The American elections and their impact on Turkey

Turkey's future should not be shaped in other capitals, but in its own national will, intellect, science, production power, and seas.

The elections held in Brazil, Bulgaria, Serbia, and most recently in the USA on November 3, 2026, point to a remarkable common trend despite different political and social conditions. Political understandings that push the economic and social demands of the public into the background and prioritize the interests of finance capital, large capital circles, and hegemonic power centers are being questioned more and more. The cost of living, the deterioration in income distribution, the economic costs of wars, corruption, and the alienation of political elites from the public are increasing the reactions accumulating at the ballot box. Although the reasons for the elections vary from country to country, the emerging picture reminds us of an important truth: Politics can be conducted despite the public; however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to win elections despite the public.

The most striking example of this trend is the heavy defeat suffered by Trump and the Republican Party in the November 3 American midterm elections. The Democrats' capture of the majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate will seriously narrow Trump's political room for maneuver in the remaining two years of his second presidential term. The economic and military cost of the Iran War, rising energy and food prices, the pressures created by customs tariffs, and the American public's reaction to endless wars have played an important role in the election results. However, it is insufficient to evaluate this development solely as Trump's personal political defeat. We are facing a picture that requires us to question the representation crisis of the American political system, the influence of finance capital and pro-Israel lobbies on Washington, economic inequalities, and the increasingly heavy costs of global hegemony together.

The real problem is that the USA, which rose to an unrivaled position in world industrial production, technology, the financial system, and naval power in 1945, is no longer the same USA. The USA, which has moved significant parts of its production abroad and increasingly finances its consumption through debt and the global privileges of the dollar, is today facing a historic challenge against China's rising industrial, technological, shipbuilding, and critical raw material processing capacity. Although Washington partially maintains its military superiority, what has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most recently in Iran shows that military power is not always enough to produce political results. In short, the conjuncture of 1945 no longer exists. Despite this, American political and military elites are trying to maintain their old hegemonic privileges in changing world conditions. Trump's election defeat, the future of the Iran War, the Netanyahu administration's support in Washington, the Ukraine front, and NATO's strategic orientation are interconnected parts of this great transformation.

The real danger for Turkey is that while the world is changing rapidly, a significant portion of the ruling elites still think and act according to the post-1945 American-centered geopolitical order. The Republic's will for full independence, won against imperialism, has gradually transformed into a structure dependent on the Atlantic system with American aid, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO membership after the Second World War. Moving away from Atatürk's understanding of reason, science, secularism, statism, national production, and independent foreign policy has created strategic consequences in a wide area, not only in foreign policy but also from education to the economy, from defense to state institutions. Today, as American hegemony erodes, Turkey's continued adherence to Washington-centered choices carries serious risks in terms of our maritime jurisdiction areas in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, the security of the Black Sea, developments in northern Syria, new military alliance searches in the Middle East, and discussions regarding the unitary structure of the Republic.

1945: THE UNLOCKING OF THE GATE OF INDEPENDENCE

On April 5, 1946, the American battleship USS Missouri anchored off Dolmabahçe. A giant "Welcome" poster hung on the Maiden's Tower greeted the ship. When the sun set, a new "Welcome" had taken its place on the mahya of the Dolmabahçe Mosque. The message was clear. We embrace you in both worldly and spiritual dimensions. After 1946, Turkey met with American aid. The victorious nuclear power of the Second World War had replaced England, which the Ottoman Empire had placed at the center for years, in the middle of the twentieth century. Both derived their power from dominance over oceans and seas. Both possessed Protestant capitalist morality and practice, as well as imperialist theory and tradition. They had become effective in Turkey's political and military decision-making mechanisms on the grounds of protecting Anatolia and the surrounding geography first against Russia and later against the USSR.

The Ottoman Empire, which missed the industrial revolutions and the Enlightenment and was lost in the dark spiral of religious fanaticism, had even handed over the mind and spirit of its defense to foreigners. Wherever we look in the military history of the Ottoman Empire's decline and collapse period, we encounter the memoirs of foreign advisor pashas who were representatives of hegemons. French, German, American, and the vast majority of British advisors prioritized the high interests of their own nation-states. This chain of dependency, which was broken with the establishment of the Republic, began to be re-established shortly after Atatürk's loss.

In 1939, we unlocked the gate of our independence by signing a tripartite alliance agreement with England and France and an agreement granting commercial privileges to the USA in the same year. The door was now ajar. On February 23, 1945, a mutual aid agreement was signed between the USA and Turkey. With the credit agreement signed on February 27, 1946, some of the war-surplus material that the USA had left in its hands and would not take back to its country was sold to Turkey. For this, a loan of 10 million dollars was given to Turkey. The path to a process that would limit the independent development of our national defense industry had been opened.

