Could Iran make Machiavelli look like an amateur!

After the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash (!), as I watched the commentators on news channels with rapt attention, my mental time machine suddenly took me back to 2006.

I was in Lebanon during Israel's 33-day “Summer Rains” operation against Hezbollah.

Hezbollah, having secured the unconditional support of Iran, was giving Israel a run for its money.

The fuse of the bomb had been lit when the organization attacked a patrol vehicle and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers; the Israeli army had rapidly entered Lebanon, launching the most intense air and naval offensive of the last 10 years.

Israel wanted to neutralize Hezbollah and force a deal without dragging the matter out too long.

But the plans made at home did not match the reality in the marketplace.

Even though Hezbollah was on the stage, this was actually a show of force by Iran. The Shiite crescent had been plunged into the heart of Israel like a dagger.

The “main man” in this bloody game was Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. He was the symbol of the resistance against Israel and had even earned the appreciation of the Wahhabi al-Qaeda.

The streets in the Middle East were overflowing with people carrying posters of Nasrallah and chanting “Death to Israel.”

He had risen to the status of a “sacred” and “untouchable” leader in Lebanon. Legends about him were a dime a dozen.

No one knew where he was, from where he was conducting the war, or what he was eating or drinking, but every statement he made created a great wave of excitement among Shiites.

Hezbollah undoubtedly had a heroic story against Israel, but Nasrallah was being polished more than necessary. The press in Iran and the Iranian-backed media in the Middle East were making a great effort to ensure that all the success was credited to Nasrallah.

But those who had read a little bit about Middle Eastern affairs could never quite make the pieces fit.

Now, let's rewind the tape a bit...

Shiites had never been politically powerful in Lebanon. It was only when the mullahs intended to create spheres of influence in the Middle East after the Islamic Revolution that Lebanese Shiites began to come to the fore. Iran spared no political, military, or economic aid to ensure they served as an outpost against Israel.

But there was a problem.

Lebanese Shiites were not, in a sense, of the “velayat-e faqih” (guardianship of the jurist) mindset, which is the foundation of Shiite political Islam and demands that politics be practiced according to religious rules.

Lebanese Shiites were acting more in accordance with their Arab roots than a Persian approach.

Their spiritual leader was Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. However, Fadlallah did not embrace the velayat-e faqih legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Moreover, he had clearly stated his stance by saying, “No Shiite leader, not even Khomeini, has a monopoly on the truth.”

At the same time, he prioritized Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who was the Marja' al-Taqlid (source of emulation) for Iraqi Shiites. He kept his distance from Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The manifestation of circumstances in this manner brought Iran to a crossroads in Lebanese politics in the early 1990s. Either they would somehow convince Fadlallah and continue accordingly, or they would find a new name close to them who had no problem with the velayat-e faqih concept and polish them.

However, it was not easy to bypass Fadlallah because he held the title of “Grand Ayatollah,” and the Lebanese Shiites were also loyal to their religious leader.

That is when Israel's Operation Summer Rains gave Iran the opportunity it wanted. Hassan Nasrallah, whose star had never quite shone despite becoming Secretary-General of Hezbollah in 1992, achieved a notable success in the 33-day war, even if he did not bring Israel to its knees.

With Iran fueling this, Fadlallah was pushed into the background. Lebanese Shiites aligned themselves behind Nasrallah, despite him being very low in the religious hierarchy.

After this stage, Nasrallah began to carry Iran's tune more comfortably.

From a Western perspective, it could be said that this issue is about the dynamics and nature of the relations between Iran and Hezbollah. But the moment we put on our Middle East glasses, we encounter the pragmatism of the mullah regime, which would make even Machiavelli look like an amateur.

When it comes to Iran's concrete interests in Middle Eastern politics, the mullah regime does not pay much attention to religious hierarchy and can even reshape it as it sees fit. Moreover, it does this with a thousand and one political maneuvers. It can construct its military and political strategies entirely on pragmatism.

It could be said that Nasrallah was just a commander responsible for military activities. But those who follow developments in Lebanon know very well that this is not the case. Because, although there is a certain distinction between religious leadership and military leadership within Hezbollah, there are no such thick lines.

Let's come to today...

As scenarios regarding the post-Ebrahim Raisi era are being discussed on news channels, I thought about how the mullah regime is extremely skilled at playing games within games. In other words, the matter may be far beyond a conspiracy constructed solely on who will succeed Ali Khamenei as the supreme leader.

Let us end our article by saying, let us not be surprised if unexpected, surprising developments emerge in the coming process.