NATO produces risk, not security, for Turkey

The NATO Summit to be held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, is an ordinary summit for NATO, but one of historical importance for Turkey. This is because while NATO has not changed, the world's power balances, Turkey's geopolitics, and its national power elements have. Throughout the Cold War, NATO was a balancing alliance surrounding the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, as seen in the examples of Yugoslavia, Libya, and Ukraine, it has become the military instrument of American geopolitics in Europe. In contrast, the new balance of power formed today by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea is ending the absolute supremacy of the Atlantic system.

Turkey has achieved significant gains in terms of the modernization and standardization of its armed forces and the development of its defense industry, and today it has reached a level where it can develop its own defense industry largely independently. However, despite this accumulation of power, Ankara has not been able to fully resist NATO's impositions in recent years. The intervention in Libya, the practices during the Ukraine war process, and the events surrounding the Kürecik Radar Base during the Iran-Israel crisis show that there is a clear difference between rhetoric and actual practice. The Ankara Summit is being held in such an environment.

Turkey's Forced Westernism

The founding philosophy of the Republic viewed Westernization as a tool for modernization, but it never adopted strategic dependence on the West. Atatürk's foreign policy approach was based on full independence, a policy of balance, and staying away from military alliances. However, in the process that began in 1939, Turkey was gradually integrated into the Atlantic security system, and Westernization eventually turned into Westernism. Yet, NATO is not just a military alliance. It is the security apparatus of the collective Western geopolitics of nearly five hundred years. In the historical process extending from colonialism to imperialism, it has constantly needed a common threat to maintain its existence. Yesterday it was the Soviet Union and communism; today, Russia, China, and Iran serve the same function. The enemies have changed, but NATO's strategic logic has not.

For this reason, the thesis that NATO is merely a defense organization established against the Soviet threat is incomplete. NATO is the institutional backbone that maintains US military and political leadership over Europe. After the Cold War, Israel's security also increasingly became an inseparable part of the Atlantic system, and the link between NATO's strategic orientation and Israel's security has strengthened even further. Today, the fact that the Israeli administration openly defines Turkey as a threat and that initiatives for sanctions and pressure against Turkey in the US Congress are increasing are important indicators of the geopolitical axis on which NATO will act in the future.

Despite this, NATO is still not being seriously questioned in Turkey. While anti-Americanism and anti-Israel sentiment have reached historical levels in public opinion, the similar reflexes of the government and the main opposition regarding NATO show that there is a clear foreign policy divergence between the public and the political elites. Yet, Turkey is today at the very center of the new geopolitical encirclement line that NATO has formed against Russia, Iran, and China. For this reason, the Ankara Summit may be a routine meeting for NATO. However, the real issue that needs to be discussed for Turkey is not whether NATO provides security, but whether it has turned Turkey into an outpost of the US-Israel-centered Atlantic geopolitics and a frontline country for future conflicts.

NATO's Reason for Being: A Constant Enemy

After the Second World War, Europe was divided between American and Soviet spheres of influence. During this period, NATO was shaped not only as a defense alliance surrounding the Soviet Union but also as the institutional backbone of the American-led Atlantic order. Washington's goal was to contain the Soviets on one hand, and to prevent the formation of a military and geopolitical power center in Western Europe, especially Germany, that was independent of the US. NATO's existence relied as much on a constant perception of a common threat as it did on its military capabilities. Throughout the Cold War, this threat was the Soviet Union. The US continued its strategy of maritime dominance inherited from Britain and keeping Eurasia fragmented through NATO. Thanks to the petrodollar system, its military superiority, and security dependence on Europe, it both contained the Soviets and directed Europe's economic power to finance its own global leadership.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991, it could have been expected that NATO would complete its historical mission. Instead, the alliance produced new threats and new areas of operation. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia, the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and finally the Ukraine War became the milestones of this transformation. Today, Russia is not just a military rival for NATO, but the fundamental element that keeps the alliance's institutional legitimacy alive. A lasting Russia-West peace would make not only Europe's security architecture but also NATO's expansion policy, defense spending, and the Atlantic system's raison d'être controversial. For this reason, the Ukraine War does not only aim to contain Russia; it also functions to keep Europe dependent on the US, limit China's rise in Eurasia, and prevent the integration of non-Atlantic power centers. The demand for NATO members to increase defense spending to 5 percent of their national income is a natural consequence of this strategy.

