While Turkey was signing the Mecca Agreement, the Arabs supported Greece

The memorandum on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, signed between Turkey and Libya in 2019, has led to a recalculation of strategies in the Mediterranean following its recent ratification by the House of Representatives in eastern Libya. With this signature, both conflicting parties in Libya have effectively accepted the memorandum signed with Turkey. This step is undoubtedly significant not only for foreign policy but also for internal political balances in Libya.

Greece reacted immediately after the signing, as did the Greek Cypriot Administration, which Turkey does not recognize as a state. Another development occurred: Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) issued a joint statement against Turkey and Libya. The Greek Foreign Minister read this statement at the United Nations on Monday.

These developments indicate that Greece and the Greek Cypriots may make new moves in Cyprus as well. The Greek Cypriots, whom the European Union made a full member by disregarding both international agreements and its own rules, have thus met with Greece under the EU umbrella. Backed by the US as well as the European Union, they are pressuring Turkey and the TRNC. They want to extract concessions. The Greek Cypriots, who want the entire island of Cyprus immediately, have certainly been emboldened by the willing and concession-ready attitudes of some politicians on the Turkish side (such as Mehmet Ali Talat and Mustafa Akıncı).

CYPRUS IS INDISPENSABLE

While the Cyprus issue stands out as a national cause in Greece, from the church to the communists, no such situation exists in Turkey. There is no longer the old sensitivity regarding this issue. The way the ruling party supported the Annan Plan is still in memory. The opposition is not very interested in this subject. The DEM Party already views the Cyprus issue from the same perspective it views other issues. It looks from Brussels, it looks from Athens, it looks from Yerevan.

Greece is arming islands that have a non-military status, contrary to agreements. There is no strong reaction from Turkey. Although Greece has occupied more than 20 islands and islets belonging to Turkey, Turkey is not taking the necessary steps. Retired Staff Colonel Ümit Yalım, the former Secretary General of the Ministry of National Defense, has been keeping this issue on the agenda alone for years. He works tirelessly to inform the public.

For Turkey, Cyprus is not just land; it is a homeland. It is strategic in terms of air and maritime security. It is important with the energy wealth surrounding it. With its geopolitical position, it is critical for Eurasia.

Contrary to the claims of liberals and "number-crunching" republicans who advocate the "give it up and be done with it" thesis for Cyprus, the importance of Cyprus has not diminished. It has increased.

Cyprus cannot be seen as a condition for Turkey's EU membership. The EU will never make Turkey a member. However, by promising membership, it is stalling Turkey at Europe's gates and trying to extract as many concessions as possible from Turkey. The European Union's stance on the so-called genocide allegations, its stance on disputes in the Aegean Sea, its stance on the PKK and FETÖ terrorist organizations, and its stance on the status of the Patriarchate are all the same. Brussels is both defending Athens' theses and using Athens to cover up the reluctance in other European capitals regarding Turkey's membership. Athens, on the other hand, conducts foreign policy with Brussels behind it.

Thanks to the Customs Union signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1996, we are faced with a Brussels that has gained great influence over Turkey's domestic market, customs regime, and foreign trade regime, and that gets what it wants economically from Turkey without making it a member. Turkey entered the Customs Union without being a member of the European Union. It is not at the table where decisions are made, but it is obliged to comply with the decisions taken. Moreover, these decisions are binding not only in relations with EU members but also in relations with third countries. The Customs Union is similar to the Balta Liman Treaty signed by the Ottoman Empire with England in 1838.

WHAT SHOULD TURKEY DO?

Turkey must see this: Turkey's European Union membership is primarily related to where the European Union wants to see itself in world politics and how it positions itself.

If Brussels wants to be a first-class actor on a global scale and is willing to bear the cost of this, it will make Turkey a member. If, however, Brussels does not want to be like ambitious and great powers such as the US, China, and Russia, but rather wants to continue its path as an economic giant but a political and military dwarf, and live under the umbrella of the US and NATO, then no matter what Turkey does, it will not take Turkey into the European Union. In the current situation, Brussels has chosen this second path.

Turkey's population is not a population that the European Union can easily digest. Turkey's geographical location frightens Europeans because if it were a full member, Turkey's borders would be the European Union's borders, meaning the European Union would be neighbors with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. According to the Europeans, the ideal is to tie Turkey tightly to Europe's gates, extract many concessions with the promise of membership, and keep it as a buffer between Europe and the Middle East. Knowing this, whenever Europeans think of European defense and security, and whenever they think of a Europe that can act even slightly autonomously from the US, they voice formulas that contemplate benefiting from the Turkish Army as much as possible without making Turkey an EU member.

Turkey should both put pressure on Brussels to discuss the articles of the Customs Union that are against Turkey, and give up on the dream of membership that will never be possible, withdraw its full membership application, and think of formulas that will establish an equal relationship based on mutual interest with the European Union. However, these should not be vague, uncertain formulas like "privileged partnership" or "special relationship" that aim to tie Turkey to Europe's gates. The framework must be clear.