naval power; on the contrary, the Ottomans' freedom of movement over the Aegean, the entrances to the Adriatic, and the Eastern and Central Mediterranean was strengthened. Military pressure on Venice continued, and with the peace of 1540, a significant portion of Ottoman gains was accepted. While Barbaros's military reputation in Europe rose extraordinarily, a greater transformation took place in Ottoman history. The great land power of the Suleiman era merged with the naval power of Barbaros. Thus, the natural requirement of the peninsula geography was fulfilled, and the Ottoman Empire had transformed into a power capable of ruling both the continent and the sea at the same time.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTORY AND NAVAL POWER

This victory was not an ordinary naval battle in Turkish history. Preveza was historical proof of how much power the Turks living in Anatolia could generate when they grasped the true character of the geography they sat upon and combined the opportunities this geography offered with the reason, science, technology, and maritime culture of the age. 488 years have passed. Today, with the Blue Homeland, we are once again facing the same geopolitical reality. Anatolia is a peninsula, and peninsula geography is a great power geography as long as it is integrated with the sea. Reading Anatolia only through land is to give up half of this unique geography.

Anatolia is a large peninsula on the east-west axis. It connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean via the Turkish Straits, Europe to Asia via the Balkans, and the Suez and Indian Ocean systems to the interior of Eurasia via the Eastern Mediterranean. A state established in such a geography grows to the extent that it turns toward the sea; it loses the strategic potential offered by its own geography to the extent that it moves away from the sea. History is full of examples of this. Rome could only transform the opportunities offered by the Italian peninsula into Mediterranean power by defeating Carthage at sea. Portugal and Spain on the Iberian Peninsula turned into world-scale empires when they went out to sea. England built a global empire by combining its island geography with naval power. The geopolitical law of Anatolia is no different. However, geography alone does not create power. Geography is potential; what turns it into power is human reason, science, technology, institutions, and strategy.

The Ottoman Empire achieved this in the 16th century. 1453 was not just the conquest of Istanbul. As the geopolitical disconnect between Anatolia and the Balkans disappeared, the Turks were settling into the center of the Black Sea, Aegean, and Mediterranean system. From the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, the importance of naval power began to be better understood. However, the real leap occurred in the 16th century with the merger of the Ottoman central state power and the highly dynamic maritime culture of the Barbary States.

THE NAVY OF THE BARBARY STATES

The Navy of the Barbary States was a fleet initially established independently of the Ottomans in Algiers and Tunis by the brothers Oruç and Hızır (Barbaros), but after 1518, it came under the control of Istanbul and maintained a presence in the central, and sometimes Western Mediterranean and even the Atlantic. The Libyan states later joined this fleet. The Navy of the Barbary States was more effective in the operational and tactical field than the Ottoman Navy. The most famous sailors who have gone down in Ottoman naval history were raised in the Barbary States. The vast majority of the sailors came from the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts and the Karaman Province. Although there were sailors of Greek, Dubrovnik (Ragusa), Maltese, Venetian, Genoese, Dutch, Irish, Scottish, and English origin among the foreign maritime sources, the heads of the states and all the leaders were Anatolian Turks. Today, those who carry the surnames Kuloğlu and Koloğlu are the children of these sailor ancestors. The reason these sailors were more advanced than the Ottomans was that they were far from the political infighting of the palace and the quagmire of bribery and nepotism aimed at primitive accumulation. The best period of cooperation between the Navy of the Barbary States and the Ottoman Navy was the period between Preveza and Lepanto.

Oruç Reis, Hızır Reis, Turgut Reis, and the sailors of the Barbary States they trained were not just warriors. They were sailors who lived the Mediterranean, knew its winds, currents, ports, islands, trade routes, and rivals. The Barbary States were also surprisingly pragmatic structures within the conditions of the period. It was more important what knowledge and talent were useful for than where they came from. It was largely this rational approach that created success in maritime affairs.

THE GOLDEN AGE OF MARITIME

With Hızır Hayrettin (Barbaros Hayreddin) Pasha entering the service of Suleiman the Magnificent in 1533, the state capacity of Istanbul and the operational experience of the Barbary States were combined. Five years later, Preveza came. The period that began after Preveza was one of the highest levels Turkish naval power reached in world politics.