On March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine was announced. The military aid agreement was signed in the same year. Economic dependency deepened further with the Marshall Plan. Instead of developing its own industrialization and development model, Turkey turned to an economic route shaped according to the needs of the Atlantic system. While the goal of becoming Europe's grain storehouse was highlighted, the development of heavy industry and national production capacity was pushed to the background. Having lost the ability to find its own solutions, Turkey began to seek salvation not in itself, but by constantly looking at the Atlantic horizon.

The Agreement on the Establishment of an Intergovernmental Education Commission signed with the USA in 1949 created a new break in terms of the future of the national, republican, statist, revolutionary, populist, and secular education system initiated by Atatürk. The institutionalization of American influence in education was a development that should be discussed not only in terms of Turkey's military and economic independence but also its mental independence. Because the future of a nation is determined not only by its weapons and factories but also by the worldview with which its young generations are raised.

Accepted into NATO in 1952, Turkey tied its defense strategy to the alliance system centered in Washington, London, and Paris. Turkish geography was placed in a critical position in the rimland and containment strategy of American geopolitics. Turkey was no longer just a state defending its own territory, but an ally used in the containment of the Soviet Union, the maintenance of the balance of power in the Middle East, and the preservation of the regional order that also affects Israel's security. We had practically turned into a mandate.

MOVING AWAY FROM KEMALISM AND MENTAL DEPENDENCY

At the beginning of the War of Independence, Atatürk had seen the danger of mandates at the Sivas Congress. However, after 1945, the idea of independence and Kemalism in Turkey began to be increasingly overshadowed by anti-communism. Atatürk's principles of independence, secularism, statism, populism, and national production were eroded in line with new geopolitical choices.

During the Democrat Party period, some of the defense industry investments of the Atatürk era were liquidated or changed function. The Village Institutes were closed. Religion was removed from the field of conscience and became one of the tools of politics in the fight against communism. Through the Associations for the Fight Against Communism and similar structures, religious conservatism was associated with the Atlantic system's anti-Soviet strategy. The intellectual and political ground for structures like Fethullah Gülen to gain power within the state in later years was formed during this period.

Turkey confused Westernization with Westernism. Westernization meant developing reason, science, law, technology, and production capacity. Westernism, on the other hand, meant adopting the West's political and geopolitical choices without questioning them. The founding will of the Republic had aimed for the former. After 1945, the latter increasingly dominated large segments of the state and society.

History is full of examples showing that military defeats can only be overcome by the reorganization of the state and society. Mustafa Kemal succeeded in a new organization with the Kuvayı Milliye (National Forces) and went down in history as the leader who saved the nation and founded the state. Later, he carried out a comprehensive transformation. From the wreckage of a collapsed empire, he aimed to create not only a new army but also a secular Republic based on national sovereignty, an independent state, and a production economy. Atatürk's greatness lies not only in the victories he won on the battlefield but in his transformation of military victory into a social, economic, and political revolution. Turkey's moving away from this model after 1945 is a strategic break that affects not only the ideological but also the state's capacity to produce national power. Turkey has practically mortgaged its sovereignty and geography with its own will.

The shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane taking off from Turkey over the Soviet Union in 1960, the fact that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey became the subject of negotiations between Washington and Moscow during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the June 5, 1964 Johnson Letter showed the true face of dependency. Turkey could experience sovereignty problems even in the use of its own territory and weapons. When it wanted to protect its kinsmen in Cyprus, it faced pressure through the use of American weapons. If the 1963 Cyprus bloody Christmas events had not happened, Turkey's awakening would not have begun.

The strengthening of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in state and social life after September 12, 1980, constituted a new stage of moving away from Kemalist secular nationalism. The national enlightenment initiated by Atatürk gradually gave way to an understanding where religious identity was politicized. Turkish nationalism was being severed from secularism, and religious affiliation was being placed ahead of national identity. The Green Belt approach, supported by American strategy throughout the Cold War, coincided with this transformation in Turkey. After 1989, Anglo-Saxon hegemony presented its Cold War victory as the end of history. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, the expansion of NATO, and the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria were attempts to ensure the continuation of the unipolar order. Turkey, instead of creating its own national geopolitics within this order, often acted according to American priorities.

