Why must the TRNC become a maritime nation in the shadow of the Filo Jet accident?

The maritime accident in Kyrenia is a tragic indicator of the TRNC's failure to become a maritime nation. Turkey has a role and responsibility in this process. This accident should serve as a warning for a new mobilization.

The Filo Jet ship disaster that occurred off the coast of Kyrenia on August 30, 2026, should not be treated merely as a maritime accident. The technical cause of the accident, why the ship took on water, whether there was a structural problem, the decisions of the captain and crew, maintenance records, the role of the classification society, and the responsibilities of the operator and public officials will undoubtedly emerge at the end of technical and judicial investigations. However, in major maritime accidents, it is not enough to look only at the malfunction inside the ship or human error. The system that sent that ship to sea, the state structure that oversees it, and the search-and-rescue organization that mobilized after the accident occurred must also be examined. In this respect, the Filo Jet disaster has made it necessary to discuss the TRNC's maritime capacity within a broader framework.

THE PROBLEM OF OVERSIGHT

The chain of oversight prior to the accident must be questioned. While the number of staff in the organizational law of the TRNC Port Authority is 219, the fact that the number of active personnel is 74 is a striking indicator regarding the capacity of an island state's maritime administration. This number alone is not proof of any fault or negligence. However, the fact that a structure with a very wide scope of duties—from ship registry to survey, from port operation to passenger transport, from pilotage to maritime safety—is working with approximately one-third of its projected human resources must certainly be evaluated. The international political status of the TRNC also creates unique difficulties in the field of maritime affairs. The TRNC is not an independent IMO member, and its relationship with international maritime regimes such as SOLAS, STCW, and MARPOL does not operate through a directly recognized flag state system. This situation does not reduce the need for a strong maritime administration; on the contrary, it increases it. The political disadvantage in the international system can only be compensated for by high institutional capacity, technical competence, a strong registration system, and professional human resources.

CLASSIFICATION CERTIFICATION

One of the important topics of the Filo Jet debate is the role of classification societies. The fact that a ship has a classification certificate does not eliminate the state's responsibility. In maritime affairs, classification, flag state control, and port state control are different concepts. A classification society can audit a ship's compliance with certain technical and structural standards. However, the ultimate public responsibility for the safe operation of the ship lies with the flag state. In other words, the approval of the ship's seaworthiness and roadworthiness certificates belongs to the flag state. TRNC legislation also assigns duties to the Port Authority regarding the survey of ships, technical controls, navigational safety, and the compliance of passenger transport with maritime legislation. For this reason, a truly maritime state cannot be content with a bureaucratic structure that only checks the classification certificate; it must develop its own experts, survey capacity, ship and seafarer registration system, and maritime safety organization.

THE SEARCH AND RESCUE PROBLEM

The picture that emerged after the accident has raised serious questions that need to be addressed, especially regarding the search-and-rescue (SAR) system. The good intentions or efforts of the public officials, private boats, fishermen, and other volunteer elements who went to the field cannot be doubted. Everyone tried to help as much as their means allowed. However, the essence of search-and-rescue activity is not individual effort, but central planning, command-and-control, and coordination. In maritime affairs, SAR activity relies on pre-prepared job descriptions, a chain of responsibility, communication procedures, and institutional reflexes gained through joint exercises.

For this reason, the Filo Jet incident should be examined not only in terms of which vehicles went to the field, but in terms of the entire SAR command-and-control chain. Although a great effort was made in the Filo Jet incident, it has become clear that a settled, pre-planned, and institutionalized SAR reflex through regular exercises has not been formed in the TRNC. The arrival times of public vehicles to the scene, helicopter capacity, the coordination of air-sea elements, and on-scene coordination should be evaluated separately in this respect. Because for an island state, search-and-rescue is not a secondary public service, but one of the fundamental elements of sovereignty and maritime safety. It is mandatory for the TRNC to have a strong, 24-hour SAR coordination center, sufficient sea and air vehicles, sensors capable of operating at night and in bad weather conditions, drift and search planning systems, a joint operational picture where AIS and radar data are integrated, and above all, a strong command-and-control culture established through regular exercises.

WHY IS THE TRNC NOT A MARITIME NATION?

The Filo Jet incident actually brought to the surface a fundamental problem that transcends itself. Northern Cyprus is an island state. The transportation, economy, defense, food security, fishing, tourism, and energy security of an island state cannot be thought of separately from the sea. Despite this, we see that the maritime state structure, port infrastructure, shipbuilding, merchant fleet, fishing, maritime education, and maritime culture in the TRNC have not reached the strategic weight they should have. The fundamental question raised by the Filo Jet file is therefore not only about the accident. Why has Northern Cyprus, an island country, still not been able to transform into a strong maritime state? This question also has a historical dimension. The words of Rauf Denktaş in the 1998 TRNC Maritime Council, "Freedom came to the Turkish Cypriots from the sea," express one of the fundamental truths of the recent history of Turkish Cypriots. In the 1950s and 1960s, the sea played a vital role in maintaining the connection with Anatolia, the 'Bereketçiler' (merchant sailors) became one of the symbols of this bond, and on July 20, 1974, the amphibious operation of the Turkish Armed Forces determined the security and political future of the Turkish Cypriot people. For this reason, in the historical experience of the Turkish Cypriots, the sea is not just an economic area, but a direct element of security and statehood.

