Kemalism in the 21st Century: A Geopolitical Necessity for Turkey

Kemalism, which founded the Republic, is the immortal founding state philosophy that will elevate Turkey once again in the great power competition of the 21st century and carry it to the geopolitical position it deserves.

The global order has changed irreversibly. The international system, which for nearly eighty years relied on American military, economic, and financial superiority, has entered a process of dissolution and collapse. The order presented as “Pax Americana” after 1945 gradually transformed, with the end of the Cold War, into “Bellum Americana”—a period of hegemony maintained through wars and crises. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia, the destruction of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, color revolutions, economic sanctions, proxy wars, and the eastward expansion of NATO have been the milestones of this era. The mass destruction and genocide in Gaza since the end of 2023 are not only a humanitarian tragedy but also the clearest indication that the rhetoric of a “rules-based order” has been effectively abandoned by its own founders. The fact that international law, the United Nations system, the Geneva Conventions, and the principle of state sovereignty have become dysfunctional in the face of the political preferences of great powers has severely eroded the legitimacy of the order established after World War II.

The Russia-Ukraine War that began in 2022, the events in Gaza after 2023, the attacks on maritime transport in the Red Sea, and finally the 12-Day Iran War in 2025, followed by the Iran, Israel, and US war that began on February 28, 2026, along with new regional conflicts, have revealed that neither wars nor the international system operate by the old rules. Military power, production capacity, technology, energy security, and geopolitical resilience have become more decisive than international law. The world is returning to a classical geopolitics based on balances of power. In this process, the weaponization of geography and the strengthening of eschatology are noteworthy.

The most important geopolitical reality Turkey faces in the second century of the Republic is that the Black Sea and the Mediterranean have once again become the main geostrategic stage for global power struggles. At the center of this struggle lies the strategic weakening or fragmentation of Russia, the containment of China to limit its global rise, and the establishment of a regional order that supports Israel’s geopolitical goals along with its eschatological vision. The competition between the collective West, represented by the US, the European Union, and NATO, and the resistance axis forming against it, has turned the Black Sea and Mediterranean basin into the defining geopolitical battleground of the 21st century.

The Mediterranean is not merely an inland sea stretching between Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is the center of the global maritime system that connects the Black Sea to the interior of Eurasia via the Turkish Straits, to the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Indo-Pacific via the Suez Canal, and to the Atlantic via the Strait of Gibraltar. In other words, the Mediterranean is the maritime lock of Eurasia. The power that controls this lock can influence not only the Eastern Mediterranean but also the geopolitical balance of Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and Eurasia. For this reason, the competition between Israel and Turkey in the 21st century has gone far beyond temporary diplomatic crises and has turned into a structural geopolitical rivalry that is extremely difficult to reverse. The Gaza war, the future of Syria, the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan), Eastern Mediterranean energy basins, the Cyprus Levant coasts, new transport corridors, and maritime jurisdiction areas now show that Ankara and Tel Aviv are facing each other on the same strategic stage. Israel views undisputed naval and air superiority in the Eastern Mediterranean and the absence of any regional power that could challenge it in the south of Anatolia as a vital interest for its security. Turkey, on the other hand, considers the protection of the Blue Homeland, the security of the TRNC, and its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean as an inseparable part of its national sovereignty. Reconciling these two approaches in the same geopolitical geography is becoming more difficult every day.

Israel’s greatest strategic advantage in this competition is not only its military and technological capacity. It is also the decisive weight it holds in shaping US policies in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, thanks to its strong political influence over Washington. The security interests of the US and Israel have largely overlapped for many years. Therefore, Washington’s regional military deployments, energy policies, diplomatic initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean, and search for regional alliances often cannot be evaluated independently of Israel’s security priorities. With the inclusion of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) in this strategic architecture in recent years, a new Eastern Mediterranean axis supported by the Atlantic system has formed against Turkey. This geopolitical line, stretching from Alexandroupoli to Crete, from Souda Bay to military structures in Southern Cyprus, and from the rapidly developing military cooperation between Israel and Greece to the energy and security partnerships established with the GCASC, has taken on the appearance of a long-term containment strategy aimed at limiting Turkey’s Blue Homeland doctrine and its maritime gateway to Eurasia. Therefore, the problem is no longer just a few islands in the Aegean, the Cyprus issue, or natural gas fields. The struggle is over the future of the Mediterranean, which forms the lock of Eurasia.