The US and EU Cling More to NATO During Their Decline

The main reason why NATO has taken on a more aggressive character today is not the strengthening of Russia, but the relative weakening of the Atlantic system. The US has lost a significant portion of its production power to China and is facing problems of high debt, financialization, and social polarization. The European Union, on the other hand, is experiencing one of the most fragile periods in its history due to low growth, the energy crisis, demographic decline, and political fragmentation. Throughout history, declining great powers have acted more aggressively abroad as they weakened internally, demanding more military and economic sacrifices from their allies. Washington's forcing of NATO countries to arm themselves more and making Europe more dependent on American defense industry and energy resources is the current reflection of this approach.

Even if Trump's priorities change, it is impossible for the US to abandon the European security architecture and the security of Israel. For this reason, NATO is no longer just a military alliance surrounding Russia, but the fundamental tool that extends the economic, political, and geopolitical life of the Atlantic system. In this process, the perception of a constant threat is becoming normalized in Western societies. The Ukraine War, Europe's rapid armament, and the narrowing of freedom spaces under the pretext of security are indicators of this. NATO's most important source of legitimacy is the Russian threat; when this threat weakens, not only NATO's but the entire Atlantic security architecture's reason for existence will be questioned.

It is also not realistic for Europe to strategically separate from the US in the short term. This is because it remains dependent on Washington for critical military capabilities such as nuclear deterrence, strategic air transport, missile defense, satellite intelligence, reconnaissance-surveillance, and joint operational planning. For this reason, Europe, as in both world wars in the past, continues to act today on the assumption that its security will ultimately be provided by the US.

Why Did Turkey Join NATO?

Churchill's statement, "Bringing an allied force to the battlefield is as valuable as a maneuver that wins a war," summarizes the alliance understanding of great powers. With the start of the Cold War, one of Washington's primary goals was to include Turkey in the Atlantic security system and prevent it from remaining neutral in a possible US-Soviet war. NATO's goal was not only to contain the Soviets but also to restructure Western Europe under the American security umbrella and bring the western peninsula of Eurasia under Washington's geopolitical control. Turkey was the key country in this strategy. Because it controlled the Straits and was located at the intersection of the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean, it was indispensable for Washington. The primary reason for Turkey's admission to NATO was not Turkish security, but the needs of American geopolitics.

Indeed, although the US Joint Chiefs of Staff's Griddle Plan dated August 15, 1946, revealed that there was no concrete intelligence that the Soviets were preparing to occupy Turkey, it envisioned keeping the Soviet threat politically alive. In 1948, General McBride, head of the US Joint Military Aid Mission to Turkey, also clearly stated that the purpose of military aid was not so much to stop the Soviets as it was to inflict the highest possible losses on the Soviets if Turkey were occupied. For Washington, the real goal was not to protect Turkey, but to prevent it from remaining neutral in a major war.

To achieve this goal, scenarios that the Soviets would occupy Turkey were disseminated through the narrative of the West and the Westernists within us, and those who came to occupy in 1919 appeared this time as saviors. Researcher and author Hazal Yalın, in her comprehensive study titled "1945: Turkey-USSR Relations (Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2021)" based on Soviet archives, significantly questions the "impending Soviet occupation" narrative that was accepted as absolute truth in Turkey for many years. According to Yalın, the primary priority of the Stalin administration was not to occupy Turkey, but to change the regime of the Straits in its favor within the framework of Black Sea security and to ensure that Turkey remained a neutral neighbor, even if not anti-Western. However, Foreign Minister Molotov's diplomatic mistakes, the proposal for the joint defense of the Straits, expressions that opened the 1921 borders to discussion, and territorial demands published in Pravda pushed the Russian fear in Ankara to the peak. Turkish decision-makers used these developments as a strong justification for entering under the security umbrella of the US and Britain. As a result, the Soviet threat, perceived beyond its real dimensions, became one of the most important psychological and geopolitical tools that accelerated Turkey's orientation toward the Atlantic system.

When Turkey was admitted to NATO in 1952, Washington's most important gain was that Turkey largely lost the option of remaining neutral in a major war under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Thus, Turkey's unique geopolitics effectively entered the service of Atlantic strategy. However, this orientation did not begin in 1952. The first significant deviation from the Republic's fully independent foreign policy line occurred with the alliance agreement made with Britain and France in 1939. Atatürk's approach based on a policy of balance was abandoned, and Turkey was gradually integrated into the Western-centered security architecture. For this reason, NATO membership was not only a military choice but also an important turning point in moving away from the understanding of strategic autonomy at the founding of the Republic.

Turkey's Security Map Has Changed

For 74 years, NATO has created a multi-layered system that has shaped not only Turkey's defense policies but also its security bureaucracy, economic understanding, and strategic orientation. However, today, Turkey's threat perception and NATO's threat perception no longer overlap. While NATO's priority is the containment of Russia, Turkey's fundamental security problems are concentrated in its south. Initiatives toward the Blue Homeland and the TRNC in the Eastern Mediterranean, the military buildup in the Aegean, terrorist formations in northern Syria and Iraq, the US presence in the region, and the new Israel-centered geopolitical equation are Turkey's priority security issues.

The bipolar world of 1952 is now behind us. At that time, the defense industry was limited, and naval geopolitics was far from its current weight. Today, Turkey has a very different strategic position than in the Cold War era, thanks to its advanced defense industry, national missile and UAV/UCAV systems, powerful navy, Blue Homeland doctrine, energy corridors, and the new opportunities offered by a multipolar world. Turkey is no longer just a frontline country protecting NATO's southeastern flank, but a geopolitical center connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Turkic World, Africa, and the Red Sea. Despite this, the attempt to still shape security strategy with the "us and them" understanding of 1952 does not align with changing geopolitical realities.

Although Turkey has areas of competition with Russia and Iran, these two countries are its permanent neighbors. Turkey's interest is not to be dragged into a war with them, but to manage competition and establish balance. In contrast, NATO's current strategic orientation carries the risk of pitting Turkey against these countries. Therefore, the issue that needs to be discussed today is not whether NATO has changed. NATO has acted with largely the same strategic logic since its inception. What has actually changed is Turkey's geopolitics, national power elements, and security needs. For this reason, Turkey's security map should no longer be the map drawn by NATO, but the national security map determined by its own geopolitics.

NATO Members' Anti-Turkey Stance

The true value of an alliance is measured by the solidarity it shows when one of its members is under a security threat. From this perspective, it is difficult to find strong examples showing that NATO or its leading members have stood by Ankara in the security problems Turkey has faced in the last forty years. In contrast, on issues that directly concern Turkey's national security, such as PKK terrorism, the Syrian crisis, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Blue Homeland, many NATO member states have pursued policies contrary to Ankara's theses. While political and legal space has been opened for the PKK in many NATO countries, some allies, primarily the US, have supported the YPG/PYD in Syria with thousands of trucks of weapons and ammunition. The protection of FETÖ members in NATO countries following the July 15 coup attempt, the failure to extradite organization leaders, and their continued activities have also created a deep crisis of confidence for Turkey.

Similarly, Turkey being subjected to CAATSA sanctions due to the S-400 purchase and being removed from the F-35 program; in contrast, the rapid armament of Greece, the transformation of Alexandroupoli into a major American logistics base, the lifting of the arms embargo on the GCA, and the support for the US-Israel-Greece-GCA axis in the Eastern Mediterranean clearly show that leading NATO members do not share Turkey's security concerns. When these developments are evaluated together, it is seen that a new geopolitical encirclement understanding aimed at surrounding Turkey on the line extending from the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean and northern Syria is taking shape. This approach is no longer covert; it has become an open state policy. Indeed, in a session held at the US House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission just 5 days before the NATO Summit in Ankara, Turkey was defined as an "occupier" and "expansionist"; the TRNC and the Blue Homeland were directly targeted, and calls for new sanctions against Turkey were made.

Similar assessments are also found in US and Israel-centered think tanks. Turkey's search for strategic autonomy, its orientation toward a multipolar world, and its Blue Homeland approach are portrayed as threats to the West's interests. Likewise, while Greece effectively uses NATO in line with its own national interests, it tries to limit Turkey's position within the alliance. All these make it necessary to question what political legitimacy an alliance that leaves Turkey alone on the PKK and YPG issues, does not show solidarity on FETÖ, does not support its rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and openly targets the Blue Homeland has in dragging Turkey into a war in line with its own strategic priorities. While every state within NATO protects its own national interest to the maximum extent, Turkey showing the same strategic reflex is no longer a choice, but a necessity of national security.

The Magic Article 5: Assurance or Strategic Trap?

The most highlighted provision of NATO is Article 5, which regulates collective defense. However, no security guarantee in international relations is absolute. Especially in asymmetric alliances, the priorities of great powers and the national interests of other allies may not always overlap. For this reason, the reliability of Article 5, as well as the future of NATO, has been increasingly debated in Western strategy circles in recent years. The greatest risks of alliances are being left alone in times of need and being dragged into an unwanted war. For Turkey, the real danger today is the second possibility. A fait accompli or a false flag operation that could arise during a crisis in the Baltics, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, or centered on Iran could make Turkey part of a major conflict that has nothing to do with its national interests. In such a situation, Turkey could face the risk of becoming one of the frontline countries of a showdown between great powers outside its own will.

Developments in recent years show that interests do not always overlap even within NATO. The fact that the European security guarantee became a matter of negotiation during the Trump era, the demand for higher defense spending from allies, and the different approaches that emerged during the Iran-Israel crisis show that the alliance now acts more on power and cost calculations than on common values. For this reason, the fundamental issue for Turkey is not whether NATO will defend Turkey when necessary. The real issue is whether Turkey will be dragged to the front on behalf of NATO in a war that has nothing to do with its own national interests. This is now one of the most important security questions that needs to be discussed in the second century of the Republic.

Turkey's Soft Underbelly: Economic Fragility

Today, Turkey's greatest strategic weakness is its economic fragility. The economic structure, which relies on external financing and hot money instead of production, limits not only the economy but also the freedom of decision-making in foreign policy and security. The geopolitical maneuvering space of states with weakened economic sovereignty is also narrowing. For this reason, the NATO debate in Turkey is often locked on the axis of economy rather than security. The government aims to maintain economic stability and its political power by protecting the flow of external financing, while the opposition aims to come to power by gaining the trust of the same international financial circles. As a result, both political blocs remain devoid of the maneuvering space to discuss the strategic risks that NATO produces for Turkey in all their dimensions.

Turkey faces a historical choice. The first path is to maintain full compliance with the Atlantic system for the sake of short-term economic stability. This choice may limit economic fluctuations, but it narrows strategic autonomy and puts Turkey under the pressure of crises that have nothing to do with its own national interests. The second path is a transformation that reduces economic dependence with a production-oriented national economy understanding, which is more painful in the short term but strengthens geopolitical independence in the long term. In the second century of the Republic, the fundamental issue is not just the economy, but establishing the right balance between economic independence and geopolitical independence. Because the price of economic independence can be heavy; however, the price of geopolitical dependence is often paid with the sovereignty of nations and the blood of their children.

Turkey's Security Requires a New Strategic Framework

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey was the flank country protecting NATO's southern flank. Today, there is a Turkey that is encircled from the south and forced to confront Russia in the north and Iran in the east. In such a geopolitical environment, remaining within NATO's military command chain increasingly produces strategic dependence rather than security. In the second century of the Republic, Turkey's goal is not to be the frontline country of others, but to be the central state of its own geopolitics.

For this reason, the issue that needs to be discussed is whether NATO membership, especially remaining in the military command structure, serves national security. France, during the General De Gaulle era, ended the system of automatically allocating its forces to NATO plans by leaving NATO's military command structure in 1966. For Turkey, the access of NATO bureaucracy and the C2ISR (Command, Control, Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance) structure to national intelligence and critical military information constitutes a security risk as important as false flag operations. The fact that FETÖ was able to seize the state's most secret military documents during the Ergenekon and Balyoz plots and that many fugitive FETÖ members are protected in NATO countries after the coup attempt are concrete examples of this risk.

Furthermore, the American tactical nuclear weapons at Incirlik and the Kürecik X-Band Radar have the potential to make our country one of the priority targets in a nuclear-based crisis that may occur in the future outside of Turkey's will. Turkey must reduce these risks, re-establish its full sovereignty over the bases, and ensure that all military activities within the Turkish Armed Forces are carried out only under the supervision of national authorities. Turkey must be able to make its decisions on war and peace only according to its own national interests and should not be made a party to a conflict it does not want through any fait accompli.

In this respect, NATO's 2026 Ankara Summit is a historical threshold where not only NATO's but also Turkey's geopolitical future is being discussed. In the second century of the Republic, Turkey will either continue to be an outpost of others' security architecture or return to Atatürk's understanding of full independence and build its own security architecture in line with its own national interests. Turkey's priority must be to take the decision of war and peace entirely back into its own sovereign will. The price of economic independence may be heavy; however, the price of geopolitical dependence is always much heavier.