Who holds the power in Iran?

As the US-Iran tension continues, significant appointments have been made in the upper echelons of Iran's military and political hierarchy. These appointments are important not only for reorganizing the command structure under wartime conditions but also for the future of power balances in Iran. In particular, the appointment of hardliners and figures from the security bureaucracy to critical positions reinforces assessments that Tehran aims to create a more centralized and coordinated structure against both external threats and potential new internal security issues. This situation also brings up the debate over whether these appointments represent a restructuring of power centers in Iran or a strategic step regarding how the regime will manage the next phase.

The announcement that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a meeting lasting approximately seven hours with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on August 10 also drew attention in this context. The fact that Khamenei has not appeared in public for a long time and the length of the meeting further increased its significance. 

Military Structure Being Reorganized

It is observed that figures with security and military backgrounds have come to the fore in the recent appointments in Iran. The appointment of Hossein Taeb, who was the first head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence apparatus and previously served in the Basij organization, to the Basij Command is noteworthy in this respect. 

With the appointment of Ali Abdullahi as Chief of General Staff, a significant change was also made in the military command structure. The appointment of Kioumars Heydari as Deputy Chief of General Staff, Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC Commander, Mostafa Izadi as Deputy Chief of Staff, and Ali Azmai as Navy Commander shows that Iran is reshaping its military structure according to wartime conditions.

One of the most striking elements of these changes was the step taken to strengthen operational coordination between the Iranian army and the Revolutionary Guards. A decision was made to merge the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, one of the most important coordination centers during wartime within the Iranian Armed Forces, with the General Staff. 

Therefore, it would be incomplete to evaluate military appointments only as a change of duty for certain individuals. The attempt to create a command center that will allow the decision-making mechanism to work faster during wartime and the re-strengthening of the Iranian army instead of the IRGC can be considered the most remarkable points. 

Critical Change in the Security Council

One of the most important changes in the political leg of this restructuring took place in the Supreme National Security Council. The appointment of former Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohsen Rezaee as the secretary of the council is a significant message for the future of Iran's security policy. 

Rezaee is a figure who has headed the IRGC for many years, played an important military role during the Iran-Iraq War, and later became influential in Iranian politics. For this reason, this appointment can be evaluated as strengthening the link between the security bureaucracy and the political decision-making mechanism.

It is known that there were disagreements between the president and the supreme leader during this appointment process, and that Pezeshkian took a stance in favor of the previous secretary, Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr. However, the appointment of Rezaee does not mean that this difference has turned into a direct political conflict. Positive assessments in Pezeshkian's statements show that they are acting within the framework of national interests.

Therefore, this change should not be interpreted as a direct power struggle between Pezeshkian and the supreme leadership office. On the contrary, it would be more accurate to evaluate it as part of the new restructuring between political power centers. 

However, although there are comments that these appointments are intended to limit the power of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Revolutionary Guards Commander Ahmad Vahidi, it can actually be said that "these people are not powerful on their own, but are powerful through their connections." 

How Effective Is Pezeshkian?

One of the important questions regarding recent developments in Iran is to what extent Pezeshkian is effective within the current power balances. The recent appointments show that the presidency is not completely outside the decision-making mechanism, but is also not in the final decisive position.

It is also not possible to say that Pezeshkian is left out of the process. The appointment of Zolqadr as the supreme leader's political advisor and the appointment of Rezaee as the Council secretary show that relationships between different power centers are being reshaped.

The appointment of Ali Abdullahi as Chief of General Staff directly by Mojtaba Khamenei once again revealed that the final authority in the military command echelon lies with the supreme leadership office. In contrast, Pezeshkian's appointment of Mohsen Rezaee as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council shows that the presidency's role in shaping security policies has not completely disappeared.

For this reason, it seems more accurate to evaluate Pezeshkian's current position not as an "actor who has taken control," but as one of the important political actors trying to create a balance between different power centers in Iran.

The Internal Front Is Also Being Taken Into Account 

It is also not sufficient to evaluate the appointments only in the context of the ongoing conflict with the US and Israel.

Iran is also facing serious economic problems, social unrest, and the possibility of new protests. Therefore, the restructuring of the security bureaucracy means strengthening military capacity against external threats and also consolidating internal security mechanisms.

The appointment of Hossein Taeb to the Basij Command is also considered an important step in this regard. Considering the duties Taeb has undertaken in both intelligence and the Basij in the past, the appointment can be read not only as a military preference but also as a quest to strengthen the state's internal security capacity against possible social movements.

Therefore, the Iranian administration is facing a two-dimensional security equation: on one side, the external security pressure created by the ongoing conflict with the US and Israel, and on the other, the internal security risk created by economic problems and social unrest. The recent appointments can be evaluated as part of an effort to respond to these two threats simultaneously.

Is Power in One Hand? 

All these developments raise a more fundamental question in Iran: Is power being concentrated in a single center again, or is a multi-centered decision-making structure emerging?

During the Ali Khamenei era, the strategic decision-making mechanism in Iran was largely shaped around the supreme leadership office. Following Mojtaba Khamenei's appointment to the supreme leadership position in March, his lack of regular public appearances has raised questions about the mechanism through which decisions are made. There are different claims about Mojtaba Khamenei's health status and actual decision-making capacity. For this reason, it is not possible to reach a definitive judgment at this stage on the extent to which the supreme leadership office actually functions in Iran. 

However, the recent appointments show that the decision-making mechanism is not dependent on the will of a single person, and that a coordination mechanism has been formed between military commanders, the Revolutionary Guards, the supreme leadership circle, the presidency, and other security institutions.

From one perspective, this structure may ensure the continuity of the regime. Because removing the decision-making mechanism from being dependent on a single person and distributing it among different institutions may increase the resilience of the regime. However, an increase in the number of power centers may also bring the risk of inter-institutional competition and jurisdictional conflict in the long run. 

The Future of Iran

The recent appointments are not the sole proof that Iran will shift to a tougher line in foreign policy. However, it is clear that the weight of the security and military bureaucracy has increased, a more centralized command structure suitable for wartime conditions has been created, and internal security has been re-prioritized. Strengthening the internal front signals that Iran will move to a position of deterrence against the outside. 

For the Iranian administration, the real issue is to maintain the balance between the military and economic costs created by the war and internal political stability. As the cost of the war abroad rises, the deepening of economic problems at home and the continuation of uncertainty regarding the leadership office may increase the pressure the regime is facing.

For this reason, the real meaning of the recent appointments should be sought not only in the question of "who was appointed to which position," but in "the new power balances created by these names."

A strong security and military coordination mechanism may be being created in Iran today. However, it is not yet clear whether this mechanism will lead to a single-centered administration or a multi-centered structure where different actors reach a consensus in the long run.

The most critical question also arises here: How much longer can Iran manage the uncertainty around the leadership office?

Especially with the leadership crisis emerging clearly on top of the high cost created by the war, it could create a much heavier political and institutional cost for the Iranian administration. For this reason, in the coming period, not only the course of the war but also how the distribution of power in Tehran will be shaped will be one of the fundamental elements determining the future of Iran.

Critical Question

And after all these developments, the most critical questions awaiting an answer for Iran are: If Mojtaba Khamenei is ill, how can he hold a 7-hour meeting? Will Khamenei's visibility in public be restored, or will the current uncertainty be a harbinger of a different political transition?