The true magnitude of the victory was seen in subsequent developments. In 1541, Charles V's attempt to eliminate Algiers failed. From 1542, the Ottoman Navy maintained a presence in the Western Mediterranean with a large force of 136 ships within the framework of an alliance with France. Nice was besieged in a joint operation with the French Navy, and the Ottoman fleet wintered in Toulon. An Istanbul-based empire was no longer just defending the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean; it was determining the balance of power in the Western Mediterranean. In 1551, Turgut Reis took Tripoli. Turkish naval presence in North Africa with Algiers and Tunis was strengthened. The period between 1543 and 1560 was a time when Turkish naval power was felt almost everywhere in the Mediterranean.

The 1560 Djerba operation is perhaps one of the most striking examples of this capacity. The Ottoman Navy, under the command of Piyale Pasha, left Istanbul and reached the Tunis-Djerba region in about 20 days and achieved results against Spanish forces. Considering the galleys of the period, which moved with oars and limited sail power, and the distance, this was an extraordinary operational tempo. The pursuit and destruction of the retreating Spanish fleet were also extremely important in terms of naval warfare history. When Piyale Pasha's victorious navy returned to the Golden Horn on October 1, 1560, the scene witnessed by the Flemish diplomat Busbecq described the peak reached by Ottoman naval power. If there was a moment when a state could claim to completely control a sea that could not be mastered, according to him, that day was being lived. It is no coincidence that the peak of the Ottoman Empire's political and military power and the peak of Turkish naval power coincided with the same period.

REASON, SCIENCE, AND NAVAL POWER

At the foundation of the success of 16th-century Turkish naval power was not just courage or heroism. The Ottoman Empire had not yet broken away from the military and naval technology of its age. There was no insurmountable technology gap between it and its rivals in cannon casting, shipbuilding, cartography, navigation, fortification, and logistics. Piri Reis's world maps are the product of such a mental environment. A maritime ecosystem had formed, living between Istanbul shipyards, the Barbary States, the Aegean islands, and Mediterranean ports. The state had not yet entered into a rigid mental closure regarding the use of the knowledge and people it needed. If knowledge was useful, it was used; if technology was needed, it was bought or developed; and talented sailors could be included in the system regardless of their origin.

THE 100-YEAR DELAYED TRANSITION FROM GALLEY TO GALLEON

Here we come to one of the most important breaking points in Turkish history. Behind the rise in the 16th century was a pragmatic state understanding that did not make reason and faith enemies of each other. The problem was not religion; the problem was the gradual narrowing of reason, questioning, science, and merit in later periods. As transmitted knowledge was placed ahead of rational and scientific knowledge, obedience began to replace questioning, and conservatism began to replace innovation. This is where the mental foundation of the retreat at sea was formed.

At this very period, world maritime was undergoing a major technological transformation. The traditional warship of the Mediterranean was the galley. It moved with oar power, was less dependent on the wind, and mostly determined the outcome of the battle by boarding the enemy ship and having the warriors on board fight hand-to-hand. However, another ship and another war culture were developing in the Atlantic world. This ship was the galleon, with high sides, a large sail area, and heavy broadside cannons. This was not just a new ship replacing the galley; it was a brand-new war system.

In the galley, human muscle was the primary driving force. In the galleon, it was necessary to read the wind, manage the sails, create routes according to changing winds, make use of astronomy, use maps, and know gunnery and ballistics. In other words, naval warfare was gradually shifting from muscle power to knowledge power. While European states opening up to the Atlantic were integrating shipbuilding technology with astronomy, mathematics, cartography, gunnery, and navigation science, the great test before the Ottomans was whether they could adapt to this transformation.

THE LEPANTO DEFEAT

The defeat at Lepanto on October 7, 1571, was a warning in this respect. Just 33 years after Preveza, the Ottoman Navy suffered a great disaster. At the head of the navy was Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, who did not have a maritime background. The battle turned into a catastrophe in which tens of thousands of people were lost within a few hours. The Ottomans were able to rebuild their ships in a short time. However, the real value lost was not the ships; it was the manpower with maritime experience accumulated over generations. The captains, masters, gunners, and sailors had been lost in a few hours. However, it is not correct to see Lepanto as the date when Ottoman naval power ended in one day. The Ottomans continued to remain a significant naval power in the Mediterranean for a long time. But Lepanto was the harbinger of the great transformation to come.