The American arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, the tensions experienced after the rejection of the Northern Iraq motion in 2003, the "hood event" in Sulaymaniyah, the 2008-2014 FETÖ conspiracy cases, the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, and the S-400 and F-35 crises revealed that Turkey's national interests and American strategic priorities do not always coincide. The support the USA gives to PKK/PYD/YPG structures, the policies it pursues in favor of Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot Administration, and the threats of sanctions against Turkey have also deepened this contradiction.

THEFT OF TRUTH AND PERCEPTION BANDITRY

For a nation to lose its independence, its territory does not necessarily have to be occupied. Being deprived of the ability to think, historical consciousness, national memory, and the means to reach the truth can lead to the same result. Accessing the truth is a function of being informed. Knowledge sets us free. It gives us ideas. However, interpreting information correctly is as important as accessing it. When mass media, academia, and political institutions come under the influence of dominant interest groups, perception is used instead of information, and propaganda is used instead of truth.

The establishment can turn even the sharpest lie into a truth packaged with theft of truth and perception banditry. If the public has been kept ignorant, equipped with religious dogmas, kept away from thinking and researching, or has to live within a powerful propaganda order, it falls into this trap. Perception management is used in every field, from the individual level to the state level. The organization of ignorance and the emergence of informal moral systems from the informal economy according to the new situation are practically encouraged. In such a conjuncture, the masses are prepared for new regimes, new economic packages, new legal orders, and even geopolitical choices that are contrary to their own interests.

Turkey experienced one of the heaviest examples of this in the FETÖ conspiracy cases. Thousands of patriotic soldiers were discredited with accusations of coup-plotting, espionage, and unimaginable crimes. The Republic's military institutions were targeted using digital forgeries, anonymous denunciations, media campaigns, and judicial mechanisms. The lawlessness that emerged during the Balyoz and Ergenekon processes caused great damage to the institutional memory, morale, and trained human resources of the Turkish Armed Forces.

The biggest contradiction was that all of this was done under the rhetoric of democracy, the rule of law, and ending military tutelage. Even though the army's bayonet had fallen, the navy's propeller had stopped, and the eagle's wings had been broken, it was claimed that advanced democracy had been reached. In the end, the July 15, 2016 coup attempt revealed how a religious-political organization embedded within state institutions could turn into a deadly security threat. In this process, not only military cadres but also society's ability to distinguish the truth suffered a heavy wound. The politicization of law, the replacement of merit with loyalty, and the loss of independence of academia and the media were the results of moving away from the Republic's founding understanding of reason and science.

TODAY'S TURKEY: NEW DEPENDENCIES INSTEAD OF INDEPENDENCE

Eighty years have passed. The economic, political, and military foundations of American hegemony are eroding. China is rising, Asia's weight in world production is increasing, and global trade and energy corridors are being reshaped. Despite this, Turkey's ruling elites, instead of using the country's geopolitical value to build an independent power, often prioritize the continuation of Western-centered alliance relations.

The Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean are among the clearest examples of this. The increase in the US military presence in Greece and the political support it gives to Greece and the GCAS (Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus) create pressure on Turkey's theses regarding maritime jurisdiction areas. Although game-changing steps such as the Turkey-Libya Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Memorandum have been taken, the determined and continuous geopolitical struggle required by these cannot be maintained to the same extent. Greece's approach to maritime jurisdiction, which grants full effect to islands, conflicts with the rights and interests arising from Turkey's Anatolian coasts. In return, Ankara's search for diplomatic normalization should not take precedence over the will to protect national maritime interests.

The problem Turkey faces in the Eastern Mediterranean is not just Greece. The US, the EU, and energy-geopolitical alliances in the region affect Turkey's freedom of movement in the seas. While Turkey needs to use its naval power, rights arising from maritime law, and diplomatic capacity together, a foreign policy understanding that focuses only on reducing tension sometimes comes to the fore. The EU Commission's 2026 Turkey Progress Report is the best example in this field.

Although the structure of the state, the management system, and the position of the army in Turkey have changed radically in the last 24 years, Brussels' intolerance for Turkey's geopolitical rights and interests in the seas does not change. In its latest report, the EU is uncomfortable with the inclusion of the "Blue Homeland" in textbooks, the 1995 Turkish Grand National Assembly decision against the 12-mile imposition in the Aegean, the reminder of the non-military status of the Eastern Aegean islands, and the Turkey-Libya maritime jurisdiction areas memorandum. It does not question Greece's claim of 10 miles of airspace against 6 miles of territorial waters, its maximalist maritime jurisdiction demands, and the Greek administration's understanding of unilateral sovereignty over Cyprus.

