The Rebirth of the Mediterranean Turk: From Lausanne to Montreux

The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, is the foundational international document that established the Republic. It is the diplomatic registration of the life-or-death struggle won by the Anatolian Turks, who were intended to be left without a state or a nation, and it stands as a document of honor written in blood.

Borders Drawn in Blood at Lausanne

Lausanne was not a negotiation at a desk, but the registration in international law of the military and political reality created by the Great Offensive and the Armistice of Mudanya. The borders of the treaty largely reflected the operational lines actually reached by the Turkish army in 1923. In other words, the borders drawn at Lausanne did not come from the diplomatic table, but from the battlefield. That is to say, they were drawn in blood. The War of Independence took place on land, and its ammunition was brought by sea from Russia across the Black Sea. Starting in 1920, the Kuvayı Milliye (National Forces) first secured the eastern borders, and by the autumn of 1922, the Turkish army had advanced to İzmir following the Mediterranean target set by Mustafa Kemal for his armies; Eastern Thrace was reclaimed at the end of 1922 without a fight.

Liberation from the Scourge of Capitulations

The value of Lausanne cannot be measured solely by the borders it drew. One of the greatest achievements of the treaty was the definitive abolition of the capitulations, which had eroded the economic sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. Ending these privileges, which opened the Ottoman finances, judiciary, trade, and customs policy to the influence of foreign states, formed the foundation of the Republic of Turkey's economic independence. Knowing that political independence could only be completed with economic sovereignty, Atatürk and the Lausanne delegation made no concessions on this matter. In this respect, Lausanne is not just a border treaty, but the founding document of the national economy, the national legal order, and the concept of a fully independent state. The abolition of the capitulations, along with the right of cabotage and maritime sovereignty, restarted the process of the Mediterranean Turk becoming a maritime nation after a long hiatus.

The Treaty of Lausanne and Maritime Geopolitics

Although our liberation from the capitulations with Lausanne was a huge gain for the Blue Homeland, two fundamental Blue Homeland issues remained unresolved in terms of Turkey's maritime geopolitics in 1923.

The first of these was the Turkish Straits. Under the "Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits," which was an annex to the treaty, Turkey could not establish full military sovereignty over the Straits; the region was demilitarized, and the administration of the Straits was left to the supervision of an international commission.

The second issue was the Aegean islands just opposite the Anatolian coast. The military success achieved on the land front of the National Struggle could not be transformed into a strategic gain of the same magnitude in the field of maritime geopolitics. The reason for this was not the diplomatic inadequacy of the Lausanne delegation, but the military balance of power that emerged at the end of the war, Turkey's naval capability at the time, and the fact that the international conjuncture limited the scope of negotiation.

Therefore, due to the lack of a navy, the Lausanne Treaty could only provide limited sovereignty over the Turkish Straits; the island of Cyprus, which had been under British occupation since 1878, was left to the United Kingdom under Article 20, and the Dodecanese Islands adjacent to the Turkish coast were transferred to Italian sovereignty under Article 15. While Gökçeada, Bozcaada, and the Rabbit Islands remained with Turkey under Article 12 of the treaty, Greek sovereignty over Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Icaria, Lemnos, and Samothrace was confirmed. Under Article 13, it was forbidden to turn Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Icaria into naval bases or to fortify them, and only limited security forces were allowed on the islands. Lemnos and Samothrace were demilitarized as part of the demilitarized security regime of the Straits within the scope of the Straits Convention signed with Lausanne. However, today, the demilitarized and unarmed status...

The Maritime Legacy of a Navy-less Ottoman Empire

The main reason why full sovereignty over the Turkish Straits was not left to Turkey at Lausanne was not legal, but rather the balance of power and security perception of the period. The Allied states, especially the United Kingdom, believed that a Turkey without a navy could not defend the Straits on its own. For this reason, they insisted on the demilitarization of the Straits, the subjection of the transit regime to international guarantees, and its supervision by an international Straits Commission.

Behind this approach was the military picture inherited from the Ottoman Empire. By 1918, the Ottoman Navy was effectively out of the war. The navy that the Republic took over in October 1923 did not have a single major warship ready for operation. The battlecruiser Yavuz was immobile, the naval doctrine and training system had collapsed, and because Istanbul was demilitarized, the shipyard and base infrastructure could not be used effectively. Under these conditions, the priority for the Ankara Government was the recognition of the National Pact's (Misak-ı Millî) land borders, the abolition of the capitulations, and the acceptance of independence in the international arena. For this reason, the demand for full sovereignty over the Straits at Lausanne was not seen as sustainable within the military and diplomatic realities of the time.

