Turkey in CIA documents, 1945-1960

The CIA, or the US foreign intelligence agency, was established in 1947. There were predecessor institutions, but the CIA, by its very inception, is a quintessential Cold War institution. It is one of the most important institutions serving the imperial interests of the US in the new order that emerged after World War II.

Almost a decade ago, the CIA made many declassified intelligence documents accessible to internet users.

While not in a direct folder, many documents regarding Turkey can be found when searching with various keywords. There is a significant number of documents concerning the first period of the Cold War for Turkey, between 1945 and 1960.

Of course, we do not know about those that have not been declassified. Moreover, there are not a few parts of the accessible documents that have been censored or made unreadable.

A significant portion of the documents are in the nature of open-source intelligence. Furthermore, these are not the final assessments of the CIA or the US on the relevant subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern the US perspective between the lines. Moreover, there are records of some private meetings.

In CIA assessments, Turkey's importance stems primarily from its proximity to the Soviet Union, its control of the Straits, and its position between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

A 1948 report stated that Turkey's fundamental problem was its Soviet neighborhood, and that Ankara was therefore trying to tighten its relations with the US and the UK.

The documents are not always consistent or prescient. A 1949 working paper assessed that if electoral reform were carried out, it would be highly likely for the DP (Democrat Party) to win the elections. Just before the 1950 elections, however, it was written that almost all American observers did not expect the DP to come to power.

Despite the DP's unexpected victory, the CIA thought that the change in government would not alter Turkey's fundamental orientations.

In the assessment prior to 1950, it was stated that regardless of whether the CHP or the DP won, state capitalism would continue, and that the DP would only provide broader and faster opportunities for private enterprise. The idea that Celal Bayar would dismantle the statist economic structure was found to be incorrect; it was recalled that he himself had a role in establishing this structure. Thus, in American analysis, the DP was seen not as a force entirely alien to the old regime, but as a different cadre of administrators coming from the same state experience.

In the first half of the 1950s, Turkey was evaluated in CIA documents not only as a country that needed to be protected, but as an ally that could contribute to Western defense in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Turkey's initiatives with Yugoslavia, Greece, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan; its desire to take part in Middle Eastern defense organizations; and its efforts to expand the Baghdad Pact were closely monitored.

However, the documents also noted the limits of Ankara's regional ambitions. For example, in 1959, it was assessed that a possible Turkish military action against Iraq could not be carried out without consulting Washington due to dependence on American logistics.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes's demands for more support from the US became visible, especially in his direct meetings with American officials.

It was reported that in April 1955, Adnan Menderes told US Ambassador Warren that Washington did not appreciate Turkey's critical importance and was constantly criticizing his government due to inflation. In September 1956, it was reported that Menderes complained that the US did not attach enough importance to the Middle East and viewed Turkey as a minor partner.

Economic crisis is seen as Turkey's primary weakness in American assessments after 1955. Inflation, the need for credit, and the inability to implement stabilization measures were addressed not only as economic indicators but also in terms of the government's resilience and their effects on Turkey's foreign policy choices.

Following the Soviet offer of economic aid in 1956, American representatives in Ankara stated that Turkey might risk negotiating with Moscow to get out of its predicament. In another assessment, it was suggested that Menderes might accept Soviet aid to protect his own political position. In 1957, it was reported that while the poor economic situation could make Soviet offers attractive, there was no sign that Turkey would change its foreign policy line.

In the documents, it was assessed that the demonstrations targeting non-Muslim citizens on September 6-7, 1955, were too well-organized to have occurred spontaneously. Pointing out that communists did not have such power, the possibility of government involvement was indicated.

The Cyprus tension was also not monitored solely as a foreign policy issue. In 1958, it was commented that Menderes could neutralize his opponents within the party by creating a nationalistic atmosphere over Cyprus.

American assessments of Menderes appear to have hardened over time.

During the cabinet crisis in 1955, it was commented that Menderes did not realize the scale of the opposition within the DP until the government resigned. In the 1956 report titled "Turkey as an Ally," it was stated that the harsh measures he applied against opponents damaged his prestige in the US and the West.

After 1957, control over the radio and the Anatolian Agency, the restriction of parliamentary debates, and pressures on the opposition were reported as the government's attempts to increase political control.

It was also reported that Ahmet Emin Yalman was arrested due to an article he translated from the American press. It was conveyed that the author of the article in question argued that Turkey was ruled by a dictatorship despite its constitutional and republican institutions, and that interference in democratic life had been normalized.

In the 1959 documents, it was stated that the CHP had brought to the agenda criticizing the DP for bowing to the US, giving the control of American bases to Turkey, and withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact; in contrast, it continued to see NATO as the foundation of Turkish foreign policy.

In a separate assessment, it was noted that the US's silence in the face of the government's pressures could be interpreted by the CHP as tacit support given to the Menderes administration.

The Kurdish issue was reported through Soviet and Iraqi propaganda, security contacts with Iran, and the possibility of an independent Kurdistan. Predictions that some separatist Kurdish leaders could take advantage of the power vacuum after May 27 found their place in the documents.

It was specifically stated that communists were not directly decisive regarding the student demonstrations before May 27 and that the actions did not carry an anti-American character.

In the assessments prepared in May, the discontent within the DP, the students' actions, and the mobility in the lower ranks of the army were addressed together.

The report dated May 23 predicted that Menderes could not grasp the scale of the discontent and that this could result in a military intervention. This appears to be an accurate assessment made just four days before the coup. However, the fact that it was written at the end of April that there were no signs of the army taking action also shows that American intelligence assessments could not clearly read the intervention for a long time.

After May 27, the focus of American assessments was the foreign policy orientation of the new regime. It was specifically noted that the National Unity Committee announced that the intervention was only against the Menderes administration and that the partnership with the US and commitment to NATO would continue.

Despite doubts about President Cemal Gürsel's real power and personal capacity, it was stated that he was not anti-American. The appointment of a figure with NATO and United Nations experience, such as Selim Sarper, as Minister of Foreign Affairs was also reported.

It was additionally noted that General Refik Tulga, who was appointed as the Governor and Mayor of Istanbul, had previously served as a military attaché in the US and was known as being extremely pro-American.

In summary, signs that foreign policy continuity was maintained came to the fore.