THE ERODING POWER OF THE US

The fundamental reason for the transformation in the international system is not merely the rise of China, Russia, and other emerging powers. The truly decisive factor is the erosion of the relative power of the United States, which established the unipolar order after the Cold War. Although Washington still possesses the world’s largest military budget, the widest network of alliances, and the most powerful financial system, it no longer has the unlimited capacity to sustain long-term strategic competition in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific simultaneously.

After the end of the Cold War, the US-led liberal West presented the American way of life, neo-liberal capitalism, and liberal democracy as the universal model of civilization, even declaring the “end of history.” However, the past thirty-five years have shown that this claim has not materialized. The chain of crises stretching from Iraq to Afghanistan, from Libya to Syria, from Ukraine to Gaza, and from the Strait of Hormuz to Taiwan has deepened instability instead of establishing global peace; it has become clear that Pax Americana is quite short-lived compared to the Roman, British, and even Ottoman periods of peace. Today, the US and Anglo-Saxon geopolitics use crises and wars as one of the primary tools of foreign policy in order to maintain their superiority rather than accepting the rising multipolar balance of power. The eastward expansion of NATO, military pressure in the Taiwan Strait, operations in the Red Sea, sanctions against Iran, and the regional strategy prioritizing Israel’s security constitute different fronts of this approach. The strategy of wearing down rivals by creating constant belts of pressure around Eurasia, taking advantage of the geographical security provided by two oceans, no longer yields the expected results.

The comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and China, the expansion of BRICS, the development of Eurasian transport corridors, and the rapid rise of China’s naval power have fundamentally changed the balance of power established after the Cold War. In contrast, the US is exhausting its military, economic, and diplomatic resources on three separate fronts simultaneously while trying to contain Russia in Europe, ensure Israel’s security in the Middle East, and balance China in the Indo-Pacific. Throughout history, no great power has been able to sustain its global military expansion for long without being supported by its economic and industrial capacity. This is the fundamental problem Washington faces today.

Behind this strategic erosion lie not only foreign policy choices but also deepening structural problems. The US, which controlled 52% of global manufacturing in 1945, has fallen to 18% today, leaving the leadership to China. While experiencing one of the heaviest fiscal pressures in its history with an annual interest payment of 1.2 trillion dollars, a public debt exceeding 41 trillion dollars, and an increasing interest burden, inequality in income distribution, political polarization unseen since the Civil War, a crisis of social trust, and a process of deindustrialization are weakening the country’s economic and social resilience. The defense industry faces similar problems. In particular, the decline in shipbuilding capacity in the field of naval power, the inadequacy of shipyard infrastructure, maintenance and repair delays, and the lack of qualified labor limit the capacity of the world’s largest navy to sustain a long-term and high-intensity war.

The Russia-Ukraine War has revealed the limits of the ammunition production capacity of the American and European defense industries. The naval operation conducted against the Houthis in the Red Sea and the 2026 Iran War have shown that stocks of high-tech ammunition such as Patriot, THAAD, Standard, and Tomahawk can be depleted much faster than expected. The problem is not just how many missiles are produced, but how quickly they can be reproduced during a war, delivered to the front, and how long it takes to replenish depleted stocks. In the high-intensity wars of the future, the decisive factor will no longer be the number of platforms, but industrial production capacity, ammunition stocks, and logistical sustainability. For this reason, the cost and sustainability of a long-term conflict that could be experienced with China in the Pacific have become a matter of debate for Washington more than ever before.

The United States, which was once the undisputed guarantor of global maritime transport routes and strategic straits, does not have absolute freedom of movement today, even in critical bottlenecks such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb. As a result, the US loss of power is relative, not absolute, but this relative erosion in the face of a rising Asia is increasingly narrowing Washington’s capacity to maintain military superiority on multiple fronts simultaneously and manage crises, becoming one of the fundamental dynamics accelerating the international system from a unipolar order toward a multipolar balance of power.

