Euro
Arrow
55,6247
Dollar
Arrow
49,8298
Sterling
Arrow
66,3839
Gold
Arrow
6485,3204
BIST 100
Arrow
11.165
Home > Authors > Prof. Dr. Özkan Yıldız > From Chiapas to Paris: A search for a new life and politics

From Chiapas to Paris: A search for a new life and politics

X Facebook WhatsApp Mail SUBSCRIBE Google News
Published: 29.10.2026 06:00

“We have been sold yet another lie called history. The lie that hope has been defeated, the lie that dignity has been defeated, the lie that humanity has come to an end.”

-Zapatista Army of National Liberation, First Intercontinental Declaration Against Neoliberalism- January 1996

Why are the protests started by high school students in France growing? Are the actions spreading from Paris to different cities in Europe a sign of deepening social unrest and dissatisfaction with the current order? What are the economic, political, and sociological dynamics fueling this anger? Is the relationship between the repulsiveness of the poor South and the attractiveness of the wealthy North changing on a global scale? Do the reactions of young people spilling into the streets form a new line in the search for new social and political alternatives?

Social movements in different parts of the world, ranging from peaceful protests to acts of ‘civil disobedience,’ are making objections to the economic and political order visible. The high cost of living, financial hardship, and anxiety about the future are deepening the discontent accumulating in societies. City squares are turning into spaces where the demand for a fairer and more humane life is voiced. However, mainstream media often misses the big picture by focusing only on images of violence rather than the social causes and demands of these movements.

The ‘End of History’ Discourse and Neoliberal Transformation

There was a time when it was argued that ideologies had ended, that the end of history had been reached, and that capitalist globalization had achieved a definitive victory. The idea that an alternative economic and social order was not possible also influenced the orientations of centrist politics in Europe. Despite different political discourses in the strong economies of the European Union (EU)—France, the UK, and Germany—market-centered policies largely persisted. This is how the great decline began.

The different political lines of Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, and Angela Merkel intersected at certain periods in market-oriented economic policies. The social costs of this transformation became evident over time. Income and wealth inequalities deepened, the protective functions of the welfare state weakened, and precariousness became widespread in different areas of life. As trust in centrist politics eroded, radical right-wing populist movements based on xenophobia and exclusionary nationalism gained strength. In Europe, centrist politics is seeking a remedy in the search for an effective social and political alternative in the face of this rise. The support provided by billionaires with economic and political power on digital platforms to some radical right-wing movements is also an important dimension of this transformation.

The welfare state that strengthened in Europe after the Second World War provided social security through mechanisms such as education, healthcare, pensions, and unemployment insurance. The expansion of industrial production and regular employment supported the contribution of economic growth to social welfare. However, in the subsequent period, the transformation in the production structure, privatizations, and the spread of flexible working forms put pressure on these gains.

With the transition from the Fordist production model to post-Fordist production and employment forms, job security weakened, labor relations became flexible, and precarization became widespread. The decline of union organization and the weakening of collective bargaining power made it easier to transfer the costs of economic crises to employees. Thus, despite the increase in production and wealth, inequalities between social segments deepened.

The “alternative globalization movements” that rose from the late 1990s onwards made objections to this transformation visible on an international scale. These movements argued that the wealth created by globalization was not shared equally and that economic power and political decision-making processes were concentrated in narrow circles. The fundamental criticism of globalization is based not on the existence of global ties, but on the unjust distribution of the gains obtained and the burden placed on the masses. In this direction, the fight against inequality includes fair taxation of high incomes, quality education, employee participation in management, and the regulation of migration. All these demands essentially reflect the search of societies for a balanced, strong, and fair order in distribution.

Arab Spring, Gezi, and the Yellow Vests: The Search for a Fair World

The 2008 global economic crisis increased unemployment and financial hardship while deepening social insecurities. Large segments of the population, who bore the cost of the crisis, took their reactions to the economic and political order to the streets. This wave, extending from the ‘Arab Spring’ in Tunisia and Egypt to the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement and protests in Europe, brought a common question to the agenda: If democracy is based on the will of the people, why are people ineffective in the face of decisions that determine their own lives?

The ‘Gezi Park’ protests that emerged in Turkey in 2013 were also one of the unique examples of this global wave of objection. The movement, which started with the demand to protect the park, soon turned into a broad social reaction including demands for the right to the city, freedoms, environmental sensitivity, and participation in decision-making processes. Bringing together different social segments, “Gezi” made the search for a freer, more equal, and participatory life visible. Developing outside of traditional political organizations, not relying on a clear leadership structure, and bringing together different political tendencies were among the distinctive features of the movement.

France, on the other hand, has been one of the historical centers of struggles for freedom, equality, and popular sovereignty since the “Enlightenment thought” and the “1789 Revolution.” The critical thinking tradition that developed with the contributions of thinkers such as Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Descartes, and Sartre has also been influential in the country's history of social struggles. Jean-Luc Godard’s cinema, especially during the 1968 youth movements, made the youth rebellion, class inequalities, and criticisms of the capitalist order visible.

Youth’s Anxiety About the Future

The protests started by high school students in France in late September spread across the country in a short time. Reactions to problems in the education system eventually combined with dissatisfaction regarding the cost of living, unemployment, and social inequality. The actions, which became massive in October, brought the objections of young people to current economic conditions and their demands for a humane life to the agenda. Similar protests seen in different European countries have also reopened the debate on the relationship between economic insecurity and social discontent.

Young people are increasingly affected by income inequality, precarious employment, and economic uncertainty. Anxiety about the future is not limited to unemployed youth; it spreads to broad segments from unemployed graduates to professional practitioners. The weakening of the expectation of providing social mobility through education also affects the future visions of young people and their trust in institutions.

According to the World Inequality Report 2026, while 53 percent of global income is concentrated in the hands of the richest 10 percent, the poorest 50 percent receive only 8 percent. The inequality in wealth distribution is even more pronounced: while the richest 10 percent own 75 percent of total wealth, the share of the poorest half remains at only 2 percent.

These data show that inequality is not limited to income and wealth distribution; it also affects opportunities for education, housing, social mobility, and political participation. Therefore, it is not sufficient to explain social discontent only through economic indicators. In addition to inequalities, problems of political representation, distrust in institutions, and weakening expectations for the future must be evaluated together.

The Political Transformation of Social Anger

Deepening inequalities in distribution relations increase social discontent while fueling new political searches and forms of collective objection. As party systems and voter behavior in Europe transform, traditional class-based political affiliations weaken; political preferences are reshaped around new social cleavages.

This transformation is related not only to economic inequalities but also to the erosion of political representation and distrust in existing institutions. Although the historical and political conditions of different movements, from Chiapas to Gezi, from the Arab Spring to the streets of Paris, are separate from each other, they can be discussed around a common question: Is a fairer, freer, and more humane life possible?

The real issue today is not the existence of social anger, but what political and social searches this anger will turn into. Whether these searches can create a lasting change depends on how the demands are organized, the openness of democratic participation channels, and the development of policies that will reduce inequalities.

Author's Latest Articles All Articles