The same lack of a navy was one of the most important factors determining the status of the Aegean islands at Lausanne. The islands, which had been under Ottoman rule since the fifteenth century, were lost first during the Greek Revolt, and then during the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars. Although the Turkish army had won a decisive victory in Anatolia at Lausanne, it did not possess the naval power to carry this victory into the Aegean Sea. For this reason, while the borders reached by the land operation were registered in terms of international law, the 1913-1914 status quo was largely maintained in maritime geopolitics. In other words, the factor that determined the fate of the Aegean islands was the balance of naval power rather than diplomatic skill. The presence of a strong navy capable of conducting operations could have allowed the negotiation ground to be shaped differently, but it was not historically possible to say that the islands would necessarily have been left to Turkey as a result.

Nevertheless, the Lausanne delegation was fully aware of the strategic value of the islands very close to the Anatolian coast. The clearest example of this is the discussions held regarding the island of Kastellorizo (Meis). In the session dated June 4, 1923, at Lausanne, İsmet İnönü argued that Meis was only two kilometers away from the Anatolian coast, that it should be considered a natural extension of Anatolia from a geographical perspective, and that it was essential for it to be attached to Turkey for the peace and military security of Asia Minor. He based his demand not on ethnic grounds, but entirely on geopolitical and military security assessments. However, the Allied Powers, led by the United Kingdom, rejected this view and insisted that the island remain with Italy. Upon this, İnönü gave up this demand, stating that they were agreeing to a "very heavy sacrifice," as recorded in the minutes, in order not to jeopardize the entirety of the Lausanne Treaty and to conclude the peace.

In this respect, the Meis discussion shows that the founding cadres of the Republic read the maritime geopolitics of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean correctly. The problem was not a lack of strategic vision, but the absence of naval power to support this vision. The Meis example is one of the most striking examples showing that the foundations of the geopolitical understanding that would later be conceptualized as the "Blue Homeland" were already visible at Lausanne; however, the lack of a navy at the time did not allow these goals to be fully realized at the diplomatic table.

The Montreux Negotiations

The Montreux Conference, which continued from June 23 to July 20, 1936, proceeded with bargaining between the conflicting interests of the great powers and Turkey's quest for sovereignty. For the United Kingdom, the Straits were not just Turkey's problem. Free entry and exit to the Black Sea were seen as vital for naval superiority in the Mediterranean and for keeping Soviet Russia under control. For this reason, it did not want the Straits to be left to the absolute control of a single state. The Soviets did not want the Straits to be completely open to foreign navies, while the United Kingdom argued the exact opposite. The Straits regime at Lausanne was a compromise created between these two approaches. On the other hand, after World War I, the victorious states saw leaving international waterways to international supervision as a method to preserve peace. Examples such as the Suez and Kiel Canals also fueled this approach. The Straits Commission was a product of this understanding.

Changing Balances in 1936

In 1936, Atatürk's Turkey faced a completely different picture. In the thirteen years that had passed, the international system had changed radically; Germany's rearmament, Italy's expansionist policies in the Mediterranean, and the approaching world war made it necessary to reorganize the Straits regime. Turkey evaluated this changing geopolitics with great diplomatic skill and regained full military sovereignty over the Straits without firing a single shot. The goal that could not be reached on the battlefield in 1923 was realized at the diplomatic table in 1936.

In this process, Turkey did not only benefit from the change in international conditions, such as Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931; it also showed that it now possessed a navy capable of protecting the Straits with the return of the Yavuz to service, the addition of new destroyers from Italy and new submarines from the Netherlands and Italy to the inventory, and the establishment of the Gölcük base. During the Montreux talks, Turkey had a deterrent force consisting of one battlecruiser, four destroyers, and five submarines. For this reason, the Straits, which were left to an international commission in 1923, were able to return to Turkey's full sovereignty in 1936. In other words, while there was a great victory provided by land power behind Lausanne, there was an effective Republican Navy realized in 13 years and diplomatic power behind the Montreux victory. For this reason, the Montreux Straits Convention is the second great Republican victory that completes the missing maritime link of Lausanne. In his message published in the Cumhuriyet newspaper immediately after the signing of Montreux, Atatürk says: "The Montreux Conference, which is proof that intelligence, logic, and energy, used by relying on and trusting in the high character of the nation, the unbreakable arm of its army, and the un-deceivable common sense of civilized humanity, can produce peace and tranquility-giving results that all humanity needs, is a historical event truly worth rejoicing over and making others rejoice."