Today, the fundamental problem is the translation of this historical experience into an economic and institutional dimension. Becoming a maritime nation means prioritizing the sea in political, military, economic, scientific, cultural, and social fields for the survival of the state and the welfare of society. Ports, shipyards, the merchant fleet, fishing, maritime tourism, marine sciences, maritime education, maritime law, the marine environment, the Coast Guard, search-and-rescue, and maritime transport are parts of this whole. The Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) should not be seen by the TRNC only as the legal and geopolitical defense of maritime jurisdiction areas. If a state does not have the economic, technological, scientific, and military maritime power to utilize the maritime areas it possesses, it cannot fill the content of its maritime jurisdiction areas. Therefore, the place of the TRNC within the Blue Homeland is also directly linked to its capacity to become a maritime nation.

MARITIME NATIONHOOD AND SOVEREIGNTY CAPACITY

Another dimension of the problem is the difference in maritime capacity between the TRNC and Southern Cyprus. The Greek side has established a significant infrastructure in many areas, including naval power, port management, ship registry, ship management, maritime trade, maritime services, and maritime tourism. For this reason, when discussing any future scenario regarding the Cyprus issue, the maritime balance of power must also be taken into account. If the economic and institutional maritime capacity of the Turkish Cypriot side is left weak, there is a risk that these areas will fall under the control of the stronger Greek infrastructure within political solution models. In this respect, the TRNC's becoming a maritime nation is also a matter of strengthening its sovereignty capacity. The TRNC now needs a comprehensive Maritime Master Plan, moving away from isolated maritime investments. This plan should determine not only the improvement of existing ports but also how the state's maritime capacity will be developed over at least a few decades. The restructuring of the maritime administration, addressing the shortage of technical personnel, strengthening survey capacity, reconsidering the search-and-rescue organization, modernization of ports, expanding shipyard capacity, developing fishing, and expanding maritime education should be the fundamental elements of this plan.

TRNC MARITIME NATIONHOOD CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE MOTHERLAND

TRNC ports, especially Kyrenia and Famagusta, are natural parts of Anatolia's maritime transport system extending to the Eastern Mediterranean. Cargo, passenger, Ro-Ro, and container traffic between Turkey and the TRNC should be planned within this framework, and the goal should be for the TRNC to become a stronger logistics hub in the Eastern Mediterranean in the long term. The potential of Famagusta and new deep-water ports that could be established should be evaluated not only in terms of Turkey-TRNC trade but also in terms of changing Eurasian trade corridors. Shipbuilding is another fundamental element of this process. It is not only an economic but also a strategic necessity for an island state to have ship maintenance, repair, and, even if limited, construction capacity. Integrating the capacity in the TRNC with Turkey's large shipbuilding ecosystem can create an important technical infrastructure for merchant ships, passenger ships, fishing boats, and public and Coast Guard elements. It should not be thought that shipyards only repair ships; shipbuilding is also an industrial ecosystem that trains engineers, technicians, welders, electronics experts, and marine engine specialists. The fishing and aquaculture sector should also be at the center of becoming a maritime nation. It is expected that marine resources will have a larger share in the food security of an island economy surrounded by seas. Areas such as the renewal of the fishing fleet, development of fishing shelters, aquaculture, sea farms, and marine biotechnology can both create economic value and reduce import dependency. The higher education capacity of the TRNC should also be directly linked to the process of becoming a maritime nation. Specialization in fields such as marine transportation management engineering, marine engines, maritime law, oceanography, hydrography, marine geology, marine biology, port management, and maritime logistics should be encouraged. For an island state to scientifically research, measure, and continuously produce data on the seas surrounding it is not only an academic matter but a matter of sovereignty.

TURKEY MUST PROVIDE STATE SUPPORT

Turkey's role in this process must be redefined. Turkey has been providing significant financial and technical support to the TRNC for many years. Roads, airports, communication infrastructure, water projects, and public investments are examples of this. In maritime affairs, technical support has also increased, especially in recent years. The commissioning of the Eastern Mediterranean Vessel Traffic Services System on July 20, 2026, is important in this respect. However, technical assistance and a long-term maritime strategy are not the same thing. Turkey needs to treat the TRNC's becoming a maritime nation as an independent strategic goal and create a permanent model that will develop ports, shipyards, maritime education, Coast Guard capacity, the SAR system, and maritime trade together.

The fact that the TRNC is the only island state of the Turkic world also gives this issue a broader perspective. This geography in the center of the Eastern Mediterranean may gain importance in the long term not only for Turkey but also for the connection of the Turkic world, which extends from Central Asia to Anatolia, with the Mediterranean. For this to happen, however, there is a need for strong ports, maritime transport infrastructure, logistics capacity, shipyards, and trained maritime personnel.