TURKEY AND THE END OF THE ATLANTIC PARADIGM

The geopolitical picture Turkey faces today shows that the security architecture of the Cold War is no longer sustainable. Energy and maritime jurisdiction initiatives that exclude Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing military and political rivalry with Israel, security threats in northern Syria and Iraq, pressures for an independent Kurdistan in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, the deteriorating environment of peace and stability in the Black Sea, the power struggle in Libya and Somalia, and deepening disputes in the Aegean reveal that the strategic encirclement around Turkey is being felt on different fronts simultaneously. PKK terrorism, the FETÖ structure, and attempts at foreign interference have also shown that internal security and external geopolitics cannot be evaluated separately. For Turkey, the fundamental issue is not to debate past alliance preferences, but to develop an independent geopolitical paradigm based on its national interests in the changing multipolar world order. Therefore, the real question that needs to be discussed in the second century of the Republic is how Turkey will regain its strategic initiative without being an extension of any power center. The answer to how is Kemalism.

THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM

In the second quarter of the 21st century, where global power balances are changing rapidly and the unipolar order is giving way to multipolar competition, it has become inevitable for Turkey to redefine its strategic priorities. History shows that states that remain attached to the status quo during periods of great power transitions pay heavy prices. Just as the British Empire gradually ceded its global superiority to the United States after World War I, today, while the American-centered international system is experiencing a relative erosion of power, new power centers are becoming more decisive in world politics. This change is not only a transformation in the international system for Turkey but also a historical window of opportunity. Located at the intersection of Anatolia, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Central Asia, Turkey is not a natural extension of any power center. Its geopolitics, historical accumulation, production potential, and state tradition place the country in a unique position where it does not have to choose between East and West, but can establish balanced relations with both directions based on its national interests. Therefore, Turkey’s future foreign and security policy should not be built on ideological allegiances, but on the principles of reason, geopolitical realism, national interest, economic production power, and strategic autonomy. A multi-dimensional foreign policy that can develop mutually beneficial relations with all power centers without becoming an automatic extension of any alliance in the face of changing international balances must be the fundamental state strategy of the second century of the Republic.

As a natural consequence of this, neither Turkish blood nor the economic resources of the Turkish nation should be consumed in geopolitical struggles that have no relevance to Turkey’s direct national interests. Economic vulnerabilities should not be attempted to be resolved through foreign policy concessions, and security concerns should not be made the justification for new networks of relationships that will increase external dependency. Turkey must determine its destiny not according to the strategic priorities of others, but based on its own history, geography, and national interests. Because in the new world order, the measure of independence is not only military power. Production capacity, technology, energy security, maritime dominance, food supply, financial resilience, and social unity have also become inseparable elements of national power. The fundamental problem facing Turkey is to be able to reunite these elements under a common state mind. It is at this point that the founding philosophy of the Republic and the Kemalist understanding of the state regain importance not only as a historical legacy but as a strategic roadmap suitable for the geopolitical realities of the 21st century.

THE NAME OF THIS ROUTE IS KEMALISM

The name of the new strategic paradigm that Turkey needs is Kemalism. However, Kemalism is not, as it has been narrowed down over the years, merely a symbolic identity expressing love for Atatürk, a state tradition reduced to official ceremonies, or a formalistic Atatürkism. Kemalism is a management philosophy that can organize national power under the guidance of an independent state mind, geopolitical realism, science, and reason. It is the name of the strategic thinking that enabled the cadres who founded the Republic to create a modern nation-state from the ashes of a collapsing empire.