Even though Turkey has stopped drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean since the end of 2020, Brussels' complaints continue. It is exemplary that the EU, which cannot provide political integrity within itself, cannot build an independent military power, has lost the advantage of cheap energy, and is struggling with economic stagnation and social tensions under large debt stocks, still attempts to give geopolitical instructions to Turkey. This approach reveals the collective imperialist character of the EU, which prioritizes Greek-Cypriot interests and the influence calculations of finance capital in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Turkey, the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus are not a matter of membership bargaining, but a matter of homeland and sovereignty. What is truly exemplary is the mentality that still ties Turkey's future to joining this structure. As long as Ankara does not firmly oppose these impositions and tries to reduce tension, Brussels' humiliating attitude will continue. However, in geopolitics, a decrease in tension does not always mean that interests are protected. Sometimes it only means time gained by the other side.

In the Middle East, another danger is growing. The possibility that the military and political rapprochement developed with Saudi Arabia will place Turkey under new obligations outside its own national security needs should be evaluated carefully. The military alliance and collective defense arrangements brought to the agenda under the name of the Mecca Pact should not turn into a mechanism that will meet Saudi Arabia's military inadequacies and share the cost of the US, rather than Turkey's own national interests. No economic or diplomatic gain of Turkey can legitimize the death of a Turkish soldier for the security of another dynasty. The Turkish Armed Forces are the guarantor of the independence and security of the Turkish nation, not the regime security of other states.

Developments in northern Syria are of a nature that could lead to much more serious strategic consequences for Turkey. The transformation of the political and military gains of the PKK/PYD/YPG structure, which the US has supported for many years, into a permanent status could create a new geopolitical reality on Turkey's southern borders. The possibility of a Kurdish political structure that could gain access to the Mediterranean should be evaluated not only in terms of border security but also in terms of the future of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, the GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project) areas, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Gulf of Iskenderun. It cannot be said yet that such a development has taken place; however, the possibility itself cannot be ignored in national security planning.

The new opening discussions carried out in domestic politics, political and legal regulations regarding the founder of the terrorist organization PKK, framework law initiatives, and searches for constitutional changes cannot be handled separately from this broad geopolitical framework. Social peace is certainly important. However, the price of peace cannot be to compromise on the Republic's unitary structure, the nation-state, national sovereignty, the principle of equality before the law, and the fundamental characteristics of the state. Ending terrorism and creating political and geographical gains through terrorism are completely different processes.

While special opportunities and privileges for the head of terrorism are being discussed, how the sense of justice of martyrs' families, veterans, and society is affected should also be considered. The legal consistency shown by the state in peace and normalization processes is as important as the determination it shows in fighting terrorism. The perception among large segments of society that the limits of concessions are unclear erodes trust in the state.

CONSTITUTIONAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC

One of the most important problems Turkey faces today is the discussions on a new constitution. The 1982 Constitution has been amended many times since it came into force, and the constitutional structure of the state has undergone a radical transformation, especially during the last 23 years of power. With the 2017 referendum, the parliamentary system was abolished, executive power was concentrated in the President, and the Presidential Government System was adopted. Therefore, the issue that should be discussed today is not why the current constitution cannot be changed, but why there is still a need for a new constitution after such comprehensive changes.

The 1982 Constitution initially consisted of 177 main articles and 15 provisional articles. Considering the fact that 133 of its 177 main articles have been changed today, this rate is approximately 75%. It is a fact that the constitution has undergone comprehensive changes, especially in the last 23 years. With the 2017 referendum, the parliamentary system was ended, executive power was concentrated in the President, and the management architecture of the state was radically changed. Now, why does the government want a new constitution when it has been able to change most of the constitution and establish the management system it wants? Is the goal really to establish a more democratic and libertarian order, or is it to reshape the Republic's founding principles, unitary state structure, definition of Turkish citizenship, and understanding of national sovereignty? These questions are of vital importance, especially considering regional geopolitical developments and new political opening discussions. The constitution cannot be a tool for daily political calculations or externally sourced geopolitical expectations. The founding philosophy, unitary structure, and national sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey cannot be the subject of any political bargaining.

ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL DECAY

The fundamental duty of the state is to protect the constitution, the honor, sovereignty, and independence of the state and the nation; to meet the basic needs of its people, primarily housing, nutrition, and security; and to ensure their peace and prosperity. When the public begins to believe that the state does not represent its own interests, political legitimacy erodes. Economic crises, corruption, favoritism, and lawlessness accelerate this rupture. The problems Turkey is experiencing today are not limited to foreign policy and constitutional order. Moving away from a production economy, becoming dependent on external sources for financing needs, deterioration in income distribution, the cost of living, the prominence of loyalty over merit, and nepotism are eroding the institutional resilience of the state.

