On TÜSİAD’s ‘democratic concern’

The fact that the president and a High Advisory Council member of the “Turkish Industry and Business Association” (TÜSİAD) offered relatively constructive and legitimate criticisms regarding the functioning of the ‘system,’ only to be met first with harsh statements from the Minister of Justice and then the President, followed shortly by lawsuits and detentions against TÜSİAD executives, has now become a classic. Political and social opposition is under immense pressure and is effectively being intimidated. After bar associations and trade unions representing the working class, the filing of this lawsuit and the detention of executives from Turkey’s most deep-rooted ‘traditional’ bourgeois business organization—whose member companies form the lifeblood of the Turkish economy—has sparked justified public reaction, unease, and debate. In the past, a similar process occurred on February 28, 1997. The National Security Council (MGK) of that era made certain demands of the government, and during the conflict between the government and the military, Turkey’s five major civil society organizations (Türk-İş, DİSK, TÜSİAD, TESK, TOBB) stated that they were in agreement with the MGK. Indeed, in the media of that time, this situation was evaluated as a “civil memorandum for democracy” and was criticized by various Islamic, leftist, and democratic circles. How could those who are ‘civil’ receive briefings from the ‘military’—from ‘officialdom’—and take a side with them?

Historically in Turkey, the private sector (the capital class) has always been dependent on the state and governments, growing with state incentives and support. In the Republic’s modernization project, within the design of a secular state with a Western appearance, economic development and industrialization became a ‘national ideal of the state’ as part of the process of “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations.” This state ideal, influenced by global developments and markets in the West, began to change in the 1950s and with the liberalization policies followed by Özal in the 1980s. Of course, that could be the subject of another article.

TÜSİAD’s relations with the state/government have been problematic from time to time. Undoubtedly, from a dialectical perspective, this is normal and welcome. The reason for the association’s problematic relationship with the state is linked to its founding philosophy and mission. In the association’s founding charter, commitment to Atatürk and the republic, the secular rule of law, contemporary market economy principles, and universal human rights and freedoms are at the forefront. The academic reports, declarations, and advertisements placed in newspapers by the association have been disturbing because they contain criticism of the political power. For example, the report titled "Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey," which TÜSİAD had Bülent Tanör prepare in 1997, also caused polemics and was criticized at the time. This report argued that a free market economy could only develop in an environment where participatory, pluralistic, and socially balanced democratic structures exist in the background. For TÜSİAD, democratic concern was at the forefront as a matter of principle.

THE MANIFESTATION OF DEEP CULTURAL DIVISIONS IN CIVIL SOCIETY

In the history of Turkish society, the tradition of ‘polarization’ or ‘factionalism’ is a known sociological phenomenon. Deep historical and cultural divisions, which began with the Committee of Union and Progress tradition in the late Ottoman period and continued with the Republic, have colored politics and civil society in every era. On one surface of the ongoing polarization are secular (laic), progressive liberal, and Western-modernist segments; on the other surface are relatively traditional, rural, Eastern, conservative, and Islamic segments. The political, economic, cultural, and social conflicts and struggles for interest between these two poles have closely affected Turkey’s processes of becoming a state, a democracy, and a civil and civilized society. Civil society, in particular, constitutes the ‘litmus test’ of this process.

Looking only at business organizations is sufficient to understand around which values and principles the ‘polarization’ is woven. For example, it is observed that the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSİAD) was established against TÜSİAD, which was founded in the 1970s. The prefix ‘Mü’ is read as Muslim and gives an idea about the socio-economic basis and ideological orientation of the association. MÜSİAD defends high technology and economic development with a vision of ‘high morality - high technology’ without compromising ‘national and spiritual’ values. It will be remembered that in Anatolia, centers such as Kayseri, Gaziantep, Konya, and Denizli, which rivaled Istanbul capital, were referred to with the concept of ‘Anatolian Tigers’ due to their ‘economic leap.’ MÜSİAD’s vision of civil society sees supreme divine truth, Islamic spirituality, and morality as the main reference source for daily life.

Just as criticisms directed at the system from the window of values and norms that guide MÜSİAD’s civil society practice are not to be dismissed, TÜSİAD’s voicing of the shortcomings it sees regarding the functioning of the system should also be met with respect. The fact that representatives of both paradigms in the field of civil society express their thoughts on the course of the country and the economy, and on the functional operation of the social system as a whole, at different times, contributes to maintaining the balance between the state and civil society. It is of critical importance for pluralistic democracy that civil and autonomous structures, which should be in different but equal positions, create a solid ground for political actors through channels of solidarity and dialogue and produce common denominators for the future.

A VIBRANT AND INDEPENDENT CIVIL SOCIETY IS THE HEART OF DEMOCRACY

In Turkey, a strong, organized, and democratic civil society is a prerequisite for the democratization of state, society, and individual relations; for the strengthening of participatory democracy, the limitation of the powers of the authoritarian state, the institutionalization of rights, law, and justice, and the rooting of individual freedoms and a pluralistic culture. Although the President responded to TÜSİAD’s criticisms regarding the “collapse of the system” by saying, ''You may miss the old Turkey, but you will learn to know your place in the new Turkey. If you are a business association, you will learn to behave like a business association. You will not incite the nation, you will not provoke the institutions of the state. You will not try to put pressure on the judiciary. TÜSİAD, you will learn to know your place,” TÜSİAD is a civil society organization founded by businessmen, that is, an important part of a democratic pressure group. For this reason, as the Minister of Justice stated, it is a democratic right for civil society organizations to express their opinions. Protecting and guaranteeing this right is possible with a strong notion of the rule of law.

The most important contribution of civil society and the organizations representing it to the democratization process is to pave the way for the process of accountability for the actions and transactions of politicians and administrators by developing a ‘public morality.’ A vibrant and vigilant civil society is one of the most important tools that erodes the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. In modern democracies, civil society organizations undertake the function of limiting the power and arbitrary practices of the government. They ensure that the accountability of governments to society is realized. The criticism, suggestion, and advocacy of TÜSİAD as a civil pressure group gain meaning precisely at this point.