Over time, the concept of Kemalism was replaced by an understanding of Atatürkism that was hollowed out, consciously or unconsciously, and its revolutionary, anti-imperialist, and geopolitical dimensions were largely pushed into the background. Yet, the essence of Kemalism is not to repeat certain historical practices, but to be able to continuously develop the Republic by protecting the principle of full independence in the face of changing world conditions. In this respect, Kemalism is not a frozen ideology belonging to the past, but a dynamic understanding of the state directed toward the future. It is noteworthy that the concept of “Kemalist” was not used by those who founded the Republic, but by foreign circles who opposed the National Struggle. For them, a Kemalist is the name of the will that rejected Sèvres, resisted imperialism, and succeeded in establishing a new state in Anatolia. Over time, this concept began to express not only the followers of Mustafa Kemal but a political thought that advocates full independence, national sovereignty, and modernization together.

Today, the only thing that has changed is not the essence of the fight. The understanding of power that wanted to bring Turkey under control through military occupation a century ago continues its existence in the 21st century with methods of economic dependency, technology, finance, proxy wars, sanctions, information operations, and geopolitical encirclement. Therefore, Kemalism is the most powerful strategic reference not only for the founding period of the Republic but also for Turkey to protect its independence in the new multipolar world order. Kemalism is the name of building the future as an independent, strong, and modern Turkey, not of longing for the past.

THE KEMALIST PRESCRIPTION IS ESSENTIAL

The ideal of a Republic of Turkey that is secure, prosperous, productive, and has reached the level of contemporary civilization, as expressed by Atatürk, can only be achieved by reinterpreting and applying the basic principles of Kemalism in accordance with the conditions of the 21st century. Because Kemalism is not only the product of a struggle for independence, but also a holistic program of contemporary state building, economic development, scientific thinking, and social transformation. Today, the vast majority of Turkish society wants to benefit from the opportunities offered by contemporary life. However, contemporaneity is not just consuming technological products, earning high incomes, or living in comfort in modern cities. True modernization is a social order where reason precedes dogma, science guides decision-making processes, the rule of law is established, women and men have equal opportunities, production precedes consumption, and the citizen does not serve the state, but the state serves the citizen.

The ideological polarizations, populist politics, and identity-centered debates experienced in the last half-century have directed a significant portion of Turkey’s energy toward internal strife. In this process, religion, ethnic identity, and ideological allegiances have often become the main field of political competition, and many strategic priorities from education to economy, from science to production, have been pushed to the background. Yet, in the 21st century, the power of states is measured by the extent to which they can unite their societies around a common national goal.

The basic principles of Kemalism—Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, and Revolutionism—are not six independent political slogans. These are complementary principles that together uphold the national sovereignty, social integrity, economic independence, scientific development, and the will for continuous renewal of the modern Turkish state. The weakening of any of these principles leads to the erosion of the others over time. Today, Turkey’s need is not to reproduce past debates, but to be able to reinterpret the founding philosophy of the Republic in line with the needs of the 21st century. The challenges of the new age, ranging from artificial intelligence to space technologies, from maritime geopolitics to energy security, and from production economy to education reform, can only be met with a state understanding that is based on reason, science, planning, production, and full independence. For this reason, Kemalism is the most powerful strategic reference for national unity, economic development, social justice, and geopolitical independence, not only for the founding period of the Republic but also in the second century of Turkey. For the Turkey of the 21st century, Kemalism is not a memory of the past, but the state mind of the future.

THE FOUNDATION OF KEMALISM IS THE REPUBLIC

Kemalism is not only the historical experience of the cadres who founded the Republic, but also a state philosophy that aims to build the future. At its foundation lies the Republic. There is an understanding of a modern nation-state where sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation, reason and science guide state administration, and full independence is accepted as an indispensable principle. Therefore, Kemalism is not a static ideology trying to protect the past, but a dynamic modernization project that aims to continuously develop the Republic by adapting to changing world conditions. The revolutions and transformation carried out in the first fifteen years of the Republic were not just the establishment of a new state, but the greatest modernization move in Turkish history. A society that had remained backward for centuries due to wars, economic backwardness, and foreign interventions, and had remained almost in the Middle Ages, was attempted to be made a part of the contemporary world in a very short time with deep-rooted reforms ranging from education to law, from economy to culture, and from women’s rights to state administration. Therefore, Kemalism is not a national development and state-building program of any class, group, or ideological faction, but one that aims to build the common future of the entire Turkish nation.