Fund and financing crises, discussions regarding the use of public resources, allegations of favoritism, and the decrease in trust in institutions are not only economic but also political and social problems. When the distance between the state and the public grows, the citizen finds it difficult to see their own state as the guarantor of their common future. When the sense of justice is damaged, trust in the law decreases, merit disappears, and young generations begin to seek their future in other countries, the issue is no longer just the success or failure of a government. The long-term resilience of the state is at stake. The fundamental goal of the Atatürk Republic was to create a state that could use its own resources, industrialize, train educated human resources, and accept economic independence as the basis of its political independence. Today, a significant portion of economic decisions are shaped according to short-term financing needs, capital movements, and the expectations of foreign investors. The sustainability of an economic model where consumption takes precedence over production, short-term financial balances over long-term development, and narrow interest networks over public interest is debatable.

Even more thought-provoking is that this process cannot be stopped by significant segments of the government and the opposition. On one side, there is the government's tendency to identify its own political future with the institutional future of the state, and on the other, the opposition's inability to present a sufficiently strong and independent alternative on fundamental geopolitical issues. Thus, Turkey's high national interests remain behind daily political competition, election calculations, and short-term interests. Unfortunately, these developments create the impression that they are being directed by an invisible hand. However, it is not enough to look for external interference here. The interests of external powers can only be effective through internal institutional weaknesses, lack of merit, political dependency, interest networks, and social polarization. A country weakening itself is much more dangerous than being weakened from the outside.

CONCLUSION: IS THIS ROUTE SUSTAINABLE?

The American elections are important for understanding the historic transformation experienced by a power at the center of the world system. America cannot maintain the economic, military, and political superiority it established in 1945 under the same conditions. The rise of China, Asia's production power, new energy and trade corridors, the strengthening of the multipolar order, and the deep contradictions within American society itself are signs of a new historical era.

If Turkey cannot read this transformation correctly, it will remain far from the opportunities offered by the rising world while bearing the geopolitical costs of a declining hegemon. Worse, dependency in foreign policy and institutional decay in domestic policy will continue to feed each other. The erosion experienced in a wide area from national education to the economy, from law to defense, from maritime jurisdiction areas to border security, shows the results of moving away from Kemalism and the founding philosophy of the Republic.

Turkey is neither Germany, nor France, nor Japan, nor South Korea, nor Italy. These countries were either occupied or saved by external powers during or at the end of the Second World War. No one saved or founded Turkey. The Republic of Turkey is the work of a war of independence waged against imperialism. Therefore, it is incompatible with its historical identity for the Turkish nation to be a proxy or vassal of any great power.

What is needed today is not a new form of mandate, but a return to the Kemalist Republic's principles of reason, science, secularism, national sovereignty, production, and full independence. Turkey must realize its geographical power, demographic potential, historical accumulation, naval power, and geopolitical position. It must determine its own interests not according to the priorities of Washington, Brussels, London, or any other capital, but according to the long-term security and prosperity needs of the Turkish nation.

The danger Turkey faces today is not just remaining in the geopolitical orbit of American hegemony despite its decline. The greater danger is the weakening of the bond between the state's economic and institutional capacity and the nation's expectations. As Clausewitz's war theory reminds us, the power of a state cannot be thought of independently of the will of society and the rational goals of the political administration. If the state does not give confidence to its people, if the law cannot provide justice, if the economy moves away from production, if merit gives way to loyalty, and if the army is directed toward external obligations whose relevance to national interests is debatable, the problem that arises is not just a management crisis. This is the erosion of the state's capacity to produce national power.

The founding philosophy of the Atatürk Republic is the antidote to this danger. Because full independence is not just the absence of foreign soldiers on the country's territory. Full independence is the national integrity established between the state's political mind, the nation's will, the army's power, and the economy's production capacity.

What both the government and the opposition must understand is that an order where state institutions are weakened, the law does not inspire confidence, the economy moves away from production, society is polarized, young people lose their confidence in the future, and national security and sovereignty issues become the subject of political bargaining cannot be sustained.

While the unstoppable flow of history shapes a new world order, Turkey has two paths before it. Either it will continue to bear the costs of the declining hegemony by remaining within the dependency relations established after 1945, or it will draw its own independent route by returning to the Republic's founding will. The greatest danger for Turks is hopelessness and a lack of self-confidence. What needs to be done in the second century of the Republic is to regain the strategic will for independence lost after 1945. Because Turkey's future will not be shaped in other capitals, but in its own national will, intellect, science, production power, and seas.