THE IMPACT OF CONSERVATISM ON MARITIME

The real danger was in the field of technology and mentality. The demolition of Taqi ad-Din's Istanbul Observatory in 1580 as a result of the religious and political infighting of the period is therefore one of the most striking symbols of Turkish history. Even more tragic is the use of naval artillery in the demolition. A state's warships were firing on the institution where the astronomical knowledge that would allow those warships to find their way on the high seas in the future was being produced. While Europe was combining astronomy, mathematics, shipbuilding, gunnery, and navigation science within the same technological system, the Ottomans began to increasingly remain outside this scientific transformation. The approximately one-century delay in the transition from galley to galleon is therefore not just a delay in ship technology. It is actually a mentality delay. It is not enough to build a large hull to make a galleon. It is necessary to train the captain, officer, sailor, gunner, cartographer, and navigation expert who will use it; and behind them, it is necessary to establish mathematics, astronomy, hydrography, and a strong education system. The bill for moving away from science was eventually paid at sea.

RETREATING TO ANATOLIA AS WE MOVED AWAY FROM THE SEA

Subsequent centuries showed the same historical law again and again. 1770 Çeşme, 1827 Navarino, and 1853 Sinop were not just naval losses. Every major naval disaster was accompanied by a further narrowing of Ottoman geopolitics. The closing of the navy to the Golden Horn at the end of the 19th century was the culmination of this process. The Ottoman Empire entered the 20th century deprived of a strong and usable navy. North Africa was lost, the Aegean islands were lost. In 1911, Italian warships were able to come to the mouth of the Dardanelles. In the Balkan War, Greece established naval control and occupied the Aegean islands. In 1915, the world's largest navies came before the Dardanelles. On May 15, 1919, the Greek army landed in İzmir from the sea. History was showing the same truth again and again: as the Turk retreated at sea, he was retreating to defense in Anatolia.

BREAKING THE CHAIN

It was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who broke this chain. The order he gave to his armies on September 1, 1922, "Your first target is the Mediterranean. Forward!" was not just a military pursuit order in this respect. It was the answer to the geopolitics of Sèvres, which tried to cut the Turks off from the seas. The Turks were reaching the sea again. The Republican Navy was rebuilt in the midst of scarcity. With the 1936 Montreux Convention, sovereignty over the Turkish Straits was consolidated. With the Hatay Wedge in 1938, the Gulf of İskenderun became subject to the internal waters regime. With the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, the most important geopolitical obstacle to Turkey's encirclement from the south in the Eastern Mediterranean was created. With the 1996 Kardak Crisis, it was reminded to the Greeks that we are the stubborn followers of our presence in the Aegean. The Republic was learning the naval geopolitics lost in the final periods of the Ottoman Empire step by step.

BLUE HOMELAND

In the 21st century, the name of the Turks' reunion with the sea became the Blue Homeland. The Blue Homeland is not just a geographical concept expressing Turkey's maritime jurisdiction areas. From the beginning, it has emerged as a symbol, a concept, and a doctrine. First and foremost, it is the Turkish nation's ideal of becoming a maritime power. The historical link between Preveza and the Blue Homeland is established right here. The essence of what Barbaros achieved in 1538 and what Turkey needs to achieve in the 21st century is the same. To create a strong, independent, and maritime state by combining the unique geographical potential offered by Anatolia with the reason, science, technology, and trained human power of the age.

Of course, the technology of the age has changed. In Barbaros's world, the basic elements of naval power were the galley, cannon, shipyard, rower, marine, and trained sailor manpower. Today, there are submarines, unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles, long-range precision weapons, cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, cyber power, satellite reconnaissance and surveillance networks, and seabed systems. Technology has changed; but geopolitics has not. Anatolia is still in the same geography. The Turkish Straits are still the key to the Black Sea. The Aegean is still the western front of Anatolia. Cyprus is still the most important strategic island in the south of Anatolia. The Eastern Mediterranean still opens to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean via Suez. Turkey is still a peninsula state surrounded by seas on three sides.

For this reason, the real question to be asked in the 488th year of Preveza is not how many ships Barbaros sank or how many ships were under Andrea Doria's command. The question that should be asked is: Will Turkey be able to recombine the great power potential offered by its geography with the reason, science, and technology of the 21st century? The true legacy of Preveza is within this question. Our ancestors achieved this in the 16th century. They read the geography correctly, did not break away from the technology of their age, built shipyards, trained sailors, used merit, and combined the maritime accumulation of the Mediterranean formed over centuries with state power. As a result, they became one of the determining powers of the Mediterranean within a few decades.