The most important feature of Kemalism is that it is not an ideology imported from outside. Unlike thought systems shaped by the historical conditions of other geographies, such as liberalism, Marxism, social democracy, fascism, or political Islam, Kemalism was born out of the struggle for existence that the Turkish nation faced during the years of the National Struggle. Therefore, it represents a unique historical experience that reaches from the necessities imposed by life to state philosophy, not from theory to practice. Its source of legitimacy is not foreign schools of thought, but the Turkish nation’s will for independence. The Republic is the concrete work of this will. The resistance at Gallipoli, the victory won at Kut al-Amara, the words “They will go as they came,” expressed by Mustafa Kemal in occupied Istanbul on November 13, 1918, the national will that began in Amasya, the Erzurum and Sivas congresses, the trust won in İnönü, the life-or-death struggle given at Sakarya, the ammunition carried from İnebolu to Anatolia, the oxcarts crossing the Küre Mountains, the Great Offensive that began at Kocatepe, and the victory that met the sea in İzmir on September 9, 1922, are the historical cornerstones of the Republic. The Republic is the political expression not only of a military victory but of national sovereignty, independence, and the will for modernization.

In this respect, the Republic and Kemalism are the greatest state work of Turkish history. It is a great civilizational move where science prevails over superstition, reason over dogma, the citizen over servitude, and national sovereignty over imperialism. It is also a manifesto of the will to overcome nearly four centuries of military, economic, and technological backwardness. The following assessment by the late Prof. Dr. Ahmet Taner Kışlalı most accurately reveals the essence of Kemalism:

“Kemalism is neither the guardianship of Atatürk nor the sum of what was done under the conditions of 1920. Kemalism is a modernization ideology with a democratic socialist essence, based on the principle of continuous revolutionism. Kemalism is a civilization movement not with the support of the West, but in spite of the West. The philosophy underlying the Republic is humane and progressive.”

This definition remains valid today. Because the main purpose of Kemalism is not to sanctify the past, but to secure the independence, prosperity, and contemporary civilization goal of the Turkish nation by continuously renewing the Republic in a way that adapts to changing world conditions.

THE SIX ARROWS BELONG TO THE TURKISH NATION

The institutional foundation of Kemalism is embodied in the Six Arrows, which is the symbol of the Republican People’s Party. However, the Six Arrows are often evaluated only as a historical party program or political principles belonging to the first years of the Republic. Yet, these six principles are complementary elements that constitute the national power of the modern Turkish state. They belong to the Turkish nation. Republicanism represents the legitimacy of the state, nationalism its national integrity, populism social solidarity, statism economic independence, secularism the guidance of reason and science, and revolutionism the will for continuous renewal. The Six Arrows are not independent of each other, but a strategic state model that complements each other.

Republicanism and nationalism have secured the nation-state by uniting the Turkish nation under a common citizenship identity. Populism has ensured social justice and national solidarity, statism has ensured national production capacity and economic independence in strategic sectors, and secularism has placed reason and science at the center of decision-making processes by clearing state administration of dogmas. Revolutionism has transformed the Republic from a frozen structure into a dynamic understanding of the state that can continuously adapt to changing world conditions.

Today, in the geopolitics of the 21st century, the meaning of the Six Arrows has grown even more. In the age of artificial intelligence, advanced technology, energy security, maritime geopolitics, space, cybersecurity, and the defense industry, the success of states is measured not only by their military power but by their ability to produce science, their education systems, industrial infrastructures, and social integrity. Each of the Six Arrows continues to be the fundamental pillars that constitute the state capacity needed by this new age.

SECULARISM, NATION-STATE, AND CONTINUOUS REVOLUTION

Kemalism has risen on the common consciousness of the homeland created by the National Struggle. The military successes stretching from Gallipoli to the Great Offensive ensured not only the end of the occupation but also the unification of the Anatolian people from different origins around a common national identity. The Republic built the modern Turkish nation with an understanding of common citizenship that transcends ethnic, sectarian, or regional allegiances. Therefore, Kemalist nationalism is not exclusionary, but a citizenship nationalism based on common history, common destiny, and common future. The most important guarantee of this structure is secularism. Secularism is not opposition to religion and belief, but a constitutional principle that ensures that state administration is conducted on the basis of reason, science, and law. By leaving belief to the realm of conscience, it guarantees both freedom of religion and the neutrality of the state. Thus, no belief or sect can use state power alone, and citizens are accepted as equal before the law.