Atatürk's aide-de-camp Cevat Abbas Gürer recorded another statement by Atatürk regarding the Straits and Lausanne after Montreux in the November 10, 1941, issue of the Cumhuriyet newspaper: "Today is a holiday; it is a day of joy. Do you know why, dear citizens? Because Lausanne has been crowned at Montreux. Lausanne is complete and will always teach its completeness in history. But there was one small thing that gave it pain and sadness: the Straits. That has been resolved at Montreux. If the high sensitivity of the Turk is related to this, it is definitely rejoicing, it is rejoicing, and it should rejoice."

The international repercussions of Montreux were also great. The Akşam newspaper reported the assessment of the British Daily Telegraph newspaper dated July 21, 1936, on July 22 with the following expressions: "Turkey, which was considered the sick man of Europe, has recovered from the spiritual illness it has been seen to have for two centuries, and Anatolia, which was partitioned among rival states twenty years ago, has become the strong man of today. The new convention has fully recognized this thought."

The Lausanne-Montreux Brotherhood

Lausanne and Montreux are not two independent international documents. They are two complementary phases of the same struggle for sovereignty. Lausanne registered the independence and land sovereignty of Anatolia, while Montreux carried this sovereignty to the sea. Without one, the other remains incomplete. Lausanne is the diplomatic registration of the borders reached by the Turkish army's land operation. Montreux is the carrying of the same sovereignty to the Straits and maritime geopolitics by taking advantage of changing international conditions. For this reason, it is impossible to separate Lausanne from Montreux or Montreux from Lausanne. Lausanne is the founding document of land sovereignty, and Montreux is the founding document of maritime sovereignty in the Straits. The geopolitical architecture of the Republic was built upon these two treaties. It is this Lausanne-Montreux brotherhood that will live forever.

Law can only protect sovereignty when there is political will, military power, and geopolitical consciousness behind it. By correctly reading the changing international conjuncture in 1936, Turkey combined its diplomatic determination with its reborn naval power and reclaimed the sovereignty of the Straits, which it could not obtain at Lausanne, without fighting. What needs to be done today is to maintain the same strategic mind, and while protecting Montreux uncompromisingly, to bring the violated security provisions of Lausanne in the Aegean back to the center of the national and international agenda. Because the protection of Montreux is the prerequisite for peace in the Black Sea, and the defense of the non-military status in the Aegean is the prerequisite for the security of Anatolia from the sea.

The Impact of the Montreux Regime on Peace and Turkish Security

The Montreux Straits Convention did not only complete the missing aspect of the Lausanne Treaty regarding the Straits regime, but also provided multi-faceted strategic gains in terms of regional and global maritime geopolitics by re-establishing Turkey's full sovereignty over the Straits.

This change did not only mean the defense of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. With Montreux, the security integrity between Thrace, Marmara, and Anatolia was re-established, and an uninterrupted strategic link was established between Turkey's territories in Europe and Asia. The period in the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire when foreign navies could pressure the capital from the sea by forcing the Straits ended, and Turkey reached the position of a sovereign state that could carry out the defense of the Straits entirely with its own will. In this respect, Montreux is not just a transit convention, but a military and political sovereignty document that directly guarantees Turkey's territorial integrity and state security.

The ninety years that have passed have shown that the Montreux regime has created a lasting maritime security and arms control system in a semi-enclosed sea like the Black Sea, which has few parallels in the world. While the convention guarantees the free passage of merchant ships, it has established a sensitive and balanced security regime between littoral states and non-littoral naval powers by limiting the class, tonnage, number, and duration of stay of warships in the Black Sea in detail.

Thus, the creation of a permanent military presence by states without a coast on the Black Sea has been prevented; the Black Sea has neither turned into a completely closed inland sea nor has it become a competition field where aircraft carrier task groups, large amphibious forces, and non-littoral navies can freely project power, as is the case in the Atlantic and Pacific. Thanks to this balance, the Black Sea has remained away from the constant naval force buildup of great powers for nearly ninety years, and Montreux, the legal basis of regional stability, has been the most important guarantee of this order. One of the most important strategic advantages that Montreux provides to Turkey is that the decision-making authority is largely left to the Turkish state in cases of war and the threat of imminent war. When Turkey is a party to a war or sees itself under an imminent threat of war, it has broad discretionary power in regulating the passage of warships through the Straits. This authority has created a strong protection mechanism that does not leave Turkey's security to the will of other states and is based on the principle of a sovereign state.

The value of Montreux has been confirmed many times not only by historical experiences but also by international crises. The limitation of the passage of warships of warring states through the Straits during the Second World War played a decisive role in Turkey's remaining out of the war and the Black Sea not turning into a major naval front directly. Although the Black Sea was one of the most sensitive contact areas between NATO and the Warsaw Pact throughout the Cold War, it did not witness a constant naval force buildup thanks to the limitations brought by Montreux. The Soviet Union's demands for bases and joint defense over the Straits after 1945 also showed what a vital security shield Montreux was for Turkey.