The decline also began with the reversal of the same relationship. As we moved away from reason and science, as "transmission" was said instead of reason, as technological developments could not be followed, as conservatism and dogma replaced merit, and as maritime was moved away from the center of state reason, superiority at sea eroded. The decline in naval power did not just mean the weakening of the navy; it led to geopolitical consequences extending to the loss of islands, coasts, sea routes, and finally the motherland over time. The last five centuries of Turkish history give us a very clear lesson. A peninsula state that retreats at sea also loses strategic depth on land.

For this reason, the Blue Homeland is not just the name of today's struggle for maritime jurisdiction areas. It is a strategic conclusion drawn from five centuries of historical experience. We should look at Preveza not just to boast about our past, but to shape our future. Barbaros's legacy is not his galleys; Barbaros's true legacy is understanding his age and turning the tools of his age into state power. Piri Reis's legacy is not just the maps he drew; it is turning knowledge into strategic power. Atatürk's legacy is not just rebuilding the Republican Navy; it is making reason, science, and independence the compass of the state.

The future of the Blue Homeland is also tied to the same understanding. Turkey's becoming a maritime power does not just mean having more warships. The navy is the indispensable and armed element of naval power, but maritime power is a broader concept than the navy. Shipyards, ports, merchant fleet, maritime transport, fishing, marine sciences, oceanography, maritime law, maritime technologies, seabed resources, energy, poles, space, and oceans are all parts of the same strategic whole. A state's true maritime power arises from the sum of the economic, military, scientific, technological, legal, and cultural relationship its nation establishes with the sea. The ultimate goal of the Blue Homeland is, beyond defending maritime jurisdiction areas, to make Turkey a maritime power in all its dimensions.

This truth was at the foundation of Preveza. The same truth is at the foundation of the Blue Homeland. 488 years have passed. In this long historical process, Turks grew in periods when they turned to the sea; they retreated toward Anatolia in periods when they moved away from the sea. The Republic, especially during the Atatürk era, turned this historical orientation back to the sea. Today, the Blue Homeland is the intellectual framework that carries the Republic's maritime process to a new stage within the geopolitical and technological conditions of the 21st century.

Anatolia is a peninsula. Peninsula geography only turns into a great power geography when it is integrated with the sea. However, geography alone is not destiny. The condition for turning geography into power is the same today as it was yesterday. Reason, science, technology, merit, production, and maritime culture are its main parameters. 488 years after Preveza, the historical task before the Turks is not to reunite with the sea, but this time to never break away from the sea again. It should not be forgotten that in today's conjuncture, there is no room for even a pause, let alone a decline, in our naval power.

The fact that Turks have remained away from the sea for long periods, the strong land-based state tradition extending from the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire to the Republican era, and the limited representation of sailors in the state's high decision-making mechanisms make Turkey's development of a strong doctrine in maritime geopolitics even more remarkable. Today, there is not only a growing and technologically transforming Turkish Navy before our rivals, but a Turkey that is trying to rediscover the sea with its economic, military, legal, scientific, and cultural dimensions. Behind and in front of the Blue Homeland is the Republican Navy representing the Turkish nation in the seas, but the real power that will make it permanent is the Turkish nation's becoming a maritime power.

One of the main goals of the Blue Homeland is for Turkey to make peace with its own geography. Because Turkey's becoming a maritime power is not a temporary foreign policy preference, but a long-term necessity imposed by geography and historical experience. State policies may change over time, governments may come and go, the international system may take different forms, but the peninsula nature of Anatolia will not change. The flow of history cannot be stopped. Turkey will become a maritime power as a requirement of its geopolitics and sociology.

It is meaningful to end this long historical journey with the striking observation of a European who looked at the Turkish naval power potential from the outside in the 17th century. The thought expressed by the British ambassador Ricaut de la Marlinière about the Turks centuries ago still deserves to be dwelt upon today:

"To cover their neglect and to throw off the failures they have encountered in this regard, the Turks say that God gave the seas to the Christians and the lands to the Muslims. For the common interests of the Christians, we wish that they never wake up from this deep sleep, because if the Turks ever put their minds to being powerful at sea and work as they should, let no one doubt that the whole world will bow before them."

This is what the 488-year historical line from Preveza to the Blue Homeland tells us.