The revolutions carried out in the first years of the Republic are also the natural result of this understanding. Reforms ranging from education to law, from economy to culture, aimed to make Turkish society a part of the contemporary world in a short time. Early attempts toward the transition to multi-party life could not be permanent due to the internal and external conditions of the period. However, this situation did not change the fundamental goal of the Republic. The goal was to first create a strong and modern state structure, and then to mature this structure with democratic institutions. The revolutionism principle of Kemalism gains importance at exactly this point. Revolutionism is not to deny the past, but the will to continuously develop the Republic according to changing world conditions. Because while states that remain static regress, states that can renew themselves can maintain their existence on the stage of history. (China is the best example of this. China, which has increased its national income 14-fold in the last 25 years, has actually been the country that has best applied Kemalism.)

POPULISM: KEMALISM’S PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

Populism, one of the most important principles of Kemalism, is not just an ideal of a classless and unprivileged society. It is also an understanding of the social state that balances the happiness of the individual with the common welfare of society. In the Kemalist understanding of the state, the welfare of the individual cannot be thought of independently of the welfare of society. The duty of the state is not only to protect its borders but also to create the economic and social conditions in which its citizens can live with dignity. Therefore, Populism is a contemporary state principle that ensures equality of opportunity, protects labor, prevents extreme deterioration in income distribution, encourages production, and observes social justice. Today, the high unemployment, especially youth unemployment, rapidly deepening income inequality, working poverty, millions of retirees struggling to make a living, the informal economy, the resurgence of child labor, the inadequacy of women’s participation in the workforce, and inequalities of opportunity that Turkey faces under the influence of wild capitalism and ruthless neoliberalism are not just economic problems. These are also the results of the weakening of the Republic’s principle of populism. A strong state is not just a state that produces large infrastructure and construction projects, but also a state that does not condemn its retirees to poverty, can offer a future to its youth, does not disconnect its children from education, provides equal opportunities to women and men in production, and does not allow the exploitation of labor.

In Kemalist Populism, what is essential is a strong social state that provides equality of opportunity within a production economy, protects labor, observes social justice, and secures the common future of all members of the nation. Because national unity is maintained not only by common history and a common flag, but also by a sense of justice, the sharing of prosperity, and the citizen’s trust in the state. For this reason, Populism is the social conscience of the Six Arrows.

POST-ATATÜRK TRANSFORMATION AND DRIFTING AWAY FROM KEMALISM

With the early passing of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the revolutionary dynamism that formed the founding philosophy of the Republic began to weaken gradually. Kemalism, which was institutionally guaranteed with the inclusion of the Six Arrows in the Constitution in 1937, maintained its legal existence but lost its decisive influence in state administration over time. The understanding of continuous revolution in the founding years of the Republic gave way to a more status-quo-oriented approach. One of the important reasons for this was that Kemalism was not born from a broad theoretical literature like liberalism or socialism, but from the practice of the National Struggle and state building. Subsequent generations reduced this thought to a historical legacy and a symbolic understanding of Atatürkism instead of adapting it to changing world conditions.

The bipolar system that emerged after World War II accelerated this transformation. Turkey was integrated into the Atlantic security system with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, and NATO membership in 1952. Although this orientation was understandable under the security conditions of the period, it led to the shaping of foreign and security policies in line with Atlantic priorities in the long run. The process affected not only foreign policy but also the military, political, and social structure of the state. While Turkey’s geopolitical memory turned toward the Atlantic axis, the Eurasian perspective was largely pushed into the background.

Although the transition to multi-party life was an important step in terms of democratization, the ideological competition of the Cold War soon determined internal politics. Democracy was reduced to the number of votes coming out of the ballot box and the absolute dominance of whoever seized power, without creating a qualified infrastructure. The statist development model weakened; the closure of Village Institutes, the failure to complete land reform, and the decline of the planning state understanding were the first signs of this transformation. While irregular urbanization, populism, and identity politics gained strength after 1960, the fundamental goals of the Republic such as production, industrialization, education, and technology were pushed to the background. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, religion-based politics and ethnic separatism were placed at the center of the security and political agenda.

The neoliberal economic policies implemented after 1980 completed this transformation in the economic field. With privatizations, the state’s production capacity weakened, the finance and service sector moved ahead of industry, agriculture and industry moved away from long-term planning, and the economy became increasingly dependent on external financing. Thus, the Kemalist paradigm based on production, science, full independence, and national development, which was essential at the founding of the Republic, was significantly eroded.

As a result, despite its strong geopolitics and state tradition, Turkey turned into a country that often determined its strategic priorities in line with the needs of the Atlantic security system rather than its own national interests. The decline of Kemalism meant not only an ideological change but also the weakening of Turkey’s geopolitical independence, state capacity, and strategic autonomy.

CONCLUSION: A NEW GEOPOLITICAL ERA IS BEGINNING

The first quarter of the 21st century has turned into a historical period of rupture in which the international order established after World War II has ended. The American-centered unipolar system is no longer sustainable. The world is transitioning to a multipolar geopolitical order where power centers compete again. Such periods are historical periods of opportunity where not only great powers but also regional states with strong geopolitical positions rewrite their destinies.

Turkey, with its geopolitics located in the center of Eurasia, its dominance over the Turkish Straits, and its position connecting the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East, is one of the most critical states of the multipolar order that is taking shape. Therefore, the fundamental geopolitical challenge Turkey faces is the new Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics centered on Israel and the Atlantic security architecture integrated into it. This axis aims to limit Turkey’s Blue Homeland doctrine, reduce the strategic importance of the TRNC, and keep the energy and transport corridors of the Eastern Mediterranean under control. However, as revealed in the previous sections, the relative erosion in the US’s military, economic, and logistical capacity is also increasingly limiting the feasibility of this strategy. This situation creates not only a power vacuum for Turkey but also a historical strategic window of opportunity. History shows that states that can correctly read the changing geopolitics during periods of great power transitions rise. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did not focus only on the defeat of the state after Mudros; he foresaw that the victors of World War I could not establish an absolute order, that the British Empire was worn out economically and strategically despite its military victory, and that the imperial system could not be sustained with its old power.

The National Struggle is the work of this geopolitical judgment. Today, the world is experiencing a similar power transition. While the American-centered unipolar order is dissolving, new power balances are forming. What Turkey needs is an independent state mind that can correctly read the changing international system, just as it did a century ago. Because although the actors change, the fundamental principles of geopolitics do not change.

In the second century of the Republic, Turkey’s fundamental problem is not to reproduce any ideological debate. The real problem is to be able to implement an independent state model that can re-establish the production economy, make science and technology a state policy, develop naval power and the defense industry, be self-sufficient in agriculture, ensure energy security, and re-establish law and merit. Such a transformation is only possible by reinterpreting the founding state mind of the Republic according to the conditions of the 21st century. It is precisely for this reason that Kemalism is returning to the stage of history. Because Kemalism is not only the ideology of the generation that founded the Republic. Kemalism is a holistic state doctrine that can combine geopolitics with economy, naval power with industry, secularism with science, statism with production, nationalism with national sovereignty, and revolutionism with continuous renewal. What Turkey needs today is not to repeat the past, but to adapt Kemalism to the geopolitics of the 21st century and make it the strategic mind of the state again.

The second century of the Republic will be the century in which Turkey returns to its own geopolitics. Because in the changing world order, Kemalism is no longer a historical memory for Turkey, but a geopolitical necessity, not a strategic choice, but the fundamental condition for the survival of national existence.

Kemalism, which founded the Republic, is the immortal founding state philosophy that will elevate Turkey once again in the great power competition of the 21st century and carry it to the geopolitical position it deserves.