CONCLUSION

Courts and experts will determine the technical and criminal responsibility of the Filo Jet disaster. However, the real major problem revealed by this incident is why the TRNC has not been able to truly become a maritime nation in the 52 years that have passed, despite being an island state. It would be a big mistake to look for the answer to this question only in Nicosia. The responsibility for the TRNC's lag in maritime affairs also belongs significantly to Ankara. Because Turkey, despite being surrounded by seas on three sides, has a state tradition that historically thinks land-centered and directs its transport and infrastructure preferences largely to land. Indeed, according to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure's "Reaching and Accessing Turkey 2022 Report," of the approximately 1.6 trillion TL invested in the transport and communications sectors in the 2003–2022 period, 60 percent was allocated to highways, 21 percent to railways, 9 percent to airlines, and 8 percent to communications, while the share of seaways was only 1 percent. This picture is enough on its own to show the true priority level of maritime affairs in the motherland over the last twenty-plus years.

Today, there is not even an independent Ministry of Maritime Affairs in Turkey. Maritime administration and legislation have been distributed among different institutions, and a strong institutional structure that will manage maritime trade, ports, ship registry, seafarers, maritime safety, search-and-rescue, and other maritime activities within a holistic state policy has not been established. Even in the February 6, 2023, Great Anatolian Earthquake, Turkey's first emergency response ship, Nene Hatun, could only set sail from Istanbul about 30 hours after the earthquake. The ship reached İskenderun about 96 hours later. In short, we are a state that, despite having the means, could not establish a maritime bridge of the intensity and capacity needed in the Gulf of İskenderun during the first critical days of the earthquake.

Therefore, it is not realistic to expect maritime affairs, which are left orphaned in institutional and bureaucratic terms in the motherland, to turn into a strong state doctrine in the TRNC. It is no coincidence that there is no large-scale shipyard ecosystem, port infrastructure that meets contemporary needs, and strong, regular maritime transport lines integrated with Turkey in the TRNC today. Kyrenia and Famagusta ports could have been made natural extensions of the Turkish maritime system over the past half-century; the TRNC's ship, port, survey, maritime safety, and seafarer legislation could have been harmonized with Turkey at a much more advanced level; and joint human resources, training, oversight, and technical capacity could have been created. The fact that these have not been done sufficiently is a strategic deficiency that not only the TRNC but also the motherland governments must question.

The Martyr Lieutenant Caner Gönyeli Search and Rescue Exercises, which have been carried out between Turkey and the TRNC for years, are also important in terms of rescue activities. These exercises have provided serious geopolitical benefits in terms of the TRNC's sovereignty, Turkey's search-and-rescue responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the demonstration of the rights of Turkish Cypriots in maritime areas. However, the picture revealed by the Filo Jet disaster suggests that the capacity displayed through exercises cannot be reflected to the same extent in the maritime safety and search-and-rescue system that the citizen needs in daily life. The real issue is not to show success in an exercise scenario, but to be able to mobilize the same command-and-control reflex, the same coordination, and the same professional capacity within minutes for an ordinary citizen in need of help at sea. This is exactly where theory must turn into practice, and geopolitics into public service.

Turkey must now truly act as an older brother to the TRNC in the field of maritime affairs. This does not mean managing the TRNC's institutions from Turkey, but ensuring that they reach the capacity to stand on their own feet. Turkey's institutional experience, especially in the fields of maritime security, maritime safety, search-and-rescue, port state and flag state controls, survey, ship registry, seafarer standards, and maritime education, should be transferred directly to the TRNC. When necessary, for a certain transition period, Turkish expert staff should be assigned to TRNC institutions, Turkish Cypriot personnel should be trained in Turkey, and joint technical mechanisms that work continuously between the two countries should be established. Kyrenia and Famagusta should be treated not only as TRNC ports but as parts of the joint maritime transport and security system between Turkey and the TRNC. Port, shipyard, maritime transport, Coast Guard, SAR, fishing, maritime education, and marine sciences should not be disconnected projects, but should be made elements of a single TRNC Maritime Master Plan.

Turkish Cypriots reached their freedom from the sea in 1974, but in the 52 years that have passed, this historical truth could not be transformed into a strong maritime economy, maritime bureaucracy, and maritime culture. The Blue Homeland is not just drawing maritime jurisdiction areas on a map, sailing warships, or declaring a search-and-rescue zone. The Blue Homeland is the port, the shipyard, the merchant ship, the fishing boat, the maritime school, the survey expert, the Coast Guard boat, the SAR helicopter, and the certainty that a person in danger at sea will be reached by the state. The Motherland, the Baby Homeland, and the Blue Homeland are a whole. However, for this integrity to gain real meaning, Turkey must first overcome its own land-centered reflexes, and then see the TRNC's becoming a maritime nation not as a secondary transport issue, but directly as a project of sovereignty, security, economy, and statehood. If the Filo Jet disaster can be the starting point of this transformation, it will be the most important state lesson we can learn after the people we have lost.

I convey my condolences to the families and relatives of our citizens who lost their lives in the Filo Jet disaster, and my best wishes for a speedy recovery to our citizens who survived the accident.