Risks and Opportunities for the CHP

In recent days, we are once again facing a frenzy of polling. Reducing politics to mere mathematics is extremely dangerous because it limits the capacity of political parties to produce actual policy.

It must not be forgotten that politics is not just a mathematical endeavor. Its analytical aspect is even more important. Indeed, after the 2019 elections, we all saw the consequences of the opposition reducing politics solely to mathematics and viewing the upcoming presidential elections as a guaranteed win: an explosion of overconfidence, an image of an alliance trapped among elites rather than in contact with society, and ultimately, defeat.

Let us come to the issue of polling... First, I must remind you: In a period without an election agenda, one should base their analysis on the difference that emerges before the undecided voters are distributed.

Because these ratios are not distributed at the ballot box through proportional or special methods, and undecided voters turn to a party based on their fundamental expectations during the election period and the government's economic performance over the last year. It should not be forgotten that in the current situation, the government, which holds public power, has a major advantage in this regard compared to the opposition when it comes to pulling the wool over people's eyes.

At this point, my observation as a researcher is this: There is an emotional detachment and a permanent break among AK Party voters at a rate we have not observed before. However, we do not observe a trend showing that the rise in the CHP is continuing.

Yes, it is certainly significant that the CHP has permanently risen above 30%. However, it must be remembered that Kılıçdaroğlu also moved the party's vote share from the 20% band to the 25% band and remained stuck there, much like the oft-repeated "middle-income trap." Furthermore, the current rate is not enough for the CHP to win an election.

In other words, although the CHP has increased its vote share to a certain extent, in an environment where the vast majority of the country agrees that Turkey is not being governed well, it has not yet reached a majority capable of receiving the mandate to govern the country. In other words, although the voters have reached a consensus on who cannot govern the country, they have not yet decided on who can.

Undoubtedly, the only party that is a candidate for this is the CHP. However, this is as much an advantage for the AK Party as it is for the CHP. Because the moment undecided voters fall into the perception that the CHP cannot govern the country, in the absence of a strong third alternative, they will revert to their original choice.

So, how can this be prevented? In such environments of major crisis, voters want to hear by whom and how the country will be governed. Therefore, instead of turning toward complicated program preparations, the CHP needs to provide the voters with answers to simple questions like the 5Ws and 1H (Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How).

Undoubtedly, it is meaningful for the CHP to have a comprehensive program regarding its utopia for Turkey, but this is also pregnant with a risk: the emergence of a set of promises that exceeds the voter's attention threshold, like the 2,400 promises of the Table of Six, and the possibility of a process arising that closes the party in on itself.

To prevent this risk, the CHP needs to produce answers that are "light in weight but heavy in value" regarding Turkey's priority issues such as the economy, migration, and healthcare. In other words, the CHP must succeed in separating its acute-period promises from its long-term vision for Turkey. This ultimately requires producing simple answers to simple questions like "who will govern and how?" Just like producing memorable and simple answers like the "3Ys" (Corruption, Poverty, and Bans) that opened the doors of power to the AK Party.