Youth in search of their future

The government's narrowing of the political and public sphere, its stifling of dissenting voices, and its refusal to abandon the politics of polarization are deepening the economic crisis and escalating tensions. The biased behavior of the country's institutions and bureaucrats, who should remain neutral, is shaking trust in the social system. In a period where hope is fading, feelings of helplessness are intensifying, and the pursuit of rights is being suppressed, a 'civil resistance movement' is raising its voice.

The outside world is also turning its sensors toward these crowds, which are gathering like snowballs in the squares and crying out. From a Western perspective, civil resistance movements that emerge from the bottom up—that is, from the people—in societies that are relatively Eastern, Muslim, centralist, closed, and have a weak tradition of seeking rights, seem surprising. This is because it is known that in non-Western societies where the tradition of a strong state and the control of religion over society are limitless, tolerance for different voices and demands is limited. Civil society movements are weak and powerless. Urban individual attitudes and behaviors have not been socialized. Rights have not been claimed; they have always been granted by the state.

After the “Gezi Park Movement” and the “Great March for Justice,” the protest actions that began in Saraçhane and spread in waves across Anatolia point to an important threshold in terms of political rupture. It is noteworthy that people from very different classes, statuses, identities, affiliations, and cultural backgrounds are reacting to injustices with a “supra-political civil resistance movement.” The large squares of cities are witnessing the outcry and rebellion of the ‘suppressed silent masses.’ In truth, it was not foreseen that desperate people, preoccupied with their own survival due to the whirlwind of price hikes and the struggle to make ends meet, would object to the government so strongly and pour into the streets. Moreover, until recently, political public opinion polls in Turkey indicated that trust in political institutions was declining, and the perception that “neither this government nor this opposition can solve” the country's direction and economic problems had become internalized.

Pressures on political and social opposition have intensified. Lawsuits are being filed at lightning speed against professional chambers, bar associations, associations, unions, and media organizations that express their criticisms out of concern for the country's direction, and arrests are being made. It is as if the opposition is being intimidated. In the climate of fear that has emerged, in a conjuncture where dissenting voices, academia, the press, and civil society are silenced and the pursuit of rights is suppressed, the masses flowing into the squares, and especially the youth, have become the harbingers of political change and the future with their courageous actions.

The ways in which the young people participating in the protests join in, their activism, and their demands open the door to the construction of a positive sociology oriented toward the future. The opposition and the government must carefully understand the meaning and messages of this sociology blossoming in Saraçhane and establish empathy, without resorting to quick and simplistic approaches. Undoubtedly, the orientation of every new social movement that flares up from time to time in the world and in Turkey must be analyzed within its own context, that is, within the ‘historicity and sociality’ of the period. The “68 movement” that started in France, the “78 movement” in Turkey, the “trade union labor movement,” the “Anti-Globalization Movements,” the “Arab Spring,” and the “Gezi Park Movement” must be evaluated within the political and socio-economic matrix of their own time. Even if periods, places, and trends change, the masses who have rebelled throughout the ages have had unchanging common demands. Class exploitation between the oppressor and the oppressed, the lack of equal opportunity in accessing rights, and the lack of justice and democracy have always existed as universal demands of humanity. It was the desire to live in a fairer, more humane, and civilized society that was being demanded in the streets.

There is no doubt that the protest movement sparked by the arrest of İmamoğlu has aspects that both intersect with and diverge from the Gezi Park movement. It was not a political party or a civil society organization that lit the fuse in Gezi. Some distinctive features of the young crowd that has been filling the squares for the last 10 days can be mentioned. First of all, it is true that it is a crowd mobilized by the CHP, but not all participants are CHP members. In a process triggered by the authoritarian culture, partisanship, arbitrariness, injustice, unfairness, and deep poverty laid down by the government, at the end of the day, the citizen said “enough is enough,” “this is too much.” It was the cry of those who cannot make ends meet, those who worry about their children's future, the injustice in job interviews, the country being turned into a warehouse for refugees, and the demand for a fairer Turkey that was rising from the squares and streets.

The harsh and exclusionary rhetoric of the government, which lacks the ability to calmly analyze what is happening, and the attitude of ‘apparatchik pens’ and ‘trolls’ on social media and TV screens that marginalize, criminalize, and devalue the masses seeking their rights, have fueled the crowds more and more every day. In particular, interpreting the participants' actions with abstract “grand narratives” such as ‘a game of foreign powers,’ ‘provocation by marginal groups,’ or an attempted coup against the national will, etc., has inflamed the anger of the mobilized crowd.

The “Gezi Park Movement” was a cosmopolitan movement that emerged independently and spontaneously from political parties and civil society organizations. The movement started with the reaction to the cutting down of trees in the park to build a shopping mall. It gained momentum with the innocent sit-in protests of young people who stood up for their city, their square, their environment, and their nature. It developed as a horizontal, leaderless movement organized from the grassroots. People from different political spectrums or “Generation Z” youth who were uninterested in politics met in the squares for “common issues.” Humor and solidarity were very intense. Colorful images were formed. However, as the crowds grew later, the nature and direction of the movement changed. The movement, which started with the protection of the park and trees, gradually turned into a protest social movement directed against capitalist urbanization, commercialization, exploitation, and commodification.

What makes the İmamoğlu protests in the squares over the last 10 days unique and important is that participation has gradually increased in reaction to oppression, violence, and arrests, and that students and young people form the core of this. What was valuable was that the reaction to the heartlessness deemed appropriate for opposition political actors in the person of İmamoğlu—which was felt by those who think that political parties do not create a channel for them to express themselves, and where civil society membership is weak—became visible in urban, public spaces. In essence, demands such as the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the defense of the right to vote and be elected, and the neutrality of the public sector formed the common goal and motivation of the actions.

These young people who took to the squares mainly came from university campuses, boycotting their classes and exams. These young people, born in 2000 and later, have seen no government other than the AKP government. They were very angry about the banning of university festivals, municipal concerts, and festivals. According to the “Changing Face of Turkey” research by the Data Institute, headed by Bekir Ağırdır, 25 percent of the cluster defined as the “pessimistic youth” of the metropolis are struggling to make ends meet. Only 13 percent are satisfied with their lives; again, only 1.4 percent are satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Turkey in general. 71 percent are afraid that their freedom will be restricted. 57 percent define themselves as ‘Kemalist’ and 30 percent as ‘Nationalist.’ 53 percent want to live outside of Turkey in the future. In short, these data reveal the reality of a hopeless and angry youth who see themselves as having ‘no future’ in their own homeland.