The most important test of the Montreux regime in the 21st century has undoubtedly been the Russia-Ukraine War. After the start of the war, Turkey invoked Article 19 of the Montreux Straits Convention and stopped the passage of warships of the warring states through the Straits. In accordance with this provision, as long as Turkey is not a party to the war, the warships of the warring states cannot pass through the Straits, and an exception is granted only to ships that want to return to their bases in the Black Sea to which they belong. Ankara's implementation of this provision in an impartial and uncompromising manner has, on the one hand, prevented Russia from sending additional warships to the Black Sea from its Baltic, Northern, and Pacific fleets, and on the other hand, prevented NATO countries from bringing new warships into the Black Sea. Thus, Montreux has functioned as an impartial security mechanism that limits both sides within the same legal order; it has prevented the Black Sea from turning into an unlimited military competition field for global naval powers. This application has clearly revealed that, despite ninety years having passed, Montreux is one of the most successful regional security regimes that can be implemented effectively even in times of crisis.

This historical experience also confirms the fundamental principle of Turkey's Black Sea policy. The security of the Black Sea should essentially be the joint responsibility of the littoral states. Turkey's state policy should be built on an understanding that keeps the Black Sea away from the unlimited military competition of external powers and is based on regional ownership and cooperation among littoral countries. Littoral-centered initiatives such as the Black Sea Harmony Operation and BLACKSEAFOR have been successful examples of this approach, and it has been seen once again that the fundamental principle is that the Black Sea should be protected by the states that have a coast on the Black Sea.

The Treaty of Lausanne laid the foundation for Turkey's economic and political independence by abolishing the capitulations; Montreux completed the Republic's maritime security architecture by re-establishing full sovereignty over the Straits. In this respect, the two treaties are not alternatives to each other, but two great complementary phases of the Republic's construction of sovereignty. Lausanne legitimized the military victory in Anatolia in terms of international law, while Montreux completed the most critical missing link of sovereignty in maritime geopolitics.

However, an important unresolved security problem continues to exist in Turkey's maritime geopolitics. Today, sovereignty over the Straits is guaranteed by Montreux, a permanent security regime limiting external naval powers has been established in the Black Sea, and strategic integrity between Thrace and Anatolia has been consolidated. On the other hand, the fact that the Eastern Aegean islands, which are just opposite the Anatolian coast, are equipped with heavy weapons despite their non-military status envisaged in the Lausanne Treaty, turned into air and naval bases, and used as forward military positions against Turkey, constitutes one of the most important open areas in Turkey's security architecture. For this reason, the status of the Eastern Aegean islands continues to be one of the most important strategic problems of the 21st century, not only in terms of international law but also in terms of Turkey's national security and maritime geopolitics.

Conclusion

Lausanne and Montreux are not two independent diplomatic successes, but two historical phases of the Turkish state's struggle for sovereignty that complement each other. Lausanne laid the foundation for Turkey's political and economic independence by registering the land victory of the National Struggle in international law; Montreux re-established full sovereignty over the Straits by carrying this independence to maritime geopolitics. Without one, the land security of the Republic, and without the other, its maritime security remains incomplete.

However, the most important lesson of these two great historical achievements is not just to understand the past. The real lesson is that international law does not produce sovereignty on its own. Law is only permanent to the extent that there is military power, economic capability, political will, and the geopolitical mind directing them behind it. The maritime sovereignty, which was limited by the lack of a navy at Lausanne, was regained through diplomacy at Montreux thanks to the Republican Navy, which was rebuilt within thirteen years. For this reason, the true architect of Montreux is not only successful diplomacy but also the Turkish Navy, which was reborn in Gölcük.

The task before Turkey in the 21st century is the same. Protecting Montreux uncompromisingly, keeping the Black Sea away from the unlimited military competition of external powers based on the principle of littoral ownership, and continuing the national will with determination against the violation of the security provisions of Lausanne regarding the Eastern Aegean islands is the natural continuation of the same strategic thinking. Because sovereignty in the seas is not a right that is won once and protected forever, but a national power element that every generation must reproduce.

History shows that states without naval power remain incomplete at the diplomatic table, while states with a strong navy, a solid economy, and a strategic vision can shape international law in their favor. Behind Lausanne were the cavalry, artillery, and infantry of the Great Offensive; behind Montreux was the reborn Republican Navy. The guarantee of Turkey's ability to protect its rights and interests in the Blue Homeland in the future is also